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ABSTRACT 
 
THE (NON-)TERRITORIALIZATION OF “KURDISTAN” IN THE MIDDLE EAST 
BETWEEN 1919 AND 1990: A CRITICAL GEOPOLITICAL APPROACH 
 
AKYOL-GÖZEN, Naz Duygu 
M.Sc., Department of International Relations 
Thesis Advisor: Assoc. Prof. Dr. Mustafa Serdar PALABIYIK 
 
 This thesis analyses the reasons of why a certain “Kurdistan” could not be 
established as a geopolitical entity within the Middle East between the years 1919 and 
1990. By using critical geopolitics as the theoretical framework, the thesis focuses on the 
effects of continuous deterritorialization and reterritorialization of the Kurdistan as a 
geopolitical entity as well as civilizational and ideological geopolitical discourses 
developed by four states in the region, being Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria. A threefold 
argument is proposed to explain why an independent or an autonomous Kurdistan could 
not be formed at the chosen time frame. The internal factors underline the traditional 
tribal and more recent territorial divisions among the Kurdish tribes preventing the 
Kurds to establish a common geopolitical discourse describing a particular and 
territorially-defined “Kurdistan”. The external factors emphasize the policies and 
geopolitical discourses developed by states to preserve their territorial integrity and to 
prevent any separatist tendency within their own states. Finally, the third set of factors 
cross-linked internal and external factors. It focuses on the cooperative and conflictual 
transversal connections between sovereign states and Kurdish political movements. 
Accordingly, some sovereign states tended to cooperate with the Kurdish groups of rival 
states in a way to undermine the power of the Kurdish groups within itself and some 
Kurdish political movements tended to cooperate with the neighboring state to 
undermine the power of the home state. All in all, the period between 1919 and 1990 
witnessed the failure of the projects to establish an autonomous if not an independent 
Kurdistan. 
Keywords: Kurdistan, Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Syria  
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ÖZ 
 
1919 VE 1990 YILLARI ARASINDA “KÜRDİSTAN”IN ORTADOĞU'DA 
SINIRSALLAŞ(AMA)MASI: 
ELEŞTİREL JEOPOLİTİK BİR YAKLAŞIM 
 
AKYOL-GÖZEN, Naz Duygu 
Yüksek Lisans, Uluslararası İlişkiler 
Tez Danışmanı: Doç. Dr. Mustafa Serdar Palabıyık 
 
Bu tez 1919 ve 1990 yılları arasında neden “Kürdistan” adı verilen belirli bir yapının 
Ortadoğu’da jeopolitik bir entite olarak ortaya çıkamadığının nedenlerini incelemektedir. 
Bunu yaparken, eleştirel jeopolitik yaklaşımını bir kuramsal çerçeve olarak kullanarak, 
bir taraftan Kürdistan’ın bir jeopolitik entite olarak sınırsallığının nasıl sürekli bir 
biçimde bozulduğuna ve yeniden tasarlandığına odaklanırken, diğer taraftan dört bölge 
devletinin, yani Türkiye, İran, Irak ve Suriye’nin ortaya koyduğu medeniyetçi ve 
ideolojik jeopolitik söylemleri analiz etmektedir. Buna göre ilk olarak iç faktörler olarak 
değerlendirilen Kürt kabileleri arasındaki geleneksel bölünme ve buna daha yakın 
zamanda eklenen sınırsal bölünmelerin, belirli ve sınırları tanımlanmış ortak bir 
Kürdistan söyleminin oluşumunu engellediği ileri sürülmüştür. İkinci olarak dış faktörler 
üzerinde durulmuştur. Bölge devletlerinin geliştirdiği politikalar ve jeopolitik söylemler 
onların toprak bütünlüğü konusunda hassasiyetini vurgularken ayrılıkçı herhangi bir 
politikaya izin verilmemesi sonucunu doğurmuştur. Son olarak iç ve dış faktörlerin bir 
araya gelmesi ile ortaya çıkan üçüncü bir neden de egemen devletler ve Kürt gruplar 
arasında geliştirilen işbirliği veya çatışma temelli çapraz sınır ötesi bağlardır. Buna göre 
bazı egemen devletler rakip devletlerin içindeki Kürt grupları kendi içlerindeki Kürt 
gruplara veya rakip devletin kendisine karşı kullanırken, bazı Kürt siyasi hareketleri de 
içlerinde bulundukları devletin gücünü zayıflatmak için rakip devletler ile işbirliği içine 
olmuştur. Bu sınır ötesi bağlantılar da ortak bir Kürdistan söyleminin önüne geçmiştir.  
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Kürdistan, Türkiye, İran, Irak, Suriye  
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In classical understanding of politics and international relations, geography has 
generally been described as the most static factor affecting political/geopolitical 
decisions of ruling elites and peoples. Accordingly, geography is perceived as something 
fixed; therefore it is argued that geography contributed to the policy-making process, not 
vice-versa. However, in reality geography in general and space in particular is not 
something stable; it changes over time as do the perceptions related to it. In other words, 
space is what the perceiver perceived of it, it is described or undescribed, it is prioritized 
or downgraded, it is praised or hated. Space, therefore, is value-laden and the value 
attached to it depends on three elements: who the perceiver is, what is perceived and 
when it is perceived. This triangular interrelationship among the perceiver, the perceived 
and time established a particular geopolitical discourse which attempts to display a 
certain understanding of a particular space. Thus as geography contributes to the policy-
making process, the politics itself is important in shaping the geopolitical discourse as 
well. 
In regions like the Middle East, where geographical have not always overlapped 
with the political boundaries, territory and people attached to it acquire an additional 
attention. Ernest Gellner believes that nationalism aims to construct one state for one 
ethnicity or one culture. Gellner has put forth the idea that a successful state emerges 
from this principle (Cuff, 2013). The plurality of identities on a particular piece of 
territory resulted in emergence of different and sometimes competing geopolitical 
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discourses. Sometimes the same territory was claimed by the ancestral homeland of a 
certain people and this claim was rejected by the other people as in the case of the 
Palestinian issue; sometimes a piece of territory turned out to attain a strategic 
significance that none of the rival states had difficulties in giving up sovereignty over 
there as in the case of the Gaza Strip, Kuwait or Shatt al Arab regions; sometimes a 
particular state is accused of extending its influence in the region by forming a particular 
geopolitical outlook as Iran has been accused of establishing “a Shia crescent”. Among 
these problematic geopolitical discourses in the Middle East the discourse developed on 
“Kurdistan” was one of the most complex and problematic discourses in the region. 
Addressing this quite quarrelling concept, this thesis attempts to discuss through a 
critical geopolitical theoretical frame the reasons why a particular geopolitical entity 
named “Kurdistan” could not emerge within the Middle East. Following the 
deterritorialization of the Middle East after the First World War, the Kurdish people 
have been reterritorialized within four territorial states, being Turkey, Iran, Iraq and 
Syria, resulting in the emergence of a transversal Kurdish issue. Today about 25 to 35 
million Kurds inhabit the region between Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria. They are the 
fourth largest ethnic group in the Middle East but they have never established an 
independent and territorially defined nation-state of their own (Jamil, 2006: 1027). The 
Kurdish issue in the region has become one of the main concerns of the given four 
states, which have defined Kurdistan as a threat to their territorial integrity and have 
administered their policies accordingly. 
 The concept of critical geopolitics was first used by Simon Dalby in the 1970s 
(Ingram, and Dodds, 2009: xi). It aims to re-examine epistemological assumptions and 
ontological commitments of classical geopolitics. In other words, critical geopolitics is a 
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construction of discourses that intend to scrutinize classical geopolitics. Critical 
geopolitics seeks to understand space, identity, vision and statecraft by questioning the 
very given meanings of these concepts. This field of geopolitics accepts the importance 
of geography in politics, but also argues that geopolitical discourses redefine the nature 
of geographical understanding of politics. Critical geopolitics not only developed a 
horizontal analytical framework focusing on different geopolitical discourses of different 
states or peoples; but also focuses on a vertical analytical framework questioning the 
transformation of geopolitical discourses over time. Accordingly, John Agnew defined 
three epochs of geopolitical discourses each of which focus on a different aspect of 
geographical knowledge being civilizational, naturalized and ideological geopolitics 
(Agnew, 1998: 85). Critical geopolitics makes use of post-structuralist theories. 
Although it does not emerge from post-structuralism, it investigates simplistic and 
dichotomical territorial representations (Kuus, 2009: 5-6). Hence geopolitical discourse 
turned out to be the basic analytical tool to understand geopolitics. As Gearoid Ó 
Tuathail argues, geopolitics must study discourses as discourses are representational 
practices of cultures. It is cultures that give meaning to words by means of narratives 
and images (van Efferink, 2009). 
 The main question that this thesis attempts to answer is why a particular 
geopolitical entity named “Kurdistan” could not be territorialized. The study has 
identified three factors preventing the emergence of Kurdistan as a concrete territorial 
entity. The first factor is the traditional tribal structure of the Kurdish communities. The 
Kurds had traditionally lived under tribal structures and the loyalty towards tribe is far 
stronger than the loyalty to a particular piece of territory. This limited the nationalist 
sentiments of Kurds as they preferred to prioritize their tribal rather than ethno-national 
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identity. After the World War I, a process of reterritorialization via the emergence of 
territorially defined states happened and the borders of these territorial states divided the 
Kurdish community. Hence in addition to tribal divisions, the Kurds were divided as 
minor ethnic groups in the newly established territorial states. This added a transversal 
rivalry to the existing tribal rivalry among the Kurds, which crippled the motivation of 
the Kurds in defending and fighting for an autonomous if not independent Kurdistan. 
The disunity among the Kurds created different geopolitical discourses of Kurdistan, 
while the borders prevented the emergence of a strong Kurdish transversal movement to 
establish a territorially defined state for the Kurds. As chances of a Greater Kurdistan 
appeared low, Kurdish people chose to fight for autonomy under Turkey, Iran and Iraq. 
In Syria it did not develop as such due to the political environment of the time. However 
still, even for the establishment of an autonomous political entity an undivided, 
determined and a strong nationalist movement was required. As Kurds failed in 
constructing the necessary foundations for such a successful movement, they found 
themselves in constant armed conflicts with sovereign states. Hence there emerged 
several rebellions in these states such as Sheikh Said rebellion in Turkey, Simko 
rebellion in Iran and Barzani rebellion in Iraq attempting to establish autonomous 
political entities; however, internal divisions among the Kurdish tribes as well as lack of 
enough transversal support resulted in their suppression by the sovereign states. 
 The second obstacle in front of the emergence of Kurdistan as a 
territorial/geopolitical entity was the sensitivity of the sovereign states on their territorial 
integrity. These states feared a process of deterritorialization through the construction of 
a Kurdistan and this fear resulted in the neglect of Kurdish political rights via a 
civilizational geopolitical discourse describing the Kurds as an uncivilized community 
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incapable of self-government. Accordingly, the sovereign states used civilizational 
geopolitics in order to subdue the Kurdish ethnic identity for promoting a singular 
national identity. Policies of nation building resulted in oppression of the Kurdish 
ethnicity, language and culture. The Kurdish community tried to voice its concerns and 
sought recognition of their cultural rights but the sovereign states generally closed the 
political arena radicalizing the Kurdish movement and resulting in armed conflicts and 
uprisings. With the Cold War, an additional threat perception emerged which began to 
label the Kurds as an ideological threat as well. Particularly in Turkey, the collaboration 
between Kurdish political movements and Turkish left alarmed the state for a 
communist threat posed by the Kurds. To a lesser degree, this was evident in Iran 
considering the collaboration between Tudeh, the Iranian communist party and the 
Kurds. Around this time ideological geopolitics appeared as an alternative to 
civilizational geopolitics. Meanwhile, some Kurdish political movements began to 
perceive the sovereign states through ideological geopolitical lenses as well and argued 
that the sovereign state had imperialist designs over the oppressed Kurds and accused 
the political elites of pursuing this oppression through collaborating with Kurdish 
landowners. Similarly, in Iraq and Syria, where pro-Soviet regimes had been established 
during the Cold War, Kurds were perceived as the tools of imperialist or former colonial 
states used for disturbing territorial integrity of home states. 
 The third obstacle in front of emergence of Kurdistan as a geopolitical entity 
stemmed from the combination of internal and external factors. Accordingly, although 
there have been a conflictual relationship between the home state and the Kurdish 
minority, there were transversal collaborations between states and Kurdish political 
movements. The transversal phenomena are a political practice that crosses boundaries 
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and questions the spatial logic through which these boundaries establish and conduct 
international relations (Bleiker, 2000: 2). A state might support the Kurdish political 
movement of its rival while a Kurdish group in a particular state could support the rival 
government of that particular state to undermine the power of the home state. For 
example, Muhammad Reza Shah of Iran provided Mulla Mustafa Barzani, a prominent 
Iraqi Kurdish leader with arms and in return asked for his support against Kurds of Iran. 
Barzani's coalition with Iran led to the isolation of the Iranian Kurds. Similarly, during 
the Iran-Iraq war, Ayatollah Khomeini of Iran supported the Iraqi Peshmergas to help 
weaken Iraq from within. The Kurdish community was not able to overcome such 
difficulties to claim for an independent or a self-governed political entity. 
 Having set the theoretical framework and basic arguments of this thesis, the 
reasons for selecting a particular period should be discussed as well. There are three 
principal reasons of conducting this research for the time frame between 1919 and 1990. 
First, the end of World War I dramatically altered the geopolitical composition of the 
region, deterritorializing the Ottoman Empire and transforming the Persian dynasty. The 
emergence of four territorially-defined states with a degree of authority over the Kurdish 
minority – Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria – make territorial integrity a top priority for these 
states in dealing with the Kurdish question. The end point of this study, namely the Gulf 
War of 1990-91 was another landmark event, after which the Kurdish question was 
tremendously transformed with emergence of a de-facto “Kurdistan” in Iraq and 
identification of Kurdish cantons in Syria in years to come. In other words, an argument 
for “non-emergence of Kurdistan as a geopolitical entity” is more supportable for the 
period between 1919 and 1990, where the sensitivity for territorial integrity was a 
common denominator for all regional states. Finally, the discipline of critical geopolitics 
7 
 
has argued for a multiplicity of geopolitical discourses after the Cold War. In other 
words, with the relative disappearance of ideological geopolitics, no geopolitical 
discourse emerges as a dominant one to describe geopolitical understanding. In other 
words, studying post-Cold War era would undermine the theoretical framework 
established by this thesis. 
 As to the methodology of this thesis, qualitative methods are preferred. Since the 
thesis uses critical geopolitics as its theoretical framework, discourse analysis has been 
used to investigate how sovereign states have enforced civilizational or ideological 
geopolitical discourses to deny the existence of Kurdistan as a self-governing entity. The 
political and the social context have been scrutinized to uncover the perceptions of 
Kurdistan among the Kurdish population as well as the sovereign states. In exemplifying 
the discourse analysis, case study approach is preferred as well with a comparative 
outlook comparing and contrasting not only different periods of Kurdish movements and 
rebellions but also different responses developed by the sovereign states. Therefore, by 
extending the chronological and territorial reach of this study, the cases examined in this 
thesis aimed to provide a holistic view of the perception of Kurdistan both domestically 
and externally.  
This attempted holistic perception is also one of the main weaknesses of this 
thesis, since the thesis attempts to cover a wider region and a wider time frame, which 
resulted in some shortcomings for in-depth analysis. Since this thesis did not focus on 
the Kurdish question of one particular state or one particular (more limited) period, it 
provides the reader with a general overview of why a particular “Kurdistan” could not 
emerge as a geopolitical entity. In other words, if the reader wishes to find out in-depth 
analysis for a particular state or period, the thesis might be disappointing. Therefore, in 
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order to present a more all-encompassing picture, the thesis might overlook some 
detailed examinations. A second and equally important limitation is the lack of referring 
to the primary resources particularly in Kurdish since the author of the thesis could not 
read Kurdish, a shortcoming which the author wishes to ameliorate by learning Kurdish 
in the years to come. Lastly, the emergence of nation states is related to the spread of 
capitalism. In order to not to further expand the study, the aspect of capitalism has been 
left out. 
The thesis is composed of three chapters. The first chapter is devoted to critical 
geopolitics, the theoretical framework of this thesis. In this chapter, emergence of the 
discipline of geopolitics, its basic tenets, the differences between classical and critical 
geopolitics as well as the concept of geopolitical discourse are tried to be examined. 
Particular attention was given to deterritorialization/ reterritorialization processes and 
the three geopolitical discourses approach designed by John Agnew, being the 
civilizational, naturalized and ideological geopolitics. The second chapter focuses on the 
non-emergence of Kurdistan as a geopolitical entity between the years of 1919 and 
1950. In this chapter, after discussing the Kurdish question in general and the concept of 
Kurdistan in particular within the Ottoman Empire and Qajar Persia the transformative 
process of World War I and the geopolitical effects of reterritorialization of the Middle 
East by colonial powers are discussed. After that the chapter goes on with the analysis of 
the impact of state/nation building in Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria on the 
conceptualization of Kurdistan, internal resistance of Kurdish people against imposition 
of a certain national identity and the failure of Kurdish movements as result of the 
factors discussed above. The third chapter examines the period between 1950 and 1990, 
when Kurdish movements became more politicized, radicalized and even militarized in 
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the Middle East. The additional ideological threat perception and specific policies 
designed by states to prevent this threat are discussed alongside with civilizational 
geopolitical discourses, which also continued in this period. Moreover, the 
intensification of transversal connections between states and various Kurdish political 
movements are examined in this chapter as well. The thesis ends with a general 
conclusion covering up the debates made throughout the thesis in a summarized and 
systematic way.   
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CHAPTER II 
 
CRITICAL GEOPOLITICS AND GEOPOLITICAL DISCOURSES 
 
 Geography shapes state policies and in return perceptions of geography shape 
international relations. Spaces, identities, images and statecraft are all interrelated and it 
is through these concepts that the world is “seen” and policies can be analyzed through 
representations. A critical inquiry on the perceptions of statecraft can reveal the 
reasoning behind policies why certain policies are preferred over the others and it can 
clarify the obscurities with regard to these choices. For decades, geopolitics appeared as 
a problem solving theory, but in reality geopolitics has tended to project projected 
merely conflicts and anxieties of certain great states in certain time frames. Critical 
geopolitics emerged from as a result of the critical inquiry against this great-power 
approach of classical geopolitics. This chapter will explain the roots of geopolitics, the 
foundations of critical geopolitics and the application of this critical inquiry study to the 
perception of “Kurdistan” as a geographical, political, and thus, as a geopolitical entity. 
 
2.1. What is Geopolitics? 
  At the dawn of the twentieth century there was a widespread belief that there 
were dramatic changes in the global economic and political system. A shift had occurred 
from a capitalist system based on steam, coal, and iron to gas, oil and electricity. 
American factories had started to implement a Fordist revolution and this had enabled 
the US to overthrow Britain as the global economic hegemon.  The fact that the US was 
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a land power on a continental scale had put more emphasis on railroad connections 
which was contrary to traditional European world order based generally on sea 
transportation. Simply this new type of transportation pointed toward a new relationship 
between spaces and state politics based more on land-based geopolitical approaches 
(Heffernan, 2000: 28-29). 
 This transformation was compounded with an upsurge in economic nationalism, 
which had begun against the cherished ideal of free trade. Geographical size had gained 
importance and had started to play an important role in defining national power but 
European states had a limited space on the European map. This led imperial powers to 
race for land from 1880s onwards. Starting from 1890s, the European inter-state system 
went through fundamental changes, defined by bipolar arrangements (Heffernan, 2000: 
28-30). A new field of study aspired to make a difference in understanding these three 
main dimensions of “geopolitical panic”, namely differentiation of resources, economic 
nationalism and imperialist rivalry, within nation-states, their borders, and state 
capacities. It was Rudolf Kjellen, a Swedish geographer, in 1899 who first introduced 
“Geopolitics” as a new scientific project (Ó Tuathail, 1994: 259). 
 The ascendancy of geopolitics can be said to have started in the late nineteenth 
century. However, the trajectory of political geographic thought can be traced back 
about 2,300 years. Aristotle had adapted a deterministic environmental study of Greece 
and pondered about requirements for boundaries and the interrelation between 
geographical size and territorial power. Greco-Roman geographer Strabo had researched 
how the Roman state functioned effectively despite its great size (Jones, Jones and 
Woods, 2004: 4). Sun Tzu, a Chinese general, who wrote between 400-320 BC, 
illustrated the view of geopolitics as a theater of military action. He especially 
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emphasized the importance of geopolitical knowledge such as calculating distances and 
the impact of topography and terrain (Gray and Sloan, 2013: 17). Ibn Haldun (1332 – 
1406), a notable Arab historian, noticed the similarity between organisms and the state. 
He theorized that just like people or communities, the state is born, then it grows, and 
eventually it gets old and dies. New states are formed in its place after its death, thus, the 
cycle continues. Thomas Hobbes (1588 – 1679) put forward sovereign states as the 
principle actors in international politics and Hugo Grotius (1583 – 1645) based the 
establishment of society on the law of nature (Brauch, n.d.). 
 Friedrich Ratzel's work in “Laws of the Spatial Growth of States” (1896) laid the 
foundations for modern geopolitics. Ratzel had a theory of a state as an organic entity. In 
1897, in his book Politische Geographie (Political Geography), Ratzel had used 
biological metaphors to describe the state; such an understanding had been 
overwhelmingly influenced by Darwinism. He believed that a state had to either grow or 
die in a constant struggle for adaptation within a political arena. Kjellen motivated by his 
opposition to Norwegian independence, believed in a notion of a state similar to 
Ratzel's. He considered the nation-state as an organism but did not employ biology only 
as an analogy. He used geopolitics to describe the physical structures of states. Kjellen 
built upon Ratzel's biological notions and suggested that states are dynamic and 
naturally grow with power. Culture was seen as the driving force behind the 
advancement of power. The more spirited and intense the culture, the more right a state 
had in expanding control over territory. Thus, borders were seen as movable and 
expandable concepts (Flint, 2006: 20). The state was perceived as an entity larger than 
individuals or communities residing within it and it was a product of interaction between 
people and nature that took place over centuries (Heffernan, 2000: 45). Even though 
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both Kjellen and Ratzel left room for statesmanship in their theories, geopolitics 
remained largely as a deterministic approach (Owens, n.d.). 
 The ascendancy of geopolitics became more visible from the nineteenth century 
until the end of the Second World War. During this period, Halford Mackinder marked a 
departure from sea-based theories of political power. His new map of the world under 
“The Natural Seats of Power” supported a new theory known as the Heartland Theory. 
Mackinder's theory identified a spatial determinism based on land power and land 
mobility. The German geopolitician, Karl Haushofer, on the other hand, perceived 
geopolitics as an important tool in education of statecraft and gave it a mission to set and 
attain political objectives (Haushofer, 2003: 33-35). However, an era of marginalization 
of geopolitics started after the blunder of the German geopolitics under the brutal and 
racist regime of the Nazis. Geopolitics was discredited as a serious academic pursuit and 
any associations with it were heavily criticized. 
 In the 1950s, an American geopolitician Richard Hartshorne (1899-1992) made 
an attempt to depoliticize geopolitics and suggested a more functional approach. He 
argued that the study of geopolitics could be used to analyze internal dynamics and 
external functions of a state without trying to shape government policies. This new path 
led geopoliticians to take up questions regarding the ethnicity of people, relations 
between borders and physical geographic traits, structure of local governances and 
mapping patterns of states (Jones, Jones and Woods, 2004: 7). Another prominent 
American geographer, Isaiah Bowman (1878-1950) highlighted the significance of 
geographers through their detailed work on wide-ranging cartographic material, their 
capacity to put things together in regional frameworks and, perhaps most importantly, 
their capacity to go beyond  the limits of formal training and thinking creatively on 
14 
 
higher levels of land use policy. According to Bowman, geographical science had a 
social value that could provide with peace and security under conditions of liberty. 
Without such knowledge the standard of living could fall and the entire social structure 
could be fatally weakened (Bowman, 1949: 1-6). After the Nazi's use of geopolitics, the 
discipline remained wary of modeling and theorizing. It prevailed to be descriptive and 
empirically driven and had little distinction from mainstream regional geography (Jones, 
Jones and Woods, 2004: 7). 
 1970s marked the era of revival for geopolitics due to reintroduction of theory 
and a more political approach in geography. Interestingly, this change did not emerge 
within the discipline but from the reflections of new research clusters that eclipsed the 
functional approach. For example the technical and theoretical innovation of electoral 
geography introduced geopolitics with the broader development of systems theory. This 
meant more focus on processes rather than places (Jones, Jones and Woods, 2004: 7). 
 It can be argued that geopolitics conjures up many images. On the one hand it 
can encompass wars, empires, and diplomacy and on the other hand it can create images 
of practices, classification of territories and masses of people. Geopolitics is a relation of 
power, politics and policy within space, place and territory. Space can be understood as 
the core concept of the field of geopolitics. While space is traditionally defined as a 
piece of fixed and immobile territory, place is described as a specific spot in space and 
territory is perceived as formal demarcated portions of space with specific identities and 
characteristics (Jones, Jones and Woods, 2004: 3). Territoriality, on the other hand, 
involves the classification of an area and is based on communication, particularly 
communication of boundaries. Territoriality also requires an attempt of control over to 
an area and to things within it as well as outside of it. Symbolic shapes such as the 
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process of naming, fixed symbols like flags, social practices and identity narratives are 
crucial in territory formation (Paasi, 2003: 112-114). It is most important to understand 
geography as something dynamic. The meaning of space, distance, territory and borders 
can change through factors as technologies or alliances. The change in perception can 
affect internal and external policies of states and the connection between individuals and 
groups (Starr, 2013: 439). 
 In order to comprehend the field of geopolitics, a connection must be made 
between geopolitics and statesmanship or the practices and representations of territorial 
spaces. Geopolitics should not be reduced to mere competition over territory or a 
production of principles to justify such political acts. Since geopolitical thought is based 
on geography, the discipline examines the world through a spatial perspective and 
geopoliticians have made claims of “seeing” or “understanding” the whole world. This 
belief constitutes the world as a transparent space that is see-able. If the world is see-
able, than the world could also be know-able. This process of “seeing” and “knowing” 
the world could only be possible by the educated and white Western elites. This biased 
view classified the world in to regions and also defined historical trends. This has made 
geopolitics an outcome of situated knowledge (Flint, 2006: 13-16). Situated knowledge 
is not abstract truths about the world but reflections of the authors in their particular 
situations (Ingram and Dodds, 2009: 6). Donna Harraway links feminist objectivity to 
situated knowledge. She states that situated knowledge is about communities not about 
individuals. Thus a larger perception can be acquired by being somewhere in particular 
and through joining of partial views and voices (Harraway, 1988: 590). 
 The concept of classical geopolitics was introduced by critical geopoliticians in 
order to define traditional approaches of geopolitics. As Merje Kuus states: 
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Classical geopolitics, taken to mean the statist, Eurocentric, balance-of-power conception of 
world politics that dominated much of the twentieth century, is closely bound up with the 
discipline of geography.  […] It goes back to the birth of self-consciously geopolitical 
analysis in the nationalism and imperialism of the fin-de-siècle Europe (Kuus, 2009: 2). 
 The following are the main principles of classical geopolitics: (1) Classical 
geopolitics has always had a privileged, white, elite Western figure as an author. (2) It 
proved a very masculine perspective. (3) It opted for labeling and classification of 
territories because there were “few opportunities for additional European territorial 
expansion and, in such circumstances, international politics became increasingly focused 
on “the struggle for relative efficiency, strategic position, and military power” 
(O’Tuathail 1996: 25). (4) Politics were always state centric and other actors were left 
out (Flint, 2006: 17). In sum, classical geopolitics focused on a state-centric, static and 
deterministic account of the impact of geography over politics and favored a one-way 
determinism as if geography defined politics and not vice-versa. On the contrary, critical 
geopolitics would attack all these classical foundations by focusing on a dynamic, inter-
relational and discursive understanding of the relationship between geography and 
politics. 
 
2.2. Critical Geopolitics 
 The concept of “Critical Geopolitics” was first used by Simon Dalby in the 
1970s. This critical understanding of the geography-politics relationship can be defined 
as “a most important and increasingly suggestive area of inquiry, unfolding at the 
conjuncture of social theory, political geography, and cultural studies” (Ingram, and 
Dodds, 2009: XI). This new field of study drew inspiration from the works of post-
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structuralist thinkers such as Jacques Derrida, Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, and 
post-colonial theorists such as Homi Bhabha. Critical geopolitics opened the concept of 
power to a new critical inquiry. Based on Foucauldian genealogy put forth by Michel 
Foucault, the notion of power was understood to be coercive and disabling but at the 
same time productive and enabling within the society (Kuus, 2009: 4). Power can be 
understood as something that is held over others and used as leverage or it can be a 
conception for getting things done. The former is an instrument of constraint and 
domination, meanwhile the latter is a tool for potential empowerment. The possession of 
power is something separate from using that capability. In geo-graphical spatial politics, 
Foucault sees power as means to justify a particular group’s authority over a subject 
population (Allen, 2003: 96-102).  ‘Power is everywhere’ and ‘comes from everywhere’ 
so in this sense it is neither an agency nor a structure (Foucault 1998: 63). Instead power 
is “a regime of truth”. Power derives from accepted notions of the knowledge, scientific 
understanding and of course the “truth”. Foucault uses the terms of power and 
knowledge to explain that “truth” is of this world and is produced through constraint. 
Each society has its own discourse of the truth or a regime of truth (Gaventa, 2003). 
The greatest contributions of Foucault towards the discipline of geopolitics can 
be labeled by two key concepts: discourse and governmentality. Discourse is defined as 
“referring to the ensemble of social practices through which the world is made 
meaningful but which are also dynamic and contested.” (Jones, Jones and Woods, 2004: 
11-12). In other words, discourses provide the meaning to the concepts and no concept 
itself can be immune from a discursive definition. The second concept, governmentality, 
is about how a government renders a society governable through the use of some 
apparatuses of knowledge. Hence, the control over knowledge turns out to be a 
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significant source of power. The importance of both discourse and governmentality lie in 
their exploration of space, because space itself becomes a tool in exercise of power. 
Foucault rejected power as something possessed and focused on how it is practiced and 
circulated among society. His work put forward the notion of space as fundamental in 
any exercise of power (Jones, Jones and Woods, 2004: 12). Considering geographical 
knowledge as an element of power, the political neutrality of geography is merely an 
illusion and that critical examination of the geopolitical discipline was necessary (Kuus, 
2009: 4). 
 In addition to these two concepts, other two concepts are borrowed from the 
writings of post-structuralist thinkers, Deleuze and Guattari, namely the concepts of 
deterritorialization and reterritorialization. According to Deleuze and Guattari, the 
consequential processes of deterritorialization and reterritorialization between 
biopolitical and the sovereign; they argued that “[f]orces of deterritorialization are 
continually being set in motion by a form of sovereignty that operates strategically by 
combining and entering into new relations with these forces in an effort to create new 
political assemblances” (Reid, 2009: 136). To put it in geopolitics, deterritorialization 
means the deconstruction of a particular discourse on territory, while reterritorialization 
refers to the redefinition of territory or emergence of a new discourse on that particular 
territory. They are intertwined and dynamic. These two concepts can take place within 
the boundaries of states as well as outside borders. Any change in perception of identity 
or ethnic makeup as well as the reconstruction of territorial understandings start by 
deterritorialization of the previous concepts and continue with reterritorialization. For 
example, the debates on the eradication of state borders through increasing permeability 
via globalization could be perceived as a deterritorialization, while emergence of new 
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borders (i.e., local or sub-state level) constitute the process of reterritorialization (Flint, 
2012: 131-133). 
 It should be noted that critical geopolitics borrows from post-structuralist 
theories, but it does not emerge exclusively from it. For critical geopolitics, classical 
geopolitics is not a critical but a problem-solving approach. The main function of 
classical geopolitics is to become aware of problems, help perceive their reality. The 
state was the focus of classical geopolitics. The international relations of the time 
consider little of the state vs. society complexes (Cox, 1981: 127) The main purpose of 
critical geopolitics, on the other hand, is to break these simplistic and dichotomical 
territorial representations such as us vs. them, security vs. insecurity, order vs. anarchy, 
etc., to create a new space for debate and action (Kuus, 2009: 5-6). Although Richard 
Ashley was not a critical geopolitician, his anarchy problematique is an earlier example 
of the study of deconstruction. He analyses the concept of anarchy meanwhile searching 
for theoretical as well as the practical notions through discourses (Ashley, 1988: 231-
233). While classical geopolitics seeks to treat geography as a given non-discursive 
terrain, critical geopolitics seeks to uncover the notion of power within geopolitical 
knowledge. According to critical geopolitics, the conventional conceptions dominating 
the twentieth century geopolitics was a pan-optic form of power and knowledge that 
sought to aid the statecraft of great powers. Its narrative was declarative and imperative. 
Critical geopolitics seeks to problematize epistemological assumptions and ontological 
commitments of geopolitics. It also seeks to deconstruct hegemonic discourses and 
question relations of power (Ó Tuathail, 2000: 166). Discourses are not taken as real 
truths but perceived as versions of describing, writing, and representing geographical 
information and international politics. Foucault perceives discourse as a system of 
20 
 
representation. By discourse he means ‘a group of statements’ that provide a way for 
language. It is a tool to represent knowledge on a particular topic in a particular time of 
history. Simply, it is a production of language through a language (Hall, 2005: 72) The 
creation of geopolitical knowledge by intellectuals, institutions, and practicing statesmen 
become the subject of analysis (Ó Tuathail, Dalby, and Routledge, 2003: 3). In this 
regard, critical geopolitics has a much wider and deeper approach compared to 
geopolitics. This is also the reason why the 1990s produced many analyses on the 
complicity of geography and geographers in colonialism, imperialism, nationalism, and 
Cold War superpower rivalry (Kuus, 2009: 4). 
 According to critical geopolitics, globalization, informationalization and risk 
society have created a post-modern geopolitical condition in world politics. These 
transform the boundaries of modern interstate systems by establishing new 
interconnections between places around the world and alter local, national and global 
relations. Even though the seeds of this post-modern geopolitical structure have been 
planted in the 1970s, it is best considered a phenomenon of late 1980s and early 1990s 
because the three processes of globalization, informationalization and the construction of 
risk society came together in such a distinct way that they created a new political 
environment (Ó Tuathail, 2000: 167-168). 
 Critical geopolitics does not examine identities or actions of pre-given political 
subjects but it investigates how the political subjects have emerged in the first place. 
Unlike classical geopolitics, sovereign state is the result of discourses of sovereignty, 
security, and identity. Thus, the states' foreign policy practices construct its identity and 
interests. Identity politics regarding geographical spaces have been one of the most 
researched practices and it is believed that borders cannot be perceived solely as lines 
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marking political entities. It is within these boundaries that entities are defined as the self 
or the other. Borders are boundaries but they can also allow movement that reproduces, 
adapts, or alters entities' identities (Kuus, 2009: 7-8). John Agnew puts this simply as 
follows: “borders are primarily the result of cultural borrowing about how states should 
be laid out. […] Borders thus make the nation rather than vice versa” (Agnew, 2007: 
399). 
 Geopolitics has associated boundary marking with the spatial extent of a state. 
The pre-globalized era of the Westphalian state used boundaries to show the exercise of 
power of a state within a particular territory but the trans-boundary movement of people, 
goods and ideas the sovereignty of states have been opened to challenge. During the 
colonial age, the geometrical lines drawn in European capitals with little knowledge and 
care of spatial patterns of ethnic and tribal distribution have led to artificial identities 
leading to strife and civil war. Boundaries should be understood as dynamic patterns and 
the demarcation of lines, both social and spatial, affect people's lives, identities of 
communities and interaction with others beyond specific locations. These lines 
demarcate the extent of inclusion and exclusion of members of groups extending from 
local to international. Thus, they have a prominent role on politics of identity. Identity 
cannot be a deterritorialized concept as power emerges from territorial bases. For 
example if a state grows weak, the focus of identity switches to local, global, religious or 
cultural, most of which are determined by some form of territorial compartmentalization. 
Based on this territoriality of identity, the concept of boundary has to take three 
dimensions into account. (1) Hierarchical nature of boundaries should be recognized and 
allow different types of territorial boundaries such as local and national or state and 
municipal. (2)  Social and spatial boundaries are as much part of boundaries as 
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organization and portions of territories. (3) Boundaries are multidisciplinary (Agnew and 
Corbridge, 1995: 125-135). 
 Geopolitical discourses are related to the context or the discursivity of 
representations of space rather than what is pronounced or penned, what is spoken or 
written by political elites. Spatial practices and images are dialectically associated with 
each other. This means that a careful analysis can reveal persisting themes and 
representations that guide and constrain conditions at a certain period of time (Agnew 
and Corbridge, 1995: 47). A periodization of geopolitical discourse is a simplification of 
complex flow of representations and practices; therefore, each period holds the 
emergence as well as the demise of other epochs within itself. Periodization helps 
greatly in understanding prevailing hegemonies, dominant sets of rules in governing that 
correlate with the economic, technological and social trends. John Agnew has identified 
three epochs of geopolitics: civilizational, naturalized and ideological (Agnew, 1998: 
46). More will be explained about these epochs later on in this chapter. 
 Four points should be kept in mind when concentrating on geopolitical 
discourses. Firstly, they are not just specific influences of foreign policy situations; they 
are present in everyday descriptions of the world. Second, they involve practical 
reasoning. Practical geopolitical reasoning relies on common-sense narratives and 
distinctions rather than formal models. Third, geopolitical knowledge is reductive as 
information is suppressed in order to fit into a priori geopolitical category. Finally, not 
all political elites have equal power on how political-economic space is represented 
(Flint, 2006: 13-17). 
 In addition to the chronological classification, critical geopolitics also divides 
geopolitical discourse into four based on the actors producing it: practical, formal, 
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structural and popular geopolitics. Practical geopolitics examines practices of everyday 
state craft. It examines geographical understandings and perceptions of states and how 
they help formulate functioning policies. Formal geopolitics is constructed by the 
academia, think-tanks or strategic institutions as geopolitical thoughts or geopolitical 
traditions. Structural geopolitics involves structural processes and tendencies that effect 
states foreign policies such as globalization and informationalization. Finally, popular 
geopolitics is geographical politics created and debated by the various media-shaping 
popular cultures. It includes social construction and collective understandings of 
transnational and national perceptions (Ó Tuathail, 1999: 109-113).  
 Critical geopolitics has shown successful engagements and proven itself to be 
important tool in understanding the geopolitical arena. However, there are also some 
limitations of critical geopolitics to be studied in detail. John Agnew has made four 
suggestions to ameliorate these limitations. First, Agnew believes that greater attention 
should be paid to histories of geopolitics within non-western geopolitical imaginations 
and polities. Second, critical geopolitics should further engage in post-colonial debates. 
Third, the concept of the “state” is not dissolving under effects of globalization therefore 
more research should be conducted towards perceptions of “state”, “territory”, and 
“community”. Finally, military affairs and strategies should be open to more scrutiny as 
geopolitical knowledge is vastly used by military organizations. Critical geopolitics has 
opened new and exciting fields of research and teaching, thus as it continues to grow it 
can answer intellectual disposition that is relentlessly questioning and open ended 
(Dodds, 2001: 471-479).  
 All in all, this section has attempted to define geopolitics, both in its classical and 
critical understanding. While classical geopolitical discourses focus on a deterministic 
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and static understanding of the impact of geography over politics, critical geopolitical 
discourses argue that while geography have an impact on politics, this impact is not 
natural or given; rather it is discursive or constructed. In other words, as geography 
influence politics, the political discourses also give new meanings to geography. In other 
words, it is mainly the discourse that prioritizes certain territories over the others, gives 
meaning to space and place and shapes and is shaped by the actors’ spatial perceptions. 
Having said this, the rest of this chapter examines three geopolitical discourses in a 
chronological sequence in order to demonstrate the dominant spatial configuration of 
certain periods. The findings of this examination would be used in the coming chapters 
in a way to understand the discourses developed by regional actors (i.e. the states) on the 
conceptualization of the Kurds in general and the spatial construction of “Kurdistan” in 
particular. 
     
2.2.a. Civilizational Geopolitics 
 The first geographical discourse put forward by Greek geographers suggested 
three continents – Africa, Europe and Asia – separated by bodies of water. As geography 
progressed, Europeans realized that European and the Asian contents did not fit into 
borders clearly cut by water. However, the division of the continents remained as the 
concept of Europe changed. Europe transferred itself from a physical-geographical 
region in to a cultural region, as a result of the Catholic Church abandoning claims to 
universality and providing a narrowly defined Christendom (Agnew, 1998: 52). It was in 
the eleventh century that the church defined a connotation of the term Christendom. 
Pope Urban II specifically expressed the idea for urging Christians to crusade Seljuk 
Turks (Heikki, 1998: 23). 
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 Perceiving Europe as a unified political entity came from the idea of unified 
Christian community and the global inheritance of the universal might of the Roman 
Empire. Thus, the use of Europe was arbitrary and variable. For some, it solely meant 
continental unity, for others Europe was something political, intellectual or religious. In 
addition to this, the unity above all enhanced attitudes towards the enemies, or “the 
others”, such as Arabs, the Mongols or the Turks (Heikki, 1998: 29-30). The differences 
between the Christian and the Muslim world created a sense of deep chasm within the 
European perspective of the world (Agnew, 1998: 52). 
 During this time frame Europe witnessed designation of imaginative maps which 
highlighted the uniqueness and the supremacy of the continent. For example the maps of 
Europe depicted as a queen was a symbol of both dominance and fertility, associated 
with ocean based imperial expansion (Figure 1). As Bassin (1991: 7) explains, “this 
imagery was reinforced by the European voyages of discovery, which demonstrated the 
self-evident initiative, vision and zeal of Europeans.” As centuries past, the feeling of 
superiority gradually increased and incorporated historical reasoning. Simply, the 
European history was perceived to be full of accomplishments, which eclipsed those of 
other nations, and destined Europeans for greatness (Agnew, 1998: 54). 
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Map 2.1. Map of Europe depicted as a queen (Maptitude, 2013) 
 
 The sense of grandeur led to an understanding of the world as “available” to use 
by Europeans and colonialism emerged. The difference between Europe and other 
continents was reinforced by the dichotomy of homeland and peripheries or frontiers and 
colonialism was rationalized by “the burden of the white men” (Agnew and Corbridge, 
1995: 88). 
 Around the nineteenth century, the nation-states became the most perfected 
version of the European difference. In time, states reworked dynastic and regional 
identities as national cultural identities and combined classical motifs with local ones. 
Nationalities were drawn from a common but an ancient past. States became delimited 
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territories that balanced one and other in the international political arena. The external 
borders of European states were thus becoming an unlimited political space open for 
conquest. This new European outlook and agenda created a world of imperial rivalry 
(Agnew and Corbridge, 1995: 90-92). By the end of the nineteenth century each 
imperialist and great state developed a geopolitical discourse to meet its own cultural, 
geographical, and strategic intentions. The discourse of civilizational geopolitics 
categorizes the people's mental maps according to the concept of civilization to which 
people inhabiting that particular region are perceived to part of a particular civilization 
(Bilgin, 2004: 270). This resulted in the understanding that some civilizations, such as 
the European civilization, are superior to others. 
 One of the most important representatives of this discourse was Alfred Thayer 
Mahan (1840–1914), an admiral in the US navy. In his work, he made a distinction 
between land and sea powers. Mahan described six factors that affect the progress and 
preservation of sea powers. These are geographical position, interconnected waters, 
exposed land boundaries, overseas bases, and the ability to control significant trade 
routes; the physical shape of the state, such as the nature of the coastline; extent of 
territory; size of population; national character; and the type of the regime (Mahan, 
2010). Mahan’s geopolitical vision for the US became the foundation on which many 
geopolitical thinkers built upon during the Cold War. The main intention of Mahan's 
work was to strengthen US influence and reach, without facing a conflict with Britain 
(Flint, 2006: 18-20). Just like Robert Cox’s idea that “theory is always for someone and 
for some purpose” (Cox, 1981: 128), 
 The British geographer Halford Mackinder (1841 - 1947) was interested in issues 
such as global strategy and the balance of power between states which greatly suited the 
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British foreign policy. Influenced by works of Mahan but contrary to his sea-based 
analysis, Mackinder viewed the world as a closed political system. He suggested that age 
of exploration had come to end causing the balance of power to shift among the states. 
His work centered on the interconnectedness of states that are to have major conflicts 
between land and sea powers (Jones, Jones and Woods, 2004: 5-6). 
One of Mackinder's major works, “Geographical Pivot on History,” written in 
1904, brought three major innovations to the field of geopolitics. First, geopolitics 
became a way of seeing the whole world as a political space. However, this political 
space was to be determined by only the elite, educated, and privileged white men, 
capable of understanding, explaining and altering history and laws. Second, Mackinder's 
work put forth a map of “The Natural Seats of Power” in which he categorizes huge 
chunks of land under single identity (Figure 2). New terminology such as “pivot area”, 
“heartland”, “World Island” and “inner and marginal crescent” were introduced and 
adapted to define these new spaces. The heartland was the center of the world, Eurasia. 
The World Island included Europe, Asia and Africa, a vast land that included most the 
world’s resources. Finally, Mackinder underlined three epochs of history. He named 
these epochs after Columbus’ discovery of the New World (pre-Columbian, Columbian 
and post-Columbian) and used dominant power of mobility as the defining factor 
between epochs. He believed that sea-powers always held the upper hand but as 
technology developed that fact could be reversed by railways, especially if one could 
control the heartland (Mackinder, 1904: 421-437). Based on these explanations, he 
developed his famous dictum: 
 “Who rules East Europe commands the Heartland. 
 Who rules the Heartland commands the World Island. 
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 Who rules the World Island commands the World.” (Mackinder, 1962: 241) 
 
Map 2.2: Mackinder’s natural seats of power (Solis, 2015.) 
 
Mackinder's contribution is an important example of classical geopolitics. He uses a 
very Western-centric view of the world to put forth an intellectual objective, which is 
very biased and is used to justify the imperial aspirations of one particular state. He uses 
fetching terms and phrases to influence foreign policies. However, Mackinder was 
unable to make an impact on the British foreign policy but his work influenced the ideas 
of Karl Haushofer and American policies in the following decades (Flint, 2006: 20-21). 
 All in all, civilizational geopolitical discourse was based on the dichotomous 
representation of Western civilization vs. the rest. Accordingly, European civilization 
was suggested to be superior to the others because of the specific historical patterns that 
the European peoples followed. Perception of nation-state as a European type of perfect 
actor of international relations was also quite evident. Finally, the civilizational 
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discourse focused on the geopolitical division between the civilized vs. the uncivilized, 
which also legitimized the control of the former over the latter under the form of “the 
civilizing mission”. In other words, the civilized had the “responsibility” of “civilizing” 
the uncivilized and this was the white man’s burden. Therefore, civilizational 
geopolitical discourse used civilization as a medium to distinguish between achievers 
and under-achievers. 
 
2.2.b. Naturalized Geopolitics 
 From the nineteenth century to the end of the World War II, geopolitics was 
defined by the “natural” character of the states. This can be understood as scientifically 
akin to the new biological advancement that took place in the same time frame. The 
foundation of naturalized geopolitics is based on the division between imperial and 
colonized peoples. This distinction was born from an understanding of states as 
“organic” beings; thus, states had “biological” needs for territories and resources in 
order to survive. The world was perceived as a closed system in which states gained 
political and economic achievements in other states expenses. Darwin's theory of the 
“survival of the fittest” had a profound effect on naturalized geopolitics. Natural 
selection transformed into the understanding of “the survival of the fittest” in the social 
world, which was then used to justify the imperialist aims of the European world. 
Distinguishing races gradually led the way to racist ideologies (Agnew and Corbridge, 
1995: 56-57).  
 The harmony of the state and the nation, natural political boundaries, and 
economic nationalism all contributed to a state’s wellbeing in the international arena. 
The harmony of the nation meant uniting its peoples around an ideology. For example in 
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Russia this was mestorazvitie, in Germany it was heimat and in the United States, states 
united around the concept of “American-ness”. Natural political boundaries implied that 
historical boundaries were not always the proper borders. The possibility of using 
natural features to specify the natural area of states also enabled states to question 
existing borders. Finally, economic nationalism can be defined as organic conservatism. 
Individuals and firms were all responsible for the state and had to act according the 
greater good of the state (Agnew, 1998: 60-61). 
 An important figure that shaped naturalized geopolitics was Karl Haushofer 
(1896-1946), a German general and a geopolitician. His military career required his 
presence in Japan, where his understanding of discipline, military rule and obedience to 
a leader had developed. These ideas reflected onto his studies as a geopolitician. As 
Haushofer progressed in his career, he came in contact with Adolf Hitler. Hitler and 
Haushofer shared the idea that the Versailles Treaty had crippled Germany and the state 
was in need of Lebensraum or living space. In his search to empower Germany, 
Haushofer established the journal Zeitschrift fur Geopolitik (Journal of Geopolitics). 
Like Mackinder, he believed in educating leaders of state and the youth to have a real 
effect on conflicts since geopolitics was a way to provide realistic insight and make 
feasible predictions. His work merged ideas of social Darwinism with the geopolitical 
thinking of Friedrich Ratzel and Halford Mackinder. In essence, this understanding 
perceived international political arena as a struggle of survival and states needed living 
spaces to exist (Ó Tuathail, Dalby and Routledge, 1998: 20). 
 The Nazis had taken this geopolitical study to a very imperialistic and a racist 
practice under Adolf Hitler's leadership. Toward the end of the World War II, the Allied 
States and the USA presented Karl Haushofer as the brain behind the blueprint for 
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Germany's world domination. In his defense Haushofer stated that he was trying to 
educate the youth on world affairs and his work was legitimate geopolitics. The defense 
raised questions about the legitimacy geopolitics as a whole and the brutal regime of 
Nazis tainted the associations with geopolitics (Ó Tuathail, Dalby and Routledge, 1998: 
21-23). It should also be noted that Haushofer did not point to racial discrimination and 
never joined the Nazi party. When asked about Hitler he would describe Hitler as a half-
educated man who never fully understood the principles of geopolitics and focused on 
catch words which he did not fully comprehend (Barnes and Abrahamsson, 2015: 65-
67). 
 In sum, naturalized geopolitics perceived state as an organism having the basing 
need of survival. In order to survive the state required to expand since without additional 
resources it would be impossible to feed and meet the needs of the people. Since 
expansive policies are legitimate, power accumulation was required to perform 
expansion. Thus only the strongest states could survive in the continuous political 
struggle. This understanding divides the world into two being the colonizers who tended 
to expand and the colonized whose duty was to serve the colonizer. Hence the 
naturalized geopolitical discourse focused on racial classifications based on the 
supremacy of the white race over the others and legitimized the pressure exerted by the 
white race over the others. 
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2.2.c. Ideological Geopolitics 
 The end of the World War II started a new era in geopolitics. Geopolitical 
imagination centered around two main conceptions on how to organize the international 
political economy; communism and capitalism. Two different sets of values promoted 
by two different victorious states of the World War II competed for world domination. 
Ideology is defined as a living connection between men and the world, as well as an 
unconscious relation such as philosophy by Louis Althusser (Brewster: 1969). The 
ideology put forth by the US had more widespread acceptance but it strongly needed the 
presence of the other – Soviet Union - as a point of comparison and threat (Agnew and 
Corbridge, 1995: 65). 
 From a practical geopolitical point of view, the friendly relations between the US 
and the USSR that had existed prior to the World War II, was terminated and this 
collapse in relations demanded a new mode of interpretation. Stalin had attempted for a 
sphere of influence in Eastern Europe and Western powers were alarmed about Soviet 
expansionism. However, this was stated to be a natural move for the Soviets by Stalin 
since the war costed for more than any other state. The Soviet leader was seeking to 
secure governments’ loyalty towards Soviet core (Dodds, 2003: 208-209). In 1946, 
George Kennan (1904-2005), an American diplomat serving in Moscow, had written his 
famous “Long Telegram” drawing attention to the differences of two very different 
societies that could have little prospect of long-term harmony. In this telegram Kennan 
presented communism as a disease or a parasite in need of a cure (Kennan, 1946). 
 The period between 1945 and 1991 resembled a chess match with a move from 
the US and a counter-move from the Soviets. “Anti-American” or “anti-Soviet” 
discourse became central to both nations construction of identity. None of these 
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ideologies were territorial. Each had an aspiration to be ideologically spread across the 
globe, which also created security issues within borders. Both states felt a threat from 
extraneous as catalysts to domestic subversions. For example, as the United States 
appealed to the public opinion since legitimizing her foreign policy became one of her 
top priorities.  Thus, exaggerating vulnerability and emphasizing a need for self-defense 
became a crucial political discourse. An important consequence of this shared 
vulnerability was the idealization of each other. Simply put, the rival was “super-potent” 
in the eyes of the adversary (Agnew and Corbridge, 1995: 104-105). 
Figure 2.1. The threefold categorization of the world (Agnew and Corbridge, 1995: 103).  
The two ideologies – communism and capitalism – contributed to emergence of a 
new concept of a “Third World” which signified old colonies or non-aligned states. 
Thus, the world was divided into blocks, and spaces were defined as “friendly” or 
“threatening”. Pre-modern – modern polarity and ideas of national security from 
previous geopolitical discourses were reworked into state politics as actual places 
became meaningful thorough their representations within these geopolitical categories. 
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Simply put, the superpowers recognized the world according to their interests. The 
threefold categorization of the world (Figure 3) can be explained as the First World 
meaning capitalist and technologically modern countries with a liberal ideology. The 
Second World was socialist which meant that it was technologically advanced but not 
ideologically free. Finally the Third World was aspiring to be developed nor liberal and 
open to influence (Agnew and Corbridge, 1995: 103). 
Ideological conflicts produced a novel geopolitical terminology such as 
containment, domino effects and hegemonic stability, which were used to define 
strategies of superpowers. Containment was a policy of preventing the spread of 
communism. Domino effect meant that if a state came under communist control than the 
surrounding states would fall into communism as well. Hegemonic stability theorized 
that the international system would be more stable under the single dominant world 
power. All these concepts played a part in naturalizing the understanding of space and 
global politics for Americans and others. They also took local conflicts and externalized 
them into global conflicts. For example, President Eisenhower had used the domino 
effect in the mid-1950s to describe the possible effects of South Vietnam in the hands of 
the communists. A local incident was perceived as a threat by a super-power, thus 
required a military action (Agnew and Corbridge, 1995: 103). 
 The 1970s witnessed a discursive change in the United States. Accordingly, 
interstate cooperation and a necessity for a benevolent hegemon in world economy were 
put forward. A justification was created under images of “fatherhood”. An American 
leadership would provide the public goods, and in times of need, would enforce 
international rules of equality. In general, Cold War politics – the polarity between the 
Soviet Union and the United States of America - helped secure and reinforce a set of 
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geographical identities while disciplining domestic social and cultural differences with 
in these spaces (Agnew and Corbridge, 1995: 112). 
 It is important to note that the practical geopolitics of this era was very much 
affected by formal geopolitical thinking. As a consequence of the rejection toward 
geopolitics after the Nazi influence, very few geopoliticians continued their work. 
However, the earlier works of geopoliticians was enough to fuel important individuals, 
resulting in the revival of geopolitics as a study. Cold War officials, such as George 
Kennan, were inspired by geopolitical views of the world politics. The desire to contain 
communism was a reflection of American concern toward the geo-power of the Soviet 
Union. Saul Cohen, published Geography and Politics in a Divided World (1973), which 
was an analysis of the post-war international system. His work reflected geopolitical 
ideas of Mackinder and his purpose was to question the American containment policy as 
well as the perception of the Soviet Union as a land power. It was the work of Henry 
Kissinger that truly contributed to the revival of geopolitics. Kissinger, troubled by the 
Soviets strategic presence in Africa and the Middle East, used geopolitical vocabulary to 
describe the potentially dangerous situation. This encouraged other academicians and 
authors to return to the ideas and languages of geopolitics and encourage the US 
government to indulge in the study (Dodds, 2003: 211-212). Harvey Sicheman has 
pointed out that geopolitics does not easily permit peace but that it cannot be put off due 
to its nature. Geopolitics can be manipulated to assure peace but it can never be 
abolished (Sicheman, 2002: 17). 
 All in all, geopolitical discourses have been part of the political history since 
thousands of years. Its emergence as a discipline in the twentieth century has opened 
new doors to comprehending the international political arena. Critical geopolitics that 
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emerged from classical geopolitics has shown ways to classify views, processes and 
open them to new scrutiny. This new perspective provided by critical geopolitics can 
help understand the Kurdish question and the reasons as to why a “Kurdistan” could not 
be established in the Middle East. The use of critical geopolitics in answering this 
question will be twofold. First of all, critical geopolitics is used to understand how and 
why different actors could not create a unified geopolitical vision of Kurdistan, whose 
borders have never been clearly defined. In doing that the deterritorialization and 
reterritorialization of the notion of Kurdistan over time and according to different actors 
will be examined in the coming chapters. Secondly, the civilizational and ideological 
geopolitical discourses are borrowed from critical geopolitics in order to show how the 
states chosen as regional actors of this thesis used these two discourses in a way to 
prevent the emergence of Kurdistan as an autonomous if not independent geopolitical 
entity and to discredit Kurds either as having no competence for self-government or 
having exerted a significant ideological/political/security threat for the “territorial” 
integrity of the home states. In other words, the next two chapters attempt to link this 
theoretical framework to understand the (non-)emergence of “Kurdistan” as a 
geopolitical entity. 
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Table 2.1.  A table summarizing the three eras of critical geopolitics  
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CHAPTER III 
 
THE IDEA OF “KURDISTAN” AND THE OBSTACLES IN FRONT 
OF ITS TERRITORIALIZATION BETWEEN 1919 AND 1950 
 
 Until the end of the World War I, most of the Kurds were living in two Middle 
Eastern Empires, being the Ottoman Empire and Iran (which, unlike the Ottoman 
Empire, was ruled by different dynasties, namely the Safavid, Afshar, Zend and Qajar 
dynasties from the sixteenth until the twentieth centuries). The social life of the Kurds 
was generally organized through feudal clans living in various eastern provinces of the 
Ottoman Empire including Bitlis, Dersim, Diyarbakır, Hakkari, Mosul, Mamuretülaziz 
(Elazığ), Van as well as in the territories from the West of Urmiye Lake to Iran's 
Khuzestan region. After the World War I, the region witnessed a significant 
reterritorialization under mandate regimes, semi-independent and independent states. 
The period between 1919 and 1950 witnessed the emergence and the development of the 
Kurdish question in different Middle Eastern states including Turkey, Iran, Iraq and 
Syria.  
This chapter examines the factors that hampered the emergence of “Kurdistan” as 
a politically independent and geopolitically delimited entity in the Middle East, after the 
World War I until 1960. Accordingly, lack of a unified imagining of “Kurdistan”, the 
tribal conflicts among various Kurdish tribes, the influence of emerging “nation”-states 
and the security concerns of the ruling elite of these states after the construction of new 
borders influenced the failure of defining “Kurdistan” as a geopolitical entity. Moreover, 
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in this period, a civilizational geopolitical discourse established by the colonial 
administrators and the ruling elites of the newly-established states emphasizing the 
uncivilized side of the Kurds and their disability of self-government was evident. Hence, 
in terms of critical geopolitics, this chapter first focuses on the impact of continuous 
deterritorialization and reterritorialization of the region between 1919 and 1950 on the 
perception of “Kurdistan” and, secondly, it examines the civilizational geopolitical 
discourse perceiving the Kurds as an uncivilized tribal community that lacks the ability 
for self-government. In doing that, this chapter follows a chronological sequence starting 
with the Kurdish political entities in the late Ottoman Empire and proceeding with the 
impact of the World War I and the mandate system afterwards, the establishment of 
semi-independent and independent political entities in the Middle East and the division 
of the Kurdish community among these newly-established territorial states. 
 
3.1. The Kurdish Political Entities in the Late Ottoman and Qajar Empires 
 For the last few centuries, the Kurds have lived between and the Zagros chain, 
stretching from the northwest to the southeast. The territories from the northern regions 
of Lake Van towards the southern plains and highland plateaus in the East had 
traditionally been populated by the Kurds. It is difficult to discern whether the identity of 
the people has defined Kurdistan or the perceived Kurdish territories have defined who 
the Kurds are (Kaya, 2012: 105). Although the pre-Islamic time for the Kurds still 
remains with many questions, most Kurds believe that they are the descendants of the 
Medes. This is also the starting point for most nineteenth and early twentieth century 
travelers and writers. The Kurdish history is said to begin with the conquest of Niniveh 
in 612 BC (O’Shea, 2004: 57-58). The primary tribal character of the Kurdish social 
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structure has made it difficult to define the Kurds as well Kurdish people have not 
belonged to a single religion or have not spoken a single Kurdish language; there are 
different religions/sects and dialects in the region. Most of the Kurds are Sunni-Hanafi 
Muslims but there also Shafi'is, Twelver Shiites, extremist Shiites (ghulat), Alevis, the 
Ahl-e Haqq (People of the Truth) and Yezidis (Van Bruinessen, 1992: 23). The dialect 
generally spoken in the northern and northwestern parts of the region described as 
Kurdistan is called Kurmanji; while the southern dialect is named as Sorani and 
Southeastern dialect as Sanandaji. The region described as Kurdistan has always drawn 
the attention of the empires surrounding it. However, none could maintain sovereignty 
throughout the entire Kurdish territories, thus it was divided by the borders of 
surrounding states, such as the Ottoman Empire and the Persian Empire (Van 
Bruinessen, 1992: 11-13). 
 The Ottoman Empire and Iran, ruled by different dynasties, had exercised forms 
of indirect rule over Kurdistan and this has had a significant impact on the social and the 
political organization of its peoples. The specific formation of tribal life has been 
effected by the interaction between different Kurdish societies, empires and eventually 
the nation-states that emerged or constructed in the region after the World War I. Over 
the past four centuries, the size and number of tribes have changed but the larger tribes 
have protected their integrity and survived in the hostile environment over time and it 
were these tribes that have shaped the lifestyle in the region they described as Kurdistan 
(Van Bruinessen, 2002: 2-4).   
 The Kurdish emirates, founded in the region, were generally in the form of 
chiefdoms that emerged as coalition of tribes led by dynasties of chieftains and they 
were officially recognized by the Ottoman Empire and Iran. Chieftains were known as 
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aghas; these were the notables with whom Kurdish primordial loyalties lay. The seyyids, 
who were the alleged descendants of the Prophet Mohammad had a significant degree of 
religious authority and were respected by the Muslim Kurds (Van Bruinessen, 1992: 6, 
343). During the Ottoman-Safavid rivalry over the region in the early sixteenth century, 
Kurdish tribes recognized Ottoman sovereignty, particularly during the reign of Selim I 
and under the influence of a respected Kurdish notable and Ottoman statesmen, İdris-i 
Bitlisî, who had been sent by the Ottoman Sultan to convince the Kurdish notables to 
recognize the Ottoman sovereignty (Bayır, 2016: 29). A crucial factor as to why Kurds 
chose the Ottomans over the Safavids was that the Kurds belonged to the Sunni sect of 
Islam and recognized the Caliph/Sultan as the supreme authority against the Shia 
Safavid Empire. An equally important factor was that Ottomans offered greater power 
and autonomy to the Kurdish chieftains unlike the Safavids which attempted to eradicate 
local autonomy of the emirates (Kaya, 2012: 107). After the destruction of the 
Aqqoyunlu confederation, the Safavid Shah Ismail I attempted to eliminate the local 
Kurdish chieftains and appoint Safavid governors as local rulers. If some power was to 
be given to the local people it was not to be placed in the hands of the traditional 
families but to their rivals with lesser statutes. Therefore, the Kurds disfavored the 
Safavid rule and preferred Ottoman rule instead (Özoğlu, 2004: 63-64). 
 In the reign of Suleiman I of the Ottoman Empire, an imperial decree in 1533 
combined nine Kurdish principalities as part of the Diyarbakir province (Kaya, 2012: 
108). Although, at first instance, this process seemed to have a centralizing effect that 
bothers the Kurdish chieftains, the local autonomy of Kurdish emirates was largely 
preserved. Even, through their interactions with the Ottomans, the courts of Kurdish 
emirates have come to resemble smaller models of the Ottoman courts. The Kurdish 
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emirates of this period were autonomous units directed by the emir who was exempted 
from paying revenue tax to the Ottoman government (Van Bruinessen, 2002: 4-7).   
 The Ottoman Empire saw no reason in trying to assimilate the Kurdish emirates. 
They had given the Kurds a vassal system in order secure the Eastern borders of the 
Empire. Instead of having the Ottoman armies come to the border for smaller conflicts, 
it was much more advantageous and economic to have the Kurdish emirs dealt with 
these incidents. Ottomans also ensured that the local government should remain in the 
hands of the same families. This guaranteed the loyalty of the emirs as they needed 
government’s authority to stay in power (Doğan, 2011: 36-38). 
Kurdish tribal association strengthened territorial attachment both in local and 
regional levels. It is believed that the Kurds had a sense of common identity long before 
the age of nationalism, even though they lacked religious/cultural unity. The 
preservation of this common identity is thought to have been made possible through the 
geographical inaccessibility of the region which restricted contact with the outsiders. As 
the Ottoman and Safavid empires rivaled over Eastern Anatolia, Kurdish tribes often 
changed their allegiances, which resulted in no complete integration to any political or 
cultural formation of the sovereign empires. In other words, there was a nascent 
common Kurdish identity in this period; however, it was not as strong as overcoming the 
tribal identity. This means that instead of linking their identity to a territorial entity, the 
Kurds first and foremost emphasized their tribal identity (Kaya, 2012: 107). 
This system of local governance more or less endured until the nineteenth century, 
when the Ottoman attempts for centralization increased. As a result, the region described 
as Kurdistan, which had vaguely defined before the nineteenth century, was begun to be 
defined more clearly, which is quite visible in the Ottoman dictionaries and lexicons 
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printed in the nineteenth century. Indeed, Kamus-u Fransevi (French Dictionary) 
published in 1883 described Kurdistan as “the country of Kurds” without referencing to 
a specific territory (Şemseddin Sami, 1883: 883). However, Lugat-ı Tarihiye ve 
Coğrafiye (Historical and Geographical Dictionary), published in one year after, defined 
Kurdistan as the territories between Armenia, Al-Jazeera, Iraq and Turkistan, thus 
providing a territorial explanation. What is more, this dictionary depicted Kurdistan and 
its people as well. Accordingly, the Kurdish population was estimated to be around 
350,000 and the Kurdish people were described as uneducated and rude nomads. 
However it was also stated that nothing can be said about their courage, humility and 
hospitality. A brief history of the region was also added, mentioning Selim I’s policy to 
use the Sunni Kurds against Safavid Persia (Ahmed Rıfat, 1884: 77-78). A Turkish and 
English Lexicon published by Sir James Redhouse in 1890 defined Kurdistan as “the 
whole country occupied by the Kurdish tribes on both sides of the mountain range of 
Zagros” (Redhouse, 1890: 1536). Finally, Kamus-u Türki (Turkish Dictionary) printed in 
1899 stated that Kurdistan was under Ottoman rule and stretched from the borders of 
Iran to north and eastern Mesopotamia (Şemseddin Sami, 1899: 1157). In sum, 
Kurdistan was perceived as a geopolitical entity by the Ottoman lexicographers, which 
had borders (though not clearly defined) and populated by the Kurdish tribes. These 
lexicon entries demonstrate that the Ottomans had not avoided naming the region; in 
other words, for the Ottomans, Kurdistan was a particular region inhabited by the Kurds 
and there was no problem in defining it as such. 
The politicization of ethnic identity in the nineteenth century started when the 
Ottoman attempts for centralization began to increase. The attempts for centralization 
created conflicts with the local power structures (Yavuz, 2001: 1). These attempts 
45 
 
started with Sultan Mahmud II and continued with his son Abdulmejid, who issued a 
Land Code in 1858 which significantly altered the Kurdish way of life. The reduction of 
communal features of the tribal life introduced individualization. Aghas were 
transformed into landlords and over the course of time they gained excessive power over 
Kurdish peasants. The urban-based landlords created a new class within the Kurdish 
community. New forms of patronage emerged between these urban-based landlords and 
tribal aghas (Van Bruinessen, 1992: 182-184). The state's centralization in terms of 
monopolizing violence and education threatened the aghas’ political and seyyids’ 
religious interests as well as their autonomy. Tribes resisted new laws as they were 
aimed to end feudal tyranny over local people (Yavuz, 2001: 5). 
 During the nineteenth century, different tribal leaders exercised control over the 
Kurdish population and their relations with the Empire began to variate from total 
loyalty to rebellion. The earlier rebellions of Kurdish tribes were not nationalist 
uprisings; rather they emerged out of political or economic reasons. One of the earliest 
Kurdish rebellions in the region was erupted in the early 1830s by Muhammad Kor 
Pasha, the emir of Soran Emirate, who made the Soran Emirate the strongest local force 
in Southern Kurdistan. Accordingly, benefiting from the rebellion of Kavalalı Mehmed 
Ali Pasha, the governor of Egypt, Muhammad Kor Pasha extended his territories against 
the rival Botan Emirate in 1833. The Ottoman offensive against the Soran Emirate was 
repelled. However, when other Kurdish tribes perceived that the expansion of the Soran 
Emirate exposed a significant, by 1836, most of them chose to side with the Ottoman 
Empire. Eventually, Muhammed Kor Pasha surrendered to the Empire, seeing low 
chances of victory. In all, although Muhammad Kor Pasha’s revolt was not based on 
Kurdish nationalism it could be perceived as a preliminary indication for establishing a 
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wider Kurdish statehood and presented a model for the rebellions to come in the 
following decades (Eppel, 2014: 53-55). At the same time, it demonstrated that the 
Kurdish allegiance to the Ottoman Empire was a matter of geopolitical balance of power 
among the Kurdish emirates. When the balance was disturbed in favor of one of the 
emirates the others chose to cooperate with the Empire to end this threat to the balance 
of power. 
Bedirkhan family of the Botan Emirate was another Kurdish dynasty having a 
strong rule in the region. Bedirkhan Pasha emerged as a mütesellim (tax collector) of the 
Ottoman Empire in the 1830s. Particularly, after the suppression of the Sorani threat, his 
authority sometimes exceeded that of the Ottomans in the region. The Empire began to 
perceive the Botan Emirate as a threat and to make it controllable the Ottoman 
government attempted to increase taxes received from the Emirate. This agitated 
Bedirkhan Pasha and resulted in his rebellion in the summer of 1847. This rebellion was 
suppressed within a few months. 
In addition to Sorani and Bedirkhan families, the Semdinan family rose to power 
in the second half of the nineteenth century, with Seyyid Ubeydullah as its leader, who 
had also become a powerful landlord by purchasing land from both the Ottomans and 
the Qajars. Ubeydullah rose to power by filling the vacuum created by the destruction of 
other tribal chiefs. Naqshbandi sheikhs were able to become more influential among the 
Kurds after the rise of Semdinan family. Previously Sufi sheiks had operated as spiritual 
leaders of tribal chiefs. By 1880, Ubeydullah secured himself as the paramount chief of 
the Kurds and his power extended over the most notable Botan and Baban 
confederations as well as the Bahdinan, Hakkari and Ardalan confederations. 
Ubeydullah rebelled after the signing of the Treaty of Berlin in 1878 in fear of an 
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independent Armenian state. He sought the help of Nestorian Christians against the 
Persians and the Ottomans. He invaded northwestern territories of the Qajar state but his 
militia consisting mostly of Kurdish tribes was easily defeated. He surrendered to the 
Ottoman authorities and was exiled first to Istanbul and then to Hijaz. Ubeydullah's 
rebellion was not of nationalists interests, either. It was simply the reactions of a 
powerful Kurdish leader to consolidate, expand and redefine his regional influence 
(Özoğlu, 2001: 383-391). 
Although there were Kurdish revolts in the nineteenth century against the Ottoman 
Empire the Kurdish tribal leaders were disinterested in and not capable of organizing an 
ethno-nationalist movement. Muhammed Kor Pasha’s revolt emerged out of territorial 
reasons, while Bedirkhan Pasha’s revolt was related to economic matters. Seyyid 
Ubeydullah’s revolt, on the other hand, was because of his fear of losing territories to the 
Armenians. The reason for lack of nationalist rebellions might be sought in the lack of 
infrastructure, external aid, political organization, and communication networks. Any 
nationalist sentiment would have to be worked through tribal, religious and local levels. 
The tribal structure encouraged Kurdish chiefs to act for their personal interests instead 
of the Kurdish nation against the centralization policies of the Ottoman Empire. The fact 
that the political space within the Kurdish society was too unevenly developed also 
crippled the support for a unified nationalist movement. The availability of alternative 
political opportunities fractured the nationalist elite and significantly weakened the 
Kurdish sentiment. Urban notables supported the sheikhs; meanwhile the intellectuals 
criticized the sheikhs, thus taking sides of the Ottomans. Kurdish tribal leaders turned to 
Sufi orders and some Kurdish notables turned to opposition groups. Even though there 
were outlets for the nationalist sentiment, the Kurdish movement was not highly 
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ethnicized, due to the fact that the Ottoman government itself was not yet Turkified. 
Therefore an “other” to work off was not created until the end of the Ottoman Empire 
(Natali, 2002: 185-187).  
 All in all, the Ottoman Empire’s decay during the seventeenth and the eighteenth 
century culminated into the peripheral aspiration of secession and independence. In 
order to prevent such a disintegrative process and to minimize the European 
encroachments, an administrative reform was particularly engaged by Sultan Mahmud 
II, who tried to re-establish the failed central control over the peripheral provinces. Thus, 
the Kurdish Emirates, which had gathered significant power and control over the region 
called Kurdistan, had become a problem for the central bureaucracy to be dealt with 
effectively. Thus, on the one hand reforms for centralization were enforced and on the 
other hand some military operations were performed over the Kurds (Van Bruinessen, 
1992: 175-176). By the end of the eighteenth century the power of the emirates were 
relatively eliminated and this handicapped the basis for a Kurdish nationalist movement 
and a Kurdish state in the course of the nineteenth and the twentieth century. This 
eradication wiped out any ambition to dominate the region defined as Kurdistan. The 
existence of such a force would have awakened imaginings of a Kurdish nation and 
attracted the educated and Westernized Kurds within and outside of Kurdistan. This 
awakening became the nucleus for Kurdish statehood and nationalism after the World 
War I. Lastly, the elimination of the emirates created an obstacle in the transformation 
and the diffusion of any one Kurdish dialect to become the modern “standardized” high 
language (Eppel, 2008: 237-240). Moreover, the demise of Kurdish emirates created the 
conditions toward reinforcement of tribal frameworks and it also strengthened the status 
of Sufi sheikhs. The weakness of the Kurdish bourgeoisie and middle class created a 
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barrier in establishing modern education in Kurdish. It has to be considered that 
education is the main social base in constructing imaginings of communities. After the 
emirates it was the clans and the tribes such as Barzani and Barjinzi under Naqshbandi 
sheikhs that effected and directed the Kurdish national movement (Eppel, 2008: 256-
257). 
 Towards the end of the Ottoman Empire, after the re-proclamation of the 
Ottoman constitution, Said Ubeydullah's son, Abdulkadir, became one of the founders of 
the Kurdish Society for Mutual Cooperation and Progress (Kürt Teavün ve Terakki 
Cemiyeti). He was inspired by the liberal atmosphere emerging in the Ottoman Empire. 
Abdulkadir became an Ottoman bureaucrat and together with his religious identity he 
was able to pose a strong authority over the Kurds. He wished for an autonomous 
Kurdish state backed by the British power as he respected the Caliphate and was not in 
favor of secession. Abdulkadir’s attempts to establish a British-backed Kurdistan 
continued after the World War I against the new republican regime of Turkey and he 
resisted against the abolishment of the Caliphate as well. It should be noted that 
Abdulkadir started his attempts for autonomy towards the end of the Ottoman Empire as 
a reaction to dissolution rather than a strict act of nationalism. He then refused the new 
Turkish state’s identity politics aiming for melting ethnic minorities under a singular 
Turkish identity. The new regime would execute him for his alleged participation to the 
Sheikh Said rebellion (Özoğlu, 2001: 392-394).  
 Said-i Nursi emerged as another important Kurdish political figure. He was born 
in Bitlis and had very strong ideals for the Kurds. In 1907, he was received by Sultan 
Abdülhamid II and proposed a Kurdish university to be established in Kurdistan. He had 
strived to achieve this goal for his entire life, though this project could never be 
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materialized. Nursi was also active in the Kurdish Society for Mutual Cooperation and 
Progress and in 1908 he became part of the movement of Muhammadan Union (İttihad-i 
Muhammediye), which organized a strong reactionary rebellion known as the 31 March 
incident against the Young Turk constitutional regime in 1909. He continued to support 
the Kurdish cause until the Sheikh Said rebellion. Interestingly, he was not a part of this 
revolt but was perceived as a reactionary religious threat by the Turkish government. In 
the final years of his life, he abandoned the Kurdish cause for a more religious 
movement known as Nurculuk and he was interested in interpreting and preaching the 
Koran (Van Bruinessen, 1992: 257-259). 
 In this period from the second constitutional period until the success of the 
Turkish national liberation movement, as a third significant Kurdish political figure, 
Bedirkhan's son, Emin Ali chose to continue his father’s footsteps and became one of 
the founders of Kurdish Society for Cooperation and Progress (Özoğlu, 2001: 395-403). 
Emin Ali took action for secession of Kurdistan at the end of the World War I. He 
perceived the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire as his last opportunity for recovering 
his family’s territory, wealth, and legacy. It was during this time that the newspaper 
entitled Jin (Kurdish Language) became the unofficial publishing organ of the society 
(Aydınkaya, 2015). In 1920, Emin Ali left the Kurdish Society to form another 
organization, the Kurdish Society for Social Organization (Kürt Teşkilat-ı İctimaiye 
Cemiyeti). The reason for his split was his rivalry with Abdulkadir and his disinterest in 
a path of autonomy set by the organization. Until his last days, Emin Ali continued to 
work for the Kurdish cause but never had the power that Abdulkadir possessed (Özoğlu, 
2004: 95-100). 
 All in all, the Kurdish community had leaders that actively worked for the 
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Kurdish cause until the end of the Ottoman Empire. They did not succeed in forming an 
independent Kurdistan due to the shortcomings of the Kurdish nationalist movement and 
the weakness caused by the eradication of the emirates, as well as the lack of a unitary 
Kurdish identity to form a single Kurdish nation striving for an independent state. The 
formation of Turkey as a secular, unitary nation-state would become another important 
obstacle, which will be explained later on in this chapter. 
 On the other side of the Ottoman border there was the Qajar Iran that governed 
over the remainder of the Kurdish community. It is important to look at the late Qajar 
Empire's perception of Kurdistan to understand the differences between Kurdish 
perceptions in the Middle East as well as the diversities in attitudes between the Persians 
and the Turks. Indeed, the understanding of Kurdistan as a geopolitical entity was 
weaker in Iran than in the Ottoman Empire, due to the fact that Kurds were a smaller 
minority (less than 10 percent of the population) and lacked political influence. Similar 
to the Ottoman Empire, the Qajars privileged the traditional tribal structure and 
encouraged tribal/religious identities over nationalist intentions. The local populations 
were arranged as either Muslim or non-Muslim. The clerical hierarchy allowed Shia 
Kurds to integrate into other Shia groups and creating opportunities for some to become 
leading ayatollahs. Unlike the non-Sunni groups of the Ottoman Empire, the Sunni 
Muslims and Sufi minorities still found some cultural and political opportunities. The 
traditional order and agrarian economy favored Kurdish landowners, tribesmen, and 
warriors. Qajars did not develop a professional army and depended on tribal groups for 
defense. In return for their services, the chiefs were exempted from taxes, received land 
or obtained positions in government. In contrast to the Ottoman political space 
emphasizing centralization towards the end of the nineteenth century, Iranian attempts 
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for centralization remained more futile. Even as the imperial system started to crumble 
in Iran, the existing Qajar's social organizations endured. In all, Kurdistan was neglected 
by Tehran as it was isolated from other provinces. This led to the emergence of different 
types of Kurdish identities. Most of the Kurds identified themselves as Kermanshahis, 
Sanandajis, or Howremanis based on their tribal affiliations. In this atmosphere, the 
Kurdish Sufi brotherhoods could not obtain governmental support or other resources to 
organize Kurds at a religious or a national level. The urban-tribal divisions that 
mobilized the Kurds in the Ottoman Empire were not present under the Qajar rule. In the 
absence of ethnicized form of nationalism within the borders, Kurds found no reason to 
differentiate themselves. In fact, the shared history and culture among the Persians and 
the Kurds, the use of secular, monarchical, and tribal themes led to favoring of the Kurds 
over the other ethnic communities within borders (Natali, 2002: 186-197). Therefore, 
unlike the Ottoman Empire, there were no large-scale Kurdish resistance movements in 
Qajar Iran. 
 All in all, the deterritorialization and reterritorialization experienced in the 
Ottoman Empire by the mid-nineteenth century led Kurdish leaders to seek alternatives 
for protecting their interests. In other words, the simultaneous processes of centralization 
and disintegration altered the relations between the Kurds and the Ottoman center. The 
Ottoman attempts for centralization, which had designed to prevent further 
disintegration of the Empire, were not welcomed by Kurdish tribes, which were 
accustomed to autonomy. Although most of the Kurdish rebellions were not based on 
nationalist discourses, they planted the seeds for nationalist uprisings in the coming 
decades. Contrarily, in Iran, the political space encouraged a more consistent and 
balanced relationship between the Kurds and the Iranian rulers. In sum, although 
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geographically existed as a distinct region, Kurdistan could not emerge as a geopolitical 
entity under Ottoman and Qajar rule both because of intra-Kurdish rivalry preventing a 
single Kurdish authority to rule the region and because of imperial responses to the 
Kurdish people. Although the imperial responses differ (conflict in the case of late 
Ottoman Empire and neglect and cooperation in the case of late Qajar Empire), there 
was no clear nationalist sentiment motivating the Kurdish people against the respective 
sovereigns. The motives for Kurdish rebellions in the Ottoman Empire were more 
political and economic than nationalist and the Kurds did not experience a significant 
pressure from the Qajar rulers leading them to rebellion. However, the disintegration of 
the Ottoman Empire and the fall of the Qajar dynasty would have dramatic implications 
changing the nature of the relationship between the Kurds and the new sovereigns. 
 
3.2. Deterritorialization and Reterritorialization of Kurdistan at the End of the 
Ottoman Era: Western Attempts for Defining “Kurdistan” 
 The eighteenth century had closed with Napoleon Bonaparte's invasion of Egypt 
in 1798 which was a psychological blow for the Ottomans since the Europeans 
penetrated for the first time the non-European territories of the Empire and became 
politically and militarily influential in the Middle Eastern provinces. From then on, 
during the nineteenth century, the Ottoman Empire was able to survive only by 
benefiting from the European balance of power (Neumann, 2006: 58). In this period, 
Britain had achieved a privileged status in Egypt; the Suez Canal had brought a new 
strategic emphasis to the region between the Mediterranean Sea and the Indian Ocean. 
By 1881, the deteriorating Ottoman economy had come to such a dead end that a Public 
Debt Administration had been formed through which European powers could interfere in 
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Ottoman economy (Quataert, 2005: 58 -104). Meanwhile, Germany turned out to be 
another significant actor in the Middle East, enhancing the European rivalry through the 
Berlin-Baghdad railway project. Finally, the discovery of vast oil resources in Southern 
Mesopotamia had significantly increased the importance of the Middle East. The 
Ottoman government had used these conflicting interests of the Great Powers to 
continue its existence, but her decision to join the World War I on the side of the 
German-Austro-Hungarian alliance dramatically changed the circumstances (Kirişçi, 
1997:103–105). 
 While, British, French and Germans increased their interest in the Ottoman 
Middle East, the Russians began to use the Armenian-populated territories of the 
Ottoman Empire as a stepping stone to the warm waters; hence they participated into the 
Great Power rivalry by opening up an eastern front. However, this created a significant 
threat for the Kurds, since the territories which Russia had interested in were the 
territories also described as Kurdistan. In other words, the territories named as “Western 
Armenia” and “Kurdistan” overlapped geopolitically, which began to alter the 
relationship between the Kurdish and Armenian people. The Russian-Ottoman wars took 
their toll on the Kurdish-Armenian relations as well. While the Russians were able to 
exert some degree of control over Eastern Anatolia Armenians backed the Russian 
occupation and even aided the Russians to pursue their advance in Western Armenia 
during the Ottoman-Russian War of 1877-78 (Ünal, 2005, 87-114).   
Meanwhile, the British and the American missionaries became active as there had 
always been a sizable Christian population in Kurdistan. Nestorians working under 
Kurdish chieftains welcomed foreign aid as they hoped to become their own masters 
(Van Bruinessen, 1992: 107-185). The British had also taken a keen interest in the 
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Armenians after the Congress of Berlin 1878 (Duguid, 1973: 142). From the Kurdish 
point of view, this was considered as an important step for the independence of Armenia 
and a direct threat to the Kurdish tribal interests (McDowall, 2007: 57). In order to 
suppress the possibility of an independent Armenian state and an attempt to keep 
Kurdish leaders at bay, the Hamidiye Regiments were created by Sultan Abdülhamid 
(Duguid, 1973: 142-145). They were tribal militia led by tribal chieftains. This allowed 
the chieftains to increase their power and even abused the authority given to them to 
suppress the local Armenian population. In some cases, Hamidiye Regiments were able 
to maintain a balance between tribes as weaker groups found ways of strength against 
rivals. Moreover, on the other hand, this policy of arming the Kurds under Ottoman 
service discouraged, at least temporarily, the Kurdish tribes to rebel against the 
Ottomans since the Armenian-Russian threat was perceived to be more significant (Van 
Bruinessen, 1992: 186). 
 The Western penetration to the Ottoman Empire’s Middle Eastern territories 
reached to a climax between 1915 and 1917, when a series of agreements were made to 
share the Ottoman Empire, the most significant of which was the Sykes-Picot 
Agreement. While the Middle Eastern territories of the Empire were put under British 
and French sphere of influences or direct rule, so were the Kurdish populated territories 
(Kirişçi, 1997: 103–105). As a result of this agreement, Syria, Lebanon and Turkish 
Cilicia were handed over to the French, and Palestine, Transjordan, the territories around 
the Persian Gulf and Baghdad were put under British control. Although Sykes-Picot 
Agreement did not envisage an independent Kurdistan as a geopolitical entity, it 
increased British presence in the Middle East dramatically. The agreement hastened 
Britain to occupy Baghdad in March 1917, Mosul on early 1918 and Damascus in late 
56 
 
1918 (Fisher, 1988: 129).  
At the beginning, the British presence in Southern Kurdistan was limited by the 
lack of sufficient army for occupation and civilian administrators. Thus, the British 
sought the support of the Kurdish population “to liberate towns from the Turkish rule”. 
Accordingly, Britain would not interfere directly but provide political and administrative 
help to Kurdish leaders. Sheikh Mahmud Barzinji emerged as one of the most influential 
Kurdish political figures after the war. He had contacted with the European powers to 
drive out the Turks from Kurdistan and wrote to the British forces to include Kurdistan 
in the list of liberated territories. He then organized a meeting of the notables of 
Sulaymaniya region to decide on Kurdistan's future after the Turkish retreat. The 
outcome of this meeting was the formation of an autonomous Kurdish state under the 
leadership of Sheikh Mahmud. Although the establishment of an autonomous Kurdish 
political identity seemed to amend the Sykes-Picot agreement, since there was no 
mention of such a political identity in the text of the agreement, the British managed to 
keep the Kurdish government between 1818 and 1819. However, not all British officers 
in the region wanted to pursue an autonomous political entity. Soon after the formation 
of the Kurdish government, Colonel Arnold Wilson, who was the Acting Civil 
Commissioner in Iraq, began to downgrade the efficiency of this local political entity 
(Gunter, 2009: 210). According to Wilson, Kurds were just as divided as the Arabs and 
they were incapable of governing. He discredited the Kurdish government by arguing 
that British interests can be better served through a British protectorate with British 
officials in command. He was quick to act and within months he had ended the 
autonomy of the Kurdish government by reintroducing the feudal system under British 
control (Eskander, 2000: 139-149). 
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 By the end of the World War I much had changed and Sykes-Picot Agreement 
could not be realized as it had been designed. The new post-World War I order for the 
Ottoman Empire was created by the Treaty of Sevres which was signed in August 1920. 
The significance of this treaty was that for the first time Kurdistan appeared as a 
geopolitical entity, which was designed to prevent Turkey from retaining control of the 
territorial gap between Armenia and Mesopotamia. It would also help strengthening 
British acquisition of Mosul (which was not left to the French contrary to the Sykes-
Picot Agreement) as well as creating a buffer zone for this oil-rich province. With the 
French pressure and diplomacy, a decision was made to establish an autonomous 
Kurdistan envisaged by a joint French-British-Italian commission. It was decided that 
within a year after the formation of Kurdistan, the Kurds could appeal to the League of 
Nations for a full independence. Mosul was excluded from this project of Kurdistan as it 
was to remain under British influence. However, no Kurd rose to represent the entire 
Kurdistan. Tribal leaders once again chose to consider their own interests. Without the 
backing of a great power, no Kurdish chieftain could achieve the control of entire 
Kurdistan (Helmreich, 1974: 27, 301-302). Some concerns were voiced by some 
European diplomats and bureacurats, who had different experiences in the Kurdish 
territories, such as James Levi Barton, who was a missionary and an executive of the 
American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions, regarding the Kurds 
inexperience for any kind of administrative government (Barton, 1918: 12). Lastly, the 
treaty had some major flaws as it did not include Kurdish territories in Syria as well as 
Dersim and it did not mark Kurdistan's boundaries with Armenia. In the end, such 
shortcomings crippled Kurdistan's chances, but they were nothing compared to the fact 
that the treaty was forced upon an unwilling government lacking constituency even in 
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Istanbul (McDowall, 2007: 137). Although the Treaty of Sevres formalized the division 
of the Ottoman Empire, it was considered to be void by a new state emerging under 
Mustafa Kemal's leadership. 
All in all, the Western penetration into the territories described as Kurdistan by the 
late nineteenth century has transformed the existing traditional power structure in the 
region. To start with, the presence of Great Powers created opportunities and challenges 
for the Kurds. On the one hand, the missionary activities in the region resulted in the 
eradication of isolation of the region from the rest of the world and began to make the 
Kurds acquainted with missionaries and their ideas. Moreover, the West began to learn 
that a particular region known as Kurdistan existed at a strategic location linking Black 
Sea basin to Mesopotamia. On the other hand, Great Power rivalry and particularly 
Russian attempts for creating an independent Armenia in the region resulted in Kurdish 
reaction against this project. The threat of an independent Armenia led some Kurdish 
tribes to ally with the Ottomans under the framework of Hamidiye Regiments and thus 
prevented emergence of an independent Kurdistan. Secondly, the partition of the 
Kurdish territories under British and French influence through the Sykes-Picot 
Agreement resulted in different colonial frameworks leading to further disintegration of 
the Kurdish people. This was tried to be reversed with the introduction of an 
independent Kurdistan in the Treaty of Sevres; however, the problems in the formulation 
of the Treaty, particularly the vague definition of the territorial boundaries of this new 
state as well as the Turkish liberation movement resisting the implementation of the 
Treaty resulted in the failure of emergence of an independent Kurdistan.   
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3.3. Turkey and the Kurds: From Cooperation to Conflict (1919-1950) 
 A Turkish national resistance and liberation movement emerged as the Ottoman 
Empire began to crumble after the World War I. The Turkish forces lead by Mustafa 
Kemal, formed the new state of Turkey. The eastern borders of this new state included a 
portion of what is known to be “Kurdistan” and made the Kurdish people the second 
largest ethnic community within the Turkish borders. The post-World War I period had 
started with discourses of brotherhood between the Turkish and the Kurdish population 
as well as promises of autonomy to the Kurds but soon after Turkey's territorial 
recognition, any form of self-government was soon out of question. This section will 
look into how a shift in autonomous politics and modernization policies triggered 
Kurdish rebellions that led to implementations of civilizational geopolitics between 1919 
and 1950. 
 Once Mustafa Kemal began to organize the resistance and became a powerful 
leader, his policies were perceived as a threat against both the Ottoman Empire and 
European powers. The European powers, which were interested in the former Middle 
Eastern territories of the Empire began to increase their contacts with the local 
population. For instance, Britain had sent Major Edward Noel, an intelligence officer 
served in Sulaymaniya region, to strengthen the British presence and undermine the 
Turkish influence in the region by installing Emin Ali Bedirkhan as the governor of 
Diyarbakir. Noel met with Bedirkhan family members and traveled to Antep and 
Malatya with them. He was hoping to use the Alevi Kurds as they did not share the 
feeling of Muslim unity and loyalty to the Caliphate, but most importantly they appeared 
hostile to a Turkish nationalist movement (McDowall, 2007: 128-129). However, 
Mustafa Kemal had learned the intentions of Bedirkhans and Major Noel to hamper the 
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national congress planned to be convened in Sivas and to detain the attendees if not 
assassinating them. As a reactive measure Mustafa Kemal chose to send the thirteenth 
district army corps, and forced Noel and the Bedirkhans to flee towards Syria (Atatürk, 
1970: 116-117). 
 Mustafa Kemal found it necessary to build relations with Kurdish tribal leaders. 
He thought it dangerous to single out a leader as it would give the impression of 
downgrading others and eventually leading to conflict. Mustafa Kemal's orchestration of 
relations with the tribal leaders was put to a test when he set about organizing the 
Turkish national resistance in 19 May 1919. He found that the Kurdish club in 
Diyarbakir was working for the Kurdish independence and increasingly cooperating 
with the Hürriyet and İtilaf Fırkası (Entente Liberal), which was an opposition group 
whose policies fitted with that of the Istanbul government. Mustafa Kemal sent a 
telegram from Samsun on 28 May 1919 to the Kurdish club underlining the importance 
of national unity and emphasizing that a racial conflict between brothers could be abused 
by external enemies. It should be pointed out that the term race was used to denote an 
ethnic community. In another telegram Mustafa Kemal declared the British intentions to 
build Kurdistan would serve Armenians more than the Kurds. He stated that Turks and 
Kurds are true brothers, thus, inseparable and that he is willing to grant all rights and 
privileges in order to ensure the unity of these two communities (Mango, 1999: 5-8). 
 A similar emphasis on the unity of Turks and Kurds was evident in the Congress 
of Erzurum. During the Congress, on August 7, 1919, Mustafa Kemal issued a 
declaration stated that Turks, Kurds and all other Muslims in Anatolia and Eastern 
Thrace were brothers and the decisions of the Congress were reported to two Kurdish 
leaders: Sheikh Abdulbaki Kufrevi of Bitlis and Cemil Çeto of Garzan.  Sivas Congress 
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refined the terms used in Erzurum and the wording implied a respect toward Kurdish 
ethnicity and customs: 
 All Islamic elements living in the above mentioned domains [the Ottoman lands within the 
armistice lines] are true brothers, imbued with feelings of mutual respect and sacrifice for 
each other, and wholly respectful of racial and social rights and local conditions (Mango, 
1999: 11). 
 There are several reasons for the Kurdish-Turkish brotherhood discourse of 
Mustafa Kemal. First, Mustafa Kemal and his colleagues must have been aware of the 
fact the entity they were trying to put together had not developed into a nation like some 
of the disparate communities in Anatolia. While there was a talk of what a Turk might 
be, there was also an attempt to bolster the shared attributes with other communities in 
order to internalize different ethnicities. Secondly, the Ottoman discourse of religious 
brotherhood continued into Mustafa Kemal's rhetoric and it would take several years 
before the Turkish leader put his innovating ideas to action. Third, Mustafa Kemal had 
been contacting with Kurdish chieftains and had developed friendly relations toward 
them. Thus, it would be natural for him to emphasize the Turkish-Kurdish brotherhood 
(Heper, 2007: 85-120). Whether Mustafa Kemal aimed to prevent the possibility of an 
autonomous if not independent Kurdistan in the future with his rhetoric cannot be said 
for certain; but these three factors certainly had an impact on the Kurdish-Turkish 
relations as they contributed to the collaboration between the two communities. As it 
will be discussed later on, this collaboration eventually handicapped the formation of an 
independent Kurdistan. 
 Meanwhile, Damad Ferid Pasha, the former Ottoman Grand Vizier, decided to 
use some Kurdish tribes to overcome the nationalist threat in general and Mustafa 
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Kemal’s prestige in particular. Moreover, he believed that he could regain his position as 
Grand Vizier if he could come up with a plan to defeat Mustafa Kemal. He sought the 
help of Kurdish Sheikh Abdülkadir and promised Kurds complete autonomy in return 
for a Kurdish assault on the Turkish nationalist forces. Abdülkadir was reluctant to act 
without guarantees from Ferid Pasha and assurance of protection toward Kurdistan from 
the British. Abdülkadir was not against Turkish rule but he feared an Armenian rule 
which he thought to be completely unacceptable. The failure of Kurds to produce 
credible leadership was a blow to the British hopes but the failure to create an alternative 
to Sykes-Picot in 1918 was an even bigger set back. The British failed to give proper 
guarantees to the Kurds for the establishment of an autonomous, if not independent, 
Kurdistan. As time passed between the Armistice of Mudros and the Treaty of Sevres, 
Kurds responded to Mustafa Kemal's call of Muslims, for it seemed the most credible 
position. A pan-Islamic propaganda proved successful and many Kurdish tribes turned 
in Kemal's favor. Meanwhile, Mustafa Kemal had strengthened his position and had 
worked for the establishment of a national assembly. In January 1920, a large Turkish 
nationalist majority affirmed a significant document known as the National Pact (Misak-
ı Milli) (McDowall, 2007: 130).  
 The first article of the National Pact follows as (Hurewitz, 1956: 74-75):  
Inasmuch as it is necessary that the destinies of the portions of the Turkish Empire which 
are populated exclusively by an Arab majority, and which on the conclusion of the armistice 
of the 30th of October, 1918, were in the occupation of enemy forces, should be determined 
in accordance with the votes which shall be freely given by the inhabitants, whole of those 
parts whether within or outside the said armistice-line, which are inhabited by an Ottoman 
Moslem majority, united in religion, in race and in aim, imbued with sentiments of mutual 
respect for each other and of sacrifice, and wholly respectful of each other's racial rights and 
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surrounding conditions, form a whole which does not admit of division for any reason in 
truth or in ordinance.  
 It can be inferred from this article that the Turks and the Kurds were aware of 
their own racial and social rights, which they respected; however, against a common 
threat, they were united as if they constitute a single entity. Thus geopolitically 
speaking, there could be no autonomous Kurdistan since it would split the non-divisible 
geographical unity proposed by the National Pact. It should be considered that this pact 
was written after the break off of Arab populated lands. Among the remaining ethnicities 
there was a high populace of Kurds. Considering the nation building process, as stated 
earlier, even though the National Pact does not state Kurds specifically, it can be safe to 
assume that it saw no conflict leading a war against European powers and constructing a 
state with the Kurdish brothers as stated by Mustafa Kemal. 
 After the inauguration of the Grand National Assembly, in which Kurdish 
deputies were also present, Mustafa Kemal put his views in a general framework on 24 
April 1920. He declared the importance of the marked borders of Turkey which 
encompassed Mosul. This was not just a military but a national frontier. He emphasized 
the Islamic elements which belonged to the same nation. However, Kurds were not 
specifically pointed out in this speech. On 1 May 1920, he touched upon the Kurds once 
more declaring that the assembly is not made only of Turks, Circassians or Kurds but a 
sincere gathering of all Islamic elements with no privileged amongst. The ambiguity 
about race remained but the choice to use “people of Turkey” instead of “Turkish 
people” was very significant (Mango, 1999: 12-13). 
 In June 1920, Mustafa Kemal wrote instructions on constitutional provisions of 
local government to Nihat Pasha, who served in Turkish Land Forces and was the 
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commander of the Al-Jazirah Front (Burak, 2005: 169). The instructions clearly foresaw 
to include Kurds directly and effectively. Despite there was no mention of an 
autonomous Kurdish government in the text of the National Pact, in these instructions it 
was mentioned that the Kurds were to have a local government when Kurdish leaders 
and notables declared to live under the administration of the Grand National Assembly. 
The Al-Jazirah front was responsible for completing the necessary work to create a local 
government of Kurdistan (Mango, 1999: 14-17). Mustafa Kemal continued to voice the 
will to create autonomy for the Kurds up until 1923 but was met with some caution from 
the politicians. For example Kazım Karabekir, who was a general in the Turkish army 
had a restrained attitude towards the Kurds, told the Chief of Staff that there would be an 
emerging problem as the Kurdish situation is consistently tempered by different groups. 
Karabekir believed that a raising Kurdish consciousness would be to Turkey's 
disadvantage, therefore a Turkish Kurdistan should be divided into three districts and 
powerful Turkish villages should be settled in these divisions. He believed only together 
with soldiers as head officials of these districts, the government could take control of the 
regions and impose its sovereignty (Tan, 2012: 259). 
 In 1922, Ismet Pasha, the head of the Turkish delegation, and Lord Curzon, the 
head of the British delegation, discussed the issue of Kurdistan in the Lausanne Peace 
Conference. The Turkish side did not see itself bound with the Treaty of Sevres and 
claimed the territory from Province of Mosul down to Jabal Hamrin in Northern Iraq. 
These claims were based on several factors. First, Turks and Kurds were said to be 
racially inseparable and the Arabs were the minority. Secondly, most of Turkey's trade 
was declared to be with Anatolia. Third, the Turks claimed illegal occupation by the 
British after the Mudros Truce. Lastly, Turks claimed that all inhabitants wanted to join 
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Turkey and it was an issue of self-determination. Mosul was temporarily left out of 
negotiation as both sides were unwilling to give it up. The treaty was signed in 24 July 
1923 and formalized the de facto division of Kurdish inhibited lands between Turkey, 
Iraq and Iran. Britain's Kurdish policy in Iraq was influenced by the negotiations with 
Turkey over Iraq. Between 1922 and 1924 Britain withdrew her support for an 
independent Kurdish state. This new stand was taken due to Britain wish to appease 
Turkey, whose cooperation was needed to isolate Bolshevik Russia. Kurds were used as 
pawns by both sides to control Mosul (Ali, 1997: 521-531). 
 The question of Kurdish self-autonomy within Turkey was pushed aside as soon 
as the Lausanne Treaty was signed and Turkish sovereignty was recognized over its 
territories. The Mosul question was still unresolved but after the Izmir Briefing in 1923 
it seemed as though Mustafa Kemal had written off Mosul. The priorities had changed 
for Mustafa Kemal. He desired to create a modern secular state and would need a strong 
authority to do it. Provincial self-government especially in an area considered backward 
would have been an obstacle. A modern state was perceived to need a homogeneous 
society as well as a homogeneous identity (Arakon, 2010: 178). 
 Overall, in the period of Turkish national liberation movement, there were some 
stakes to establish an autonomous regional government in the region defined as 
“Kurdistan”; however, two factors prevented this process. First, the National Pact was 
formulated in a manner to create a single territorial unit populated by Ottoman/Muslim 
majority, and in order to emphasize the unity of the Turkish government, no autonomous 
region was designed in it. While some of the Kurdish elites might have thought to 
establish such an autonomous entity, the existence of a common threat prevented them 
to insist on these schemes. When the war was over and when Mustafa Kemal’s authority 
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and legitimacy became mostly indisputable, the Turkish ruling elite opted for a unitary 
nation-state, in which ethnic-based territorial formations were not allowed. Therefore, 
the deterritorialization of Kurdish-populated provinces during World War I and their 
reterritorialization with the Treaty of Lausanne resulted in the failure of establishing an 
autonomous Kurdistan in this period. The articles of Lausanne between 37 and 45 are 
part of the political clauses of the treaty. They refer to the minority rights of Greeks, 
Armenians and non-Muslims such as the Jews leaving out any mention of the Kurds or 
Kurdistan (Republic of Turkey Ministery of Foreign Affairs, n.d.). 
 
3.3.a. Civilizational Geopolitics in a New-born State: 
 The next step after recognition of Turkish independence was further 
modernization and economic development of the country. The discourse of development 
of the Turkish leaders resembles the discourse of civilizational geopolitics. Accordingly, 
the concept of civilization became dramatically important which was laconically 
expressed with the expression of “reaching the contemporary level of civilization” 
(muasır medeniyetler seviyesine ulaşmak). The state assumed the paternal role of ruling 
as well as constructing and defending the common good. The notion of civilization 
created an uncivilized other, which had to be civilized by the state. In other words, 
likewise the external civilizing motive of the nineteenth century, which legitimized 
European penetration into the non-European world through civilizational discourse, an 
internal civilizing mission was designed to eliminate “traditional/oriental” characteristics 
of the society and to make them “modern/western”. This mission involved othering of 
the Ottoman past, of all rural and tribal structures. The ethnic, religious and the linguistic 
differences of the old empire were presented as the source of instability and an obstacle 
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in front of progress. The authorities ignored the dissident voices when trying to mold 
loyal nationalist citizens (Zeydanlıoğlu, 2008: 155-162). 
 Following decades of the new republic showed no signs of autonomy for the 
Kurds. Works of Ziya Gökalp were very much influential at the time. For example in his 
book about the principles of Turkism, Gökalp examines the existing definitions of a 
nation and concludes that unity is transferred through education and education does not 
have much to do with ethnic heritage. As long as people within a nation share the same 
language, religion, culture they can be held together in unity (Gökalp, 1968: 32-40). 
 In 1924, the Law of the Unification of Instruction (Tevhid-i Tedrisat Kanunu) 
was adopted to eliminate the socio-political legacy of the Ottoman education system. 
The Hat Law in 1925 discouraged excessive veiling and encouraged a Western type of 
dress and prohibited the fez. The caliphate was abolished, religious foundations were put 
under government control, courts became secular, dervish orders and sectarian facilities 
were shut down. These secularist reforms aimed to eliminate the traditional structure of 
the Ottoman Empire and construct the nation-state of Turkey. Turkification was 
introduced to take place of Islam, which had been perceived as a source of unification 
under the Ottoman Empire. The measures taken for homogenization of the Turkish 
nation intended to obtain loyalty of citizens as well as preventing ethnic separatism. At 
the same time the ruling elite had hoped to weaken European colonial interference which 
had left a deep scar since the collapse of the Ottoman Empire (Zeydanlıoğlu, 2008: 162-
163). 
 Within this nationalist/secularist fervor, the Kurds as a people and Kurdistan as a 
region was perceived as backward; thus the region had to be civilized for the good of the 
people living there. Hence a civilizational geopolitical discourse became evident even at 
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the higher echelons of the Turkish ruling elite. For example, the Turkish foreign minister 
Tevfik Rüştü expressed his views regarding the Kurds in 1925 as such: 
…in their [Kurdish] case, their cultural level is so low, their mentality so backward, that 
they cannot be simply in the general Turkish body politic [...] they will die out, 
economically unfitted for the struggle for life in competition with the more advanced and 
cultured Turks [...] as many as can will emigrate into Persia and Iraq, while the rest will 
simply undergo the elimination of the unfit (McDowall, 2007: 200). 
 Similarly, in 1930, towards the end of the Ararat rebellion (explained later on in 
this chapter), Mahmud Esad Bozkurt, the Turkish interior minister, made his declaration: 
Only the Turkish nation has the privilege of demanding national rights in this country. There 
is no possibility that other ethnic groups' demands for such a right will be recognized. There 
is no need to hide the truth. The Turks are the sole owners and the sole nobles of this 
country. Those who are not of Turkish origin have only one right: to serve and be the slaves, 
without question, of the noble Turkish nation (Olson, 2000: 93). 
 In sum, the Kurds were perceived as ethno-linguistic aliens and insufficiently 
civilized. The official Turkish view was that Kurds were “mountain Turks” who had 
forgotten their identities. They have culturally and linguistically degenerated and, thus, 
speak gibberish comprised of Persian, Arabic, and Turkish. Their language is incapable 
of expressing sophisticated thought. According to Van Bruinessen (1984: 6), the Turkish 
elite of the time have been very much obsessed with territorial integrity and national 
unity which is another traumatic heritage from the dismemberment of the Ottoman 
Empire. These laid the foundations for policies of assimilation.  
 The civilizational geopolitical discourse began to strengthen in 1930s with the 
introduction of “Turkish History Thesis”, which argued that the Turks came from 
Central Asia and they spread civilization across different parts of the globe. It put forth 
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the Turks as the origin of all ancient civilizations in Anatolia. Schools books were 
rewritten to contain this theory to support the Turkish education and nationalism. The 
other theory put forth around the same time was the Sun Language Theory which 
asserted Turkish as the foundation of all the languages spoken in the Middle Asia. 
Turkish as spoken today was the continuation of this original and unique heritage. 
Turkish Language Institution was founded to purify Turkish (Kirişçi and Garet, 1997: 
153-154). These civilizational discourses had two main objectives: First, through these 
discourses, a community that had no social, ethnic or religious differences was tried to 
be constructed. Secondly, no religious-ethnic minorities have been defined to disturb the 
national unity discourse (Arakon, 2010: 177). It is aimed to melt the Kurdish culture 
within the Turkish one through these theories and institutions. Had they been successful, 
a homogeneous Turkey could be created but it was not enough to erase the cultural and 
ethical bonds of the Kurds.  
Creating a Turkish nation meant that the Kurdish identity had to be forgotten, 
postponed and canceled (Yeğen, 1999: 120). The new Turkish state discourse was based 
on the denial of existence of Kurds as a different ethnic identity. When reference had to 
be made towards the Kurdish issue, the state chose to address conflicts without 
pronouncing the word “Kurd” (Yeğen, 1999(b): 560). In 1934, the Settlement Law was 
enacted which divided the people living in Turkey under three categories. The first 
category was comprised of persons possessing the Turkish culture, language and 
ethnicity. The second category was the non-Turkish populations who were considered 
Turk, but could not speak Turkish. Finally, the last category was composed of those who 
could not speak Turkish and did not possess anything of the Turkish ethnicity. The 
settlement law separated Turkish lands into three zones. The first zone was settled by 
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Turkish-speaking ethnically-Turkish citizens therefore it could be opened to immigrants 
from inside and outside of the state. The second zone was for those who needed to be 
assimilated further into the Turkish culture. The last zone was closed to any kind of 
settlement due to security reasons. The seventh article of the law stated that those of 
Turkish dissent could reside in any area that was open for settlement, but other 
immigrants were to be settled by the government. It should be noted that this law was 
not designed only for Kurds but for immigrants from the Balkans and the Caucasus 
(Kirişçi and Garet, 1997: 148-149). 
 As explained above, the Turkish state itself started a process of 
deterritorialization and reterritorialization within its borders aiming to dissolve the 
Kurdish identity within the Turkish character and remove the perception of Kurdistan all 
together. Civilizational geopolitics provided Turkey the necessary tools to suppress and 
eliminate the contrasting identity of the Kurds. A strong rhetoric of Turkishness was put 
forth as a source of unity, nationalism and pride under the secular and modernizing state 
of Turkey. However, these politics failed as the emphasis of Turkishness led to the 
unexpected reaction of the Kurdish aghas, who saw the new policies as a threat to their 
customs and traditional way of life. The agitation of the aghas soon transformed in to 
three powerful rebellions against Ankara. 
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3.3.b. The Kurdish Resistance: Sheikh Said, Mt. Ararat and Dersim: 
 It was argued in the previous parts that the main reason for Kurdish failure to 
form a “Kurdistan” was their inability to unify under nationalist aims and their lack of 
common ethnic self-consciousness. Soon after the World War I, there were three groups 
of Kurds based on their will of coexistence with the Turks. The first group was a small 
group of Kurds desiring an independent state, while the second group sought autonomy 
under the Ottomans or the Turks. A third group consisted of tribal chiefs who wanted 
their own political units on the land that they had control over, not a unified Kurdistan. 
Part of Turkey's success in denying the Treaty of Sevres and hindering the establishment 
of Kurdistan lies within the disorganization of the Kurds (Kirişçi and Garet, 1997: 120). 
 It is no surprise that Kurds chose to side with the Turks due to the political 
atmosphere of the time as mentioned above. There were seventy-four deputies in the 
Grand Turkish Assembly coming from the Southeastern provinces, most of which were 
of Kurdish; but there were also Kurdish tribes that rebelled against the Turkish 
government. Still, among the twenty-three rebellions against the Turkish resistance 
movement and measures for centralization, four took place within the Kurdish-settled 
lands and Kurdish tribes participated in only three of those rebellions. These were the 
Cemil Çeto rebellion (May 1920), the Milli tribe rebellion (Summer 1920) and the 
Koçgiri rebellion (March and June 1921). These acts were inspired or influenced by the 
Society for the Progress of Kurdistan but none were as serious as the Koçgiri rebellion 
led by Sharif Pasha (Kirişçi and Garet, 1997: 120-122). Sharif Pasha had been present 
during the Paris Peace Conference and had attempted to prepare the first formal map of 
Kurdistan. He wanted to form an independent Kurdistan (O'Shea, 2004: 143-144). 
Hence he clearly reterritorialized the region that he defined as Kurdistan. Some Turkish 
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historians have described the Koçgiri rebellion as a great act of treachery to Turkish 
people during the War of Independence as the Kurds tried to utilize foreign presence to 
form a state of their own declining any communication with Ankara (Yurtçicek, 2016: 
35). However, it was a time of political uncertainty and unity among Kurds could not be 
established. Some Kurds had already joined Mustafa Kemal, crippling the Kurdish 
revolt. Without the support of Great Powers, a divided Kurdish revolt had no chance of 
success (Bozarslan, 2008: 338). 
It would be Sheikh Said in the coming years, who would be able to use his 
position effectively to outset a powerful rebellion that economically cost more than the 
Turkish War of Independence (Kirişçi and Garet, 1997: 151) and set a pattern that would 
influence all the revolts in Turkey as well as the Middle East until 1970s (Bozarslan, 
2008: 339). Accordingly, on 13 February 1925, a rebellion started in the southeastern 
Turkey under the leadership of a Naqshbandi sheikh and tribal leader Sheikh Said 
against the regime. Sheikh Said's influence came from his status as a hereditary religious 
leader which simultaneously made him the leader of the tribes in the area. He was also a 
government official in the Sultan's government in Istanbul, as well as official 
representative to various nationalist organizations established by Mustafa Kemal (Olsen 
and Tucker, 1978: 195-196). 
The reasons of this rebellion are manifold ranging from a reaction against the 
governmental efforts to create a secular state to British agitation over the Mosul question 
to obtain oil-reach territories by arguing that the Turkish and Kurdish peoples did not 
have an intention for peaceful coexistence. In other words, a Kurdish conflict would 
force the Turks to work together with the British and hopefully settle within British 
interests (Değerli, 2010: 96-99). A more balanced approach argues that the real reason of 
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the rebellion was the Turkification and centralization policies of the government. 
Accordingly, Kurdish sheikhs who were present in the first Grand National Assembly 
were not elected to the second. Local notables were angered by removal of tithe, the 
collecting and in most cases pocketing of the taxes, which was a profitable income. The 
Kurds resented conscription and the taxation of the government and the fact that they 
were no longer recognized as separate people, but as “mountain Turks”. The 
abolishment of religious schools and the forced use of Turkish were significantly 
resented. Moreover, the disestablishment of Islam as a source of political power altered 
sheikhs’ bases of power. The abolishment of the caliphate and the abolishment of the 
Sharia gave the impression of an attempt to remove religion from the public sphere. The 
objective of the rebellion was declared as the restoration of caliphate and the 
establishment of Islam (Olsen and Tucker, 1978: 198–200). 
 Despite its being a Kurdish rebellion to a great extent, this rebellion was not 
organized for the creation of an independent Kurdistan as a geopolitical entity. There is 
no doubt that some who participated in the rebellion had intentions of independence but 
the lack of participation of the chieftains (aghas) show otherwise. The chiefs were not 
men of religion like the sheikhs and were able to benefit from governmental positions. 
The main concern was the preservation of traditional way of life. The sense of 
nationalism that the leaders possessed was not defined or articulated; but a 
consciousness of a community existed. Between 1923 and 1924 the Kurdish leaders had 
not felt the effects of reforms and centralization, thus they presumed that they would 
continue to be the Ankara governments arm in the eastern Kurdish areas. Lastly, the use 
of the army to suppress the Sheikh Said rebellion made Kurds cautious of engaging in 
further rebellions at least for some time (Olsen and Tucker, 1978: 199). 
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 The success of the rebellion was strong and frequent in the beginning. The 
government changed as Fethi Bey resigned and İsmet Bey came to power. This 
transition signaled an aggressive military policy. A specific Law for the Maintenance of 
Order (Takrir-i Sükun) was passed and the government obtained the right to suppress 
any organization, publication or institution, which might encourage any action or 
agitation against the regime. The implementation of the law was left to the Independence 
Tribunals (İstiklal Mahkemeleri). The Turkish offensive started in March and the 
rebellion collapsed in April. Said and his followers were brought to the Independence 
Tribunals and Said refused to admit that he done anything wrong and pleaded not guilty. 
He and forty-six of his followers were executed the next day. Mustafa Kemal was than 
able to carry on with his reform projects in the region more vigorously. The rebellion 
was used to justify suppression of dissident elements (Olsen and Tucker, 1978: 199). 
Moreover, Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Partisi (Progressive Republican Party), which was 
formed in 1924 as the first opposition party claimed to support these conservative 
aspects of the rebellion, was closed based on the Takrir-i Sükun (Çağatay, 1972: 27). 
Moreover, some of the Kurdish tribes were sentenced to forced resettlement in various 
parts of the country. 
 Although the revolt was suppressed and the rebels were punished, the security of 
the Eastern Anatolia could not be established. Some rebels that had crossed borders to 
Iran, Iraq and Syria raided the villages across borders and returned Turkey where they 
were said to kill gendarmes and government officials. The revolt had also brought the 
Sunni Kurds in favor of the reforms and the Alevi Kurds in opposition to new 
regulations against each other (Koç, 2010: 162 - 165). 
 The declaration of Ismet Inönü after the elimination of the rebellion was quite 
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conspicuous because of its perception of Turkish nationalism and Turkification policies 
to come: 
We are frankly Nationalist [...] and Nationalism is the only factor for our cohesion. Before 
the Turkish majority other elements have no kind of influence. At any price, we must 
Turkify the inhabitants of our land, and we will annihilate those who oppose Turks or "le 
turkisme." What we seek in those who would serve the country is that, above all, they be 
Turks and "turquistes". They say we lack solicitude for religious currents; we will crush all 
who rise before us to use religion as an instrument (Olson, 2000: 93).  
 Sheikh Said rebellion occurred at a time when two ideologies were conflicting in 
the world: modernism/secularism vs. traditionalism. Mustafa Kemal and the ruling elite 
saw this rebellion as a counter revolution. The rebellion was perceived as a threat to the 
Turkish state and it undermined the confidence of Kemal and his partners towards the 
reforms. This insecurity led to new laws being passed, aiming to fortify the Turkish 
ethnicity and language (Kirişçi and Garet, 1997: 150-151). 
 The importance given to modernization, centralization and secularization of the 
Turkish state had helped the spread of Kurdish ethnic consciousness. The second revolt 
erupted around Mount Ararat in 1927 and it was planned by a new Kurdish party 
founded in Syria: Khoybun. Unlike Sheikh Said rebellion, this revolt aimed to create an 
independent Kurdistan and Mount Ararat was designated as the provisional capital of 
Kurdistan (Edmonds, 1971: 91). Lieutenant Ihsan Nuri, who deserted the Turkish 
military, undertook the leadership of the rebellion. At first Ankara tried to negotiate with 
the rebels but failed to persuade the Kurdish leadership of its sincerity, and Nuri's 
demands of Turkish evacuation of Kurdistan made a settlement impossible. By the 
autumn of 1929, Kurdish forces dominated the area between Mt. Ararat and southern 
regions of the Lake Van, thus, the Turkish government increased its pressure over the 
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rebels. Law no. 1850 was passed in 1931 to ensure that no one engaged in the 
suppression of the rebellion would be prosecuted (McDowall, 2007: 204-207). The 
rebellion was suppressed after this fierce military intervention; however the real 
weakness of the rebellion was the Kurdish tribal system and the lack of coordinated 
action, which crippled the Kurdish fighting capacity. As significant number of rebels 
would be found to act against the Turkish government, there would always be as much 
from other tribes willing to work with and for the government to uphold their interests 
(McDowall, 2007: 207). 
By the mid-1930s, Dersim was a province of Turkey that had not been brought 
under sufficient government control, though some measurements were taken to limit the 
activities of previous rebellions and especially the works of Khoybun. Mustafa Kemal 
himself had signed documents forbidding the printing and the distribution of Khoybun's 
newspapers, books and magazines within Turkey (Yeşiltuna, 2012: 456-460). However, 
the tribes residing in this province had never been truly subdued by the government and 
they continued to live via traditional tribal rules. Chieftains and religious leaders had 
significant power over the commoners and economically exploited them. They did not 
oppose the government as long as it kept out of their affairs and some developed close 
relations with military and police officers to further consolidate their power. Conflicts 
between tribes were common and many tribesmen carried arms, often participating in 
raids against other tribes. Local military were drawn into these feuds as come chieftains 
claimed conspiracy against themselves. At the same time sons of educated families 
carried and tried to spread a Kurdish nationalist understanding (Van Bruinessen, 1994: 
2-3). 
 In 1936, Dersim was decided to be “civilized”, was put under strict governmental 
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authority and renamed as Tunceli. The process of renaming a certain region, town, 
village, etc., is very important in terms of critical geopolitics, which provides 
reterritorialization in line with the demands of existing power structures. Not only 
Dersim, but also the Kurdish names of villages and other towns in the region were also 
abandoned and new Turkish names were given to eradicate any notion of Kurdistan. 
Moreover, the state claimed to bring civilization by building roads, bridges and police 
posts. Some chieftains sought accommodation with the military and other chieftains 
resented the interference by the government. It was one of the first regions where the 
law of resettlement had been put in to practice. It was constituted as a separate province 
and was to be governed by a military governor who had extraordinary powers to arrest 
and deport families. The Minister of Interior, Şükrü Kaya had declared the law as 
necessary against backwardness and unruliness of tribes. In early 1937, the government 
had come to believe that a rebellion was imminent due to resistance to the centralization 
attempts of the government. Chief conspirator was declared to be a religious leader, 
Seyid Riza and five tribes out of a hundred were believed to be conspiring together (Van 
Bruinessen, 1994: 3-11). The conflict escalated and the military had permission to 
interfere. As tribes refused to give up their leaders to the military, the Turkish army 
mounted a large campaign. In September Seyid Riza and his men surrendered but the 
military operations continued with greater force (Dersimi, 1952: 274-286). 
The strong reprisal of the government was not claimed officially to be directed at 
the Kurdish population and the authorized sources never mention Kurds specifically. It 
should be noted that during the Dersim rebellion the Kurds were considered as 
“mountain Turks”. Şükrü Kaya had informed the National Assembly that Dersim 
commoners were authentic Turks but did not know of their Turkishness. In the eyes of 
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the regime, this was the only way to assert the process of liberation leading to a human 
equality and dignity (Van Bruinessen, 1994: 7-12).  The military reports called the rebels 
as Dersim bandits. The Turkish newspaper Cumhuriyet printed on March 1936 also 
informed the readers of the rebellion as an act of bandits but at the same emphasized the 
Turkish citizenship and goodwill. It is very likely that the paper was trying to lower the 
tensions in Tunceli as well as around Turkey as it wrote:  
Tunceli peoples suffering from public insecurity today celebrated with drums and clarions 
the new operations and the groups of bandits coming to surrender to the authorities as a 
show of good will and a sign of honest Turkish citizenship (Yeşiltuna, 2012: 746)  
 There was an external dimension of the rebellion as well. Seyid Riza had 
appealed to Anthony Eden, the Britain Foreign Secretary and demanded support for 
preventing the Kurdish assimilation process practiced by the Turks; but Britain did not 
answer this demand (McDowall, 2007: 208). In fact the government had gained a 
stronger international support (Romano, 2006: 38). 
Although some Kurdish authors describe the Dersim rebellion as a Kurdish 
nationalist movement, it is evident that most of the rebels had acted out in their own 
narrow interests and their own loyalties, instead of establishing an independent or 
autonomous Kurdish polity. The rebellion seems to be another attempt of resistance 
against the civilizing acts of the government and the interference it had on local affairs 
of chieftains (Van Bruinessen, 1994: 11-12). When the revolt ended in 1938, rebellious 
Kurdish elites had all been exiled, killed or deported to Western parts of Turkey. Aghas, 
beys, sheikhs and chieftains either chose to cooperate with the government or they were 
detained (McDowall, 2007: 37-39). 
 After the suppression of this rebellion, Kurdish rebellions seemed to cease to 
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exist and during World War II, the Kurdish separatist movement seemed to lose ground 
in Turkey. Under conditions of war, despite the Kurdish peoples living in countryside 
suffered much economically, they had largely escaped state interventionism and many 
landlords were able profit greatly from this situation. The Republican People's Party 
introduced a Land Reform Bill aiming to divide arable areas to give to the peasants that 
had little or no land. Most of the intended territories were either state-owned or 
traditional waqf (charity property under religion) properties; but there were a number of 
powerful landlords in the southeast that would be affected by implementation of such a 
law. This law needed a powerful one party based system to be passed and the Democrats 
presented themselves as the protectors of private properties from 1946 and onwards. The 
Kurdish peasants that had the most to gain from this law took it suspiciously. Some even 
considered it a plot to destroy Kurdish populate lands. Their devotion as well as their 
loyalty to the Kurdish landlords made them stand beside and vote for the Democrats. In 
1950, when the Democrats won the elections a new era had started for the Turkish Kurds 
(McDowall, 2007: 400-401). 
 To conclude, domestically, the reason for the failure to establish an independent 
or autonomous Kurdistan within Turkey rested in the lack of strong national 
consciousness among the Kurds because of insufficient Kurdish intelligentsia and strong 
local political/religious elites which perceived traditional way of life more viable 
compared to establish an independent state. In other words, these local landlords or 
sheikhs were not aiming to establish an independent geopolitical entity; rather they tried 
to preserve existing tribal formations. This meant that, they would rebel against the 
government only when their traditional interests were harmed and stopped supporting 
rebellions when their interests were restored. The relationship between the central 
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government and the Kurds was much based on a civilizational geopolitical discourse, in 
which the government made an “other” of the Kurds as an uncivilized people, who were 
incapable of self-government and who had to be civilized in order to make themselves 
proper citizens of the new republic. Kurdistan as a territorial concept was not much 
mentioned by the ruling elite as if it had not existed before.  
 
3.4. Iran and the Kurds: Rebellion, State Response and Mahabad Republic (1919-
1950) 
 Western penetration towards Iran had started in the early nineteenth century by 
the military defeats of the Qajars first to the Russians and then to the British. The two 
powers had turned the country into a buffer zone and a contested territory in their “Great 
Game”. The treaties signed with the foreign powers had brought capitulations to the 
Tehran government further weakening the state. The Qajars started a process “defensive 
modernization” in hopes of limiting foreign penetration; however, the efforts failed due 
to the inability of the state to raise sufficient tax revenues. The economic crises brought 
about by the government bankruptcy and inflation triggered a revolution in 1905, which 
paved the way for a written constitution. In 1906, the Constitution was approved by 
Muzaffar al-Din Shah who died shortly after and was replaced by Muhammad Ali Shah. 
By 1908, Muhammad Ali had felt strong enough to lead a coup against the Majlis which 
triggered a civil war within the country. On 12 December 1921 General Reza Khan, 
commander of the Cossack garrison in Qazvin, took control of Tehran. At first he 
declared himself a pro-Shah and a pro-British actor, but soon he started to undermine 
British influence and capitulations. Reza Khan managed to become the real power 
behind the throne first as an army commander, then as Minister of War, and then as the 
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Prime Minister as well as commander-in-chief. In 1925, he convened a Constituent 
Assembly, and by accepting the crown, Reza Khan became Reza Shah, replacing the 
Qajar dynasty with his self-declared Pahlavi dynasty (Abrahamian, 2008: 36-65). During 
this chaotic time, the signing of the Treaty of Sevres and various revolts in the region 
defined as Turkish Kurdistan as well as the Iraqi Kurdistan influenced the Iranian Kurds 
to revolt against a weak Tehran government. This would start a new era in Iranian 
Kurdistan (Yildiz and Taysi, 2007: 2-11).  
 
3.4.a. The Kurdish Uprising of Ismail Agha Simko 
In February 1919 important chieftains of the Iranian Kurdistan came together and 
discussed an insurrection against the Iranian government. Among them were Ismail 
Agha Simko, the chief of Shakkak tribe controlling Urmiyeh, Salamas and souther parts 
of Khoy, and Sayyid Taha,
 
a strong Kurdish notable descending from Sheikh 
Ubeydullah. Accordingly, Sayyid Taha visited Baghdad to obtain British support and 
Ismail Agha Simko wrote a letter for British support to Civil Commissioner in Baghdad, 
A.T. Wilson. Neither of them was able to obtain a definite support for their cause. 
Despite this lack of foreign support, Simko was able to appoint governors of his choice 
in Urmiyeh, tax villages and through raids he was able to obtain firearms as well as 
resources for his future operations. Simko also have a strong influence over the Kurdish 
notables in the regions he had controlled in early 1920s. The biggest tribes of 
Azerbaijan, the chieftains of the Artushi confederacy and other tribes of Hakkari had 
come to council convened by Simko to discuss the Kurdish issue, and they recognized 
Simko's power. By 1921, his authority extended towards all Iranian territory west of 
Lake Urmiyeh, to Baneh and Sardasht, as well as the north western district of Iraq. The 
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same year Simko plundered Souj Bulagh (Mahabad) which was a Kurdish populated 
area. This caused discord among the Kurdish nationalists. However, his success against 
the government troops earned him wide support and increased the numbers of his 
followers (Van Bruinessen, 2006: 18-20). 
 The Kurdish chieftains perceived forming friendly relations with Simko quite 
important since his power was extending day by day. In 1922, Reza Khan decided to act 
against Simko's power with a new, modern, coherent and disciplined army that he had 
built. This changed everything for Simko as he could not resist the army. All but a few 
loyal men remained at his side after the defeat as he had to escape first to Turkey than to 
Iraq. In exile he searched for supporters and although he was greeted with respect, no 
one was ready to join him. In 1926 he made another attempt for independence and 
failed. Finally, in 1929, the Iranian government re-invited him offering the Governorate 
of Osnaviyeh. This was a set up by the government and he was killed few days after 
arrival (Van Bruinessen, 2006: 20-21). 
 The weakness of Simko’s movement was the absence of any kind of formal 
organization and its dependence on personal connections of Simko. The governors 
appointed by him were tribal chieftains with no connection to the people of the towns, 
similar to the Tehran appointed officials. There was no systematic taxation and the 
treasury was filled by looting. Nationalism was one of the factors that mobilized his 
troops but the rate at which his followers dwindled in times of difficulty demonstrates 
that it was merely an additional motivation. It is usual for tribes to look for concrete and 
immediate gains such as military accomplishments over the state, as well as other tribes 
or simply, plunder. When faced with the power of a modernized army the tribes judged 
the possibility of success as inadequate, breaking down the unity of the Kurds (Van 
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Bruinessen, 2006: 23). 
Simko failed because of his shortcomings in creating a political agenda and his 
inability to create a successful bureaucracy to rule. The nationalist aims of the upraising 
were low compared to the tribal nature of the leadership. Simko still had opponents 
within Shakkak tribe; they were silenced but not destroyed. There were also Kurds in the 
North who wanted paid employment and asked the government to form a local 
contingent against Simko. The Mukri, the Dihbukri and the Mamash tribes were divided 
among themselves as pro- or anti-Simko (McDowall, 2007: 217 - 221). Those that chose 
to side with him did so because Simko seemed to be the most powerful figure. What 
Simko did was to use the Kurdish nation state to obtain more power and authority for 
himself (Romano, 2006: 223). In other words, nationalism that he envisaged was only a 
tool; therefore, he failed to unite Iranian Kurds against the state (Yildiz and Taysi, 2007: 
12). 
 Similar to the Turkish case, tribal structure was a huge obstacle for the national 
Kurdish movement. The loyalty that one felt towards its tribe rarely passed onto another 
structure. A Kurd is born into a social relationship with a tribe and he cannot dismember 
himself if he is to remain within the system. This traditional way of life has its own built 
in rivalries and conflicts with other tribes and neighbors that cannot easily be forgotten. 
Only under extraordinary circumstances they could unite against a common enemy or 
for a common goal (Harris, 1977: 114). For the Kurdish folk the question was how they 
could escape taxation, conscription, and other controlling policies of the centralized 
state. For Kurdish leaders or intellectuals the question was how to form an autonomous 
power or if the circumstances presented itself, to form an independent state (Kaveh, 
2008: 29). However without unity and external help, the Kurdish desires of Kurdistan 
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was almost impossible to achieve. 
 
3.4.b. State Response to the Kurds: Reza Shah and the Kurdish Question 
 Reza Khan crushed the Simko rebellion after noticing the threat that the tribal 
society created for the state. He resorted to the strategy that had proved effective since 
centuries. Reza Khan chose to play the tribes against each other, take hostages and act 
against tribal chieftains. However, the proximity of the Kurdish tribes to the Turkish and 
Iraqi borders was disadvantageous as dissident tribes could cross over borders in times 
of threat posed by the government and escape Reza Khan's plans (McDowall, 2007: 
223). Therefore, an argument can be made regarding the border permeability of 
Kurdistan Borders demarcate the territorial limits of a state’s jurisdiction and authority, 
the spatial reach of a given state, and provide a map of geographical distributions of 
named peoples (Cox, 2016). In the case of Kurdistan, the Kurdish community can easily 
cross borders to the villages of their brothers to refrain from states’ jurisdiction. Thus, 
existing state borders were deterritorialized by the Kurds in a way to create a Kurdish 
space free of borders within but having a border separating this space from a non-
Kurdish one, though this latter space was not so much clear. Moreover, this vague 
border perception also becomes a cause of instability of Kurdistan's imagining as its 
perceived definition can change according to the needs of its peoples. It should also be 
noted that the nomadic Kurds would wander across borders between seasons, regardless 
of political conflicts. Bandits, as mentioned earlier, would cross over borders and raid 
villages causing security issues between sovereign states. In case of Reza Shah, the 
crossing and the re-crossing of borders undermine state authority and emphasize the 
trans-border nature of the Kurdish issue. 
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 The conflict of the borders has created a problem over an international dimension 
in the Middle East between Iraq, Iran, Turkey and Syria. Considering the delicacy of the 
borders to the newly founded states such as Turkey and Iran, the Kurdish violation of 
demarcated lines was of considerable significance. The rebellion of Kurdish aghas 
would be logistically supported by Kurds across the borders, making the suppression of 
rebellion a lot harder to suppress. For example, Turkey and Iran had made several 
meetings over Simko’s backing by Kurds living in Turkey. Turkey's decision to increase 
monitoring of logistical support of Kurdish aghas considerably weakened Simko's 
movement and had a direct effect on his downfall (Erdal, 2012: 79). It can be said that 
the Kurdish issue also contributed to the establishment of the Saadabad Pact in 1937 
between Iran, Iraq, Turkey and Afghanistan as these states shared a similar periods of 
nation building, security concerns and a Kurdish conflict. In other words, the Kurdish 
boundary issue led to the search of allies especially between Iran, Iraq and Turkey, in 
order to effectively enforce their sovereignty (Palabıyık, 2010: 157-160). 
 In addition to border management policies, towards the end of the 1920s, the 
Iranian government began to disarm tribes. This required a lot of manpower as the 
Kurdish men were not willing to give up their weapons to the state and preferred instead 
to send them over the borders to other tribes Iraq. The period between 1927 and 1934 
witnessed clashes between the government troops and the Kurdish tribes in terms of 
disarmament. With each clash, the suppression of the state increased. The important 
chiefs such as Sheikh Taha, Umar Khan (Simko's nephew), and Sawj Bulaq chief of the 
Mukri started to be eliminated by the government one by one under suspicious 
circumstances (McDowall, 2007: 225). 
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3.4.c. Civilizational Geopolitical Discourse in Iran  
 Indeed, the model of modernization/westernization pursued by Reza Shah was 
similar to the understanding of the Turkish ruling elite; a coherent society with 
distinctive concept of nation and state. On the political level regional autonomy would 
need to be ended and tribes would have to be weakened through resettlement and their 
opposition would be silenced. On the cultural level a low degree of cultural diversity and 
a high degree of ethnic homogeneity would need to be obtained (Zad, 2012: 54). Despite 
this similarity implementation of civilizational geopolitics in Iran was more difficult 
compared to Turkey. Iran had a much larger variety of ethnicities to be controlled and 
building a common identity would take a lot more work than it had in Turkey. Reza 
Shah set out to promote nation-building using the Turkish example. He even used the 
term “mountain Iranians” to refer to the Kurdish population of the country, although the 
term “Kurd” was never banned as was the case within Turkish borders (Romano, 2006: 
224). The following words of Reza Shah regarding the uniformity of dress are a strong 
example of his attempt at nation-building: 
We know that the ten to twelve million Persians, although of the same race and, with few 
exceptions [sic!], of the same language and religion, used to form groups that were rendered 
heterogeneous by the large distances that separated them and by the bad state of roads. Each 
of them had its own mores, customs, and costumes. The Lors, Kurds, Turcoman, 
Shahsavans, Baluchis, Bakhtiaris, etc., dressed so differently that it was difficult for them to 
consider each other as belonging to the same country (Chehabi, 1993: 224). 
In 1928 traditional honorific titles such as beg, emir, or agha were banned. In 1929 
the Pahlavi hat became obligatory which caused great anger that led the Mamas and the 
Mangur tribes to fight the garrison. Conscription was vigorously rejected. Kurdish 
language was banned in schools in 1934 and on any public notices the following year. In 
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1939, Sardasht tribes revolted against the enforcement of conscription, disarmament and 
the adaptation of European clothes. Before his forced abdication, Reza Shah settled 
tribes and tried hard to destroy their organizations. During the 1930s, the Shah forcibly 
transferred Kurds from their settlements to other locations of the state's choosing and 
placed Turkic speaking peoples. Other Kurds had their lands sequestrated; only 
sometimes were they compensated by lands far away from their own. However, even by 
1936, the chiefs were successful in bribing state officials to leave them relatively free 
from government suppression. Soon the military officers had taken over the roles of 
chieftains in corrupt and cruel affairs. The reforms also had severe economic 
consequences as tribes became impoverished and many towns that depended on the 
Kurdish tribes for their food supply found themselves in short supply. By the late 1930s 
the Kurds were under complete submission (McDowall, 2007: 225-226). 
 Another similarity between Ankara and Tehran governments was the accusation 
of the British on creating a Kurdish nationalist sentiment. Iranian government saw the 
Kurdish nationalism partially as a British game due to the short lived Sevres Treaty that 
promised Kurds a state of their own. The British administration worked to create a 
Kurdish district in Iraq and the manipulation of Kurdish nationalism in order to thwart 
Turkish claims on Mosul in mid-1920 contributed to their suspicions. This belief had 
two main consequences. First, it led to the neglect of internal dimensions of the Kurdish 
grievances and second, it fostered the idea that the problems of Kurds could be quieted 
by diplomatic relations with great powers (Kaveh, 2008: 31). 
 All in all, the period before the World War II in the Iranian Kurdistan was a 
period of tribal conflict and the rivalry among Kurdish tribal chieftains. No significant 
discourse of Kurdish nationalism had taken form. Reza Shah was against any act of 
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autonomy or any transfer of power that would disrupt his plans of nation building. He 
used his victories over local revolts to enhance his military rule and forcibly resettle 
Kurdish tribal leaders or place them in Tehran under his supervision (Ghods, 1991: 38). 
The Kurdish rebellions were against these nationalization and de-tribalization reforms of 
the Shah's government. Just like in Turkey, the Kurds in Iran had failed to unite for their 
common interests under Kurdistan. However, the circumstances would radically change 
with the World War II and with the establishment of the Republic of Mahabad.   
 
3.4.d. The Organized Resistance of Iranian Kurds: Komala JK, KDPI and the Mahabad 
Republic 
 Iran was greatly affected by the World War II as the country was split into two 
spheres of influence. The northern part was controlled by the Soviet Union and the 
southern part by the British and to a lesser degree, the United States. In 1941, Reza Shah 
had been replaced by his son Mohammed Reza Shah, whose influence was low as the 
country was under occupation. To undermine the authority of the Tehran government, 
the exiled and jailed Kurdish tribal chiefs were allowed to return by 1942. They engaged 
in a number of uprisings in the early 1940s seeking to recover their land or their 
positions (Yildiz and Taysi, 2007: 13). For example Abbas Qabudian, one of the most 
significant of Kurdish landlords returned to Kermanshah and with the British support he 
was elected to the Parliament and then to the Tribal Commission of the Parliament, 
where he was able to restore the confiscated tribal lands. He was not alone as many 
chiefs worked to incorporate governmental posts for themselves and for their relatives to 
obtain a monopoly of local power (McDowall, 2007: 334). 
 In the north, tribes living in the west of Lake Urmiyeh were contained by strong 
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Russian garrisons. Since the Iranian authority was almost non-existent in this part of the 
country, the Soviets engaged in direct relations with the Kurdish tribes: the Jalali in the 
north, the Shikak in the mountains west of Shahpur, and the Herki west of Rezaieh. 
There was an intermediary region between the Russians and the British-controlled 
regions, located at the middle of Merivan and the Avroman Mountains that the Kurds 
were able to form a kind of autonomy. In this region, Mahmud Khan of Kani-Senan 
established his hegemony and in Baneh, Hama Rashid Khan established a principality 
including Saqqiz and Sardasht. They were both recognized by the Iranian government as 
semi-autonomous local leaders until 1945, when the reorganized Iranian army forced 
them into Iraq (Roosevelt, 1947: 248). In sum, Iranian Kurdistan was geopolitically 
divided into three, being the British-controlled, Russian-controlled and relatively 
autonomous chiefdoms. 
 It was not only the tribal chiefs at work but also the urban intellectuals of 
Mahabad and other Kurdish towns, as well as middle class civil servants, merchants and 
teachers. This newly emerging relatively well-educated group formed an organization 
called Komala-i-Zhian-i-Kurd (the Committee of Kurdish Youth), or also known as 
Komala JK. Komala was a nationalist organization working for self-governance and 
establishment of an autonomous region within Iranian Kurdistan. At first, it began to 
work as a secret organization performing its activities in formation. Komala kept in 
touch with the Soviets as well the Kurds from HIWA, an Iraqi party working for a 
greater Kurdistan. The Soviets had influenced Komala's Marxist-Leninist character. By 
1944, its representatives started to travel to Iraq, Turkey and Syria which transformed 
the movement into the most significant and innovative Kurdish nationalist movement of 
the time (Yildiz and Taysi, 2007: 13-15). 
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 Soon the Russians had interested in the Komala JK's activities. In 1942, they had 
invited the leading aghas to Baku. As Komala’s influence began to increase, its leaders 
requested Russian assistance to found a branch in Mahabad, where they could hopefully 
meet regularly. In 1945, Komala declared itself officially with a pompous ceremony. 
However, the Soviets were not in favor of the democratic structure of Komala and were 
looking for someone for leadership that could comply with their “suggestions”. Qazi 
Mohammed was a hereditary judge and religious leader of Mahabad and at the same 
time came from a respectable family. He was the man the Russians were searching for. 
At first Komala had feared his reputation as they thought he had the potential to 
dominate the party and had rejected his admission. When Soviets interfered, Komala's 
fear came true as the party turned into a one man rule (Roosevelt, 1947: 250-253). After 
Qazi Muhammad’s takeover, the party did not last very long and its brief life ended on 
15 August 1945 as Mohammad dissolved Komala and absorbed its membership into the 
new Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan (a.k.a Partî Dêmokiratî Kurdistanî Êran, 
Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran or KDPI) (Gunter, 2009: 102). 
 This change proved the powerful grip the Soviets had on the Kurdish party, 
because the radical change that Komala JK was hoping to achieve in Iranian Kurdistan 
would have had adverse consequences for the Soviet security and strategic interests in 
the region. The absence of radical populist rhetoric in KDPI’s discourse of “Kurdistan” 
was specifically designed to incorporate the tribal leaders, landowners and mercantile 
bourgeoisie (Vali, 2011: 25-27). The KDPI gave an opportunity to tribal leaders 
disappointed by the political repression of Reza Shah’s policies as they had begun to use 
nationalism in their political aspirations to oppose the Iranian state after their release. 
With the end of Komala JK, the radical nationalist ideals and reformist ideas were 
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largely abandoned, leaving KDPI with a commitment to autonomy. In the party 
program's part 2, clause 4, its main purpose is stated as: 
To safeguard the rights of the Kurdish people within the boundaries of the Iranian state ... In 
Kurdistan democracy should be fundamentally accessible to the people and they should 
have the right to take part in the elections for the national consultative assembly [the Majlis] 
without national and religious discrimination.(Vali, 2011: 26) 
 Meanwhile in northwestern Azeri-populated territories of Iran, Iranian 
government was rapidly losing control. When Tabriz fell into the hands of Azerbaijan 
People's Government, Qazi Muhammad decided that it was time for the Kurds to do so 
as well. On 22 January 1946 vast number of Kurds from Mahabad and some tribal chiefs 
along with Qazi Muhammad declared the establishment of the Kurdish Republic of 
Mahabad. Qazi Muhammad became the new president. Almost all of the members 
chosen for his cabinet were former members of Komala JK with middle or upper class 
backgrounds (Koohi-Kamali, 2003: 104-109). Qazi Muhammad had managed to go 
beyond tribal relations of the Kurds and had managed to attract different confederations 
of tribes against a commonly identified enemy, the Iranian central government, to form 
an autonomous Kurdistan within Iran (Harris, 1977: 114). 
 It was the tribes that offered their military forces for security of this newly 
established state, but their reason for support was far from nationalist. The Republic was 
the only alternative to the central government and was the only option to end tribal 
rivalry. There were also many chieftains discontent about the republic and its increasing 
power. The reason for this discontent was the threat it posed to tribal leaders’ power and 
influence. The conflicts and rivalries among Kurdish tribes once more appeared as an 
obstacle in front of national unity within the Republic. The central government also 
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abused this obstacle by bribing to some Kurdish notables and offering state support 
against their rivals. By the end of 1945 the Mahabad Republic had grown stronger but its 
dependence on tribal troops emerged as a big vulnerability as it had to rely on tribal 
military power to fight against the government forces as well as rival tribes hostile to the 
Republic. The majority of the cabinet members, the Central Committee of the Party and 
the government officials were from the urban middle class and would take any chance 
they could to reduce the power of tribal chiefs but not much could be done without a 
strong central army. Thus, the movement appeared to be nationalist in appearance, while 
it remained largely under the influence of traditional and tribal factions (Koohi-Kamali, 
2003: 110-111). 
 In sum, the Mahabad government was inexperienced, poorly-organized as a 
result of Kurdish tribal affiliations. Moreover, it did not properly organize its provincial 
structure or reach an administrative-political unity demonstrated by an official map of 
the state. The boundaries of the Republic, whether real or imagined, fell within the 
domestic jurisdiction of the Western and the Eastern Azerbaijan. KDPI also lacked a 
political doctrine. Even though the ruling elite were under the Soviet influence there was 
no talk of socialism, no word of land distribution or action toward equality between the 
peasants and landlords. The political concept of a “Kurdish nation” was claimed to name 
a community internally divided into different social classes and strata, in other words, 
each class had contradictory political, cultural and economic interests (Vali, 2011: 58-
86). 
 Main achievements of Mahabad Republic experience were cultural such as the 
translation of educational books to Kurdish, printing of a newspaper named Kurdistan as 
well as some magazines published in Kurdish. The treasury was sufficient enough to 
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meet daily expenses. Taxes and party dues were collected from tribal leaders who tried 
hard to prove their loyalty. A twenty year agreement of friendship and cooperation was 
signed with the newly formed government of Tabriz in 1946 which had a shocking 
effect on Tehran as it was an act indigenous to independent states (Koohi-Kamali, 2003: 
112-115). 
 As the tension rose with Tehran, Qazi Mohammad and his colleagues gave up 
titles such as president and minister and took up names as party leader or chief of 
finance to appease the Iranian government. Tribal support to Mohammad had started to 
dwindle as soon as the Tabriz-Tehran deal was broadcast. This meant that Azeris had 
abandoned the Kurds and the chieftains began to follow up their personal interests. The 
Iranian government started military operations to bring order to the country and the 
government allowed the army to enter Iranian Kurdistan to maintain law and security 
during parliamentary elections. On 13 December 1947, after the Iranian government re-
entered Tabriz, the Mahabad government declared that it would peacefully receive 
government forces. Thus the Mahabad experience had not lasted a full year when the 
Iranian forces closed Kurdish printing presses, burned the Kurdish books and banned the 
teaching of Kurdish. On March 31, Qazi Mohammad was hanged in the town square 
(McDowall, 2007: 244-245).  
 In sum, Tehran saw the Mahabad Republic and the new Kurdish nationalism as a 
lot more dangerous to its sovereignty then tribal rebellion. The Shah perceived Mahabad 
the same way the Turks viewed the autonomous rule of Kurds, as a dangerous cultural 
framing. After the dissolution of the Republic, Kurdish identity was recognized as long 
as it was not politicized (Romano, 2006: 229)  
 The Mahabad Republic was the first experience that a provincial Kurdish 
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government took a form of an autonomous geopolitical entity, and it was one of the 
political structures closest to a particular state that could exert control over a region 
named as “Kurdistan”. However, except the Soviet political support, the Republic was 
never recognized by any other country. The social and political limits of Mahabad 
prevented it to exert extensive control over a region along Iranian borders; even some 
the major Kurdish cities within Iran such as Sanandaj and Kirmansah were not under 
Mahabad's control (Ahmadzadeh and Stansfield, 2010: 14-15). The Republic of 
Mahabad was too short lived to fulfill the role of a functioning government. For example 
it was able to print school books, but it didn't have the opportunity to educate young 
Kurds. The Republic also depended too much on the Soviet support. Once the Russians 
withdrew, the Kurds of Mahabad were unable to resist the Iranian forces. The most 
important aspect of this government in terms of its geopolitical implication lies not in its 
state formation in itself, but in its realization of the Kurdish nationalism in a transversal 
manner. Only thirty percent of the Mahabad administration was from Iran and the rest 
had come from Iraq, Turkey and Syria (O'Ballance, 1996: 33). Therefore, although 
hampered by the tribal conflicts, it represented a pan-Kurdish desire. In its short life 
span, the Kurdish culture found time to rediscover and recreate its traditions (O'Shea, 
2004: 151-154). Thus, the Republic of Mahabad was perceived by some of the Kurdish 
intellectuals as a proof of the possibility of constructing an independent “Kurdistan”, if 
Kurdish tribalism could be overcome. 
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3.5. Iraq and the Kurds: British Mandate System and Independent Iraq (1919-
1950) 
 After the defeat of the Ottoman Empire in the World War I, Iraqi territories of 
the Empire were invaded by the British. General Sir Frederick S. Maude entered 
Baghdad as the commander of an army of “liberation” on 11 March 1917. By 1918, the 
British occupied most of the country, though Mosul's status would not be legally settled 
until 1926. Sheikh Mahmud was made governor of Sulaymaniya and other Kurdish 
officials were placed to work under the British. In 1920 mandate for Iraq was given to 
the British powers by the League of Nations. Faisal, son of Sharif Hussein, declared as 
King of Iraq as a political act of balance. He had to work hard to keep up with the 
demands of different ethnic and sectarian communities as well as the British mandate 
administrators (Fattah and Caso, 2009: 157-171).  
 
3.5.a. Early Kurdish Political Actors and Kurdish-British Relations in Iraq 
 Once assumed the governorship of Sulaymaniya, Sheikh Mahmud faced deep 
problems within the governmental system. There was a conflict between the 
institutionalized government and the highly personalized form of government-based 
patronage between the Kurdish tribal and religious strata. Mahmud tried to build 
personal power and tried to increase his personal security through the elimination of 
political figures that opposed him. Soon, General Noel replaced him with Major Elly 
Bannister Soane, who perceived Sheikh Mahmud as a rogue figure having deep 
commitments to the Kurdish cause (Gunter, 2009: 190). The British politics continued to 
support the tribal system and the following are Major Soane's words on the problems of 
the tribalism: 
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Revival of the tribal system was ... a retrograde movement. Already South Kurdistan had 
become largely detribalized and a measure of prosperity, in consequence, had been its lot in 
prewar times. Now, the Political Officer [Noel], accepting the views of Sheikh Mahmud, 
devoted leader. The idea was to divide South Kurdistan into tribal areas under tribal leaders. 
Petty village headmen were unearthed and discovered as leaders of long dead tribes.... Law 
was to be administered by this chief, who must only recognize Sheikh Mahmud as 
Hukmdar.... Ideal for the clansman but fatal for trade, civilization and tranquility 
(McDowall, 2007: 157). 
 Before the British could act on the deteriorating situation, Sheikh Mahmud raised 
three hundred tribal troops and imprisoned all the British personnel and toppled the 
garrison in Sulaymaniya in 1919. He wanted to become the ruler of Iraqi Kurdistan, 
which in his mind did not consist of territories beyond Iraq. Sheikh Mahmud was a true 
nationalist and his aims were toward creating a Kurdish political entity but under his 
own rule. He had come to believe that self-determination was what the Allies had 
promised. However, his power of influence did not extend beyond the Governorate of 
Sulaymaniya and even in that area the large Jaf tribe resisted his desires to become the 
King of Kurdistan (W.L.E., 1956: 419-420). His rebellion soon became the symbol of 
Kurdish nationalism but he failed and was exiled. In 1922, he returned from exile and 
was made governor once again. He tried to revolt one more time in spring of 1931 and 
declared himself to be the “King of Kurdistan”. He failed yet again to the British powers 
and accepted house arrest for him as well as his family in Southern Iraq (O'Ballance, 
1996: 19-20). Though his rebellion could not succeed, his self-declared title of “King of 
Kurdistan” was important for his perception of Kurdistan as a geopolitical yet not clearly 
defined entity. His Kurdistan only comprised of Iraqi Kurdistan and there was no 
transversal intention.  
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 Things got further complicated with the Mosul problem as Turkey and Britain 
had conflicting ideas about this region. The British appeared to be more sensitive to the 
Kurdish culture than the Arab government but this was motivated purely by economic 
interests, particularly considering the rich oilfields of Mosul. Soon, the British came to 
perceive Kurds as a disintegrative force in the context of Mosul. The British saw the 
natural resources as a crucial element of stability and prosperity. When Mosul was 
incorporated into Iraqi territories, the Kurdish territories were seen as a direct threat to 
the consolidation of state power over areas containing oil. From the 1920s onwards, 
Arabization of Northern Iraq started. Similar to Turkey, the British mandate aimed to 
amalgamate country's diverse people into a coherent whole, hoping to stop dissident 
voices. The British failed in this regard as the government was shaped meanly by Sunni 
Arab majority, which resulted in societal divisions along ethno-sectarian lines (Romano 
and Gurses, 2014: 44-45). 
 In 1935, forty Kurdish chiefs challenged the government by demanding the 
official use of Kurdish as was stated by the League of Nations. They had no intentions of 
autonomy but wanted fair representation in the National Assembly, fair share of natural 
resources and development of Kurdish agriculture and industry (Yıldız, 2007: 15). The 
politicians in Baghdad did not comply with the Kurdish demands as the Kurds could not 
be properly organized. By 1936, Kurdish civil society activity was nearly nonexistent. 
There was an informal Komala-i Liwan (Young Men’s Club) formed by Kurdish 
students in Baghdad in 1930 but lacked an official political program. An official Iraqi 
Communist Party was founded in 1934 and it supported Kurdish independence. Some 
Kurds joined since no other alternative existed. Even after the party abandoned to work 
for Kurdish independence, many continued to support the Party as it backed minority 
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rights (McDowall, 2007: 288). 
 In October 1936, General Bakr Sidqi staged a coup in Iraq. He was ethnically 
Kurd, but he was not a Kurdish nationalist. A year later he was assassinated (Yıldız, 
2007: 15). Sidqi’s coup provoked anti-Kurdish feeling among Arab nationalists. Pan-
Arabists saw Kurds as an obstacle in front of their ideals, while their provocative 
policies in turn strengthened Kurdish national feelings. As a reaction a class of young 
professional Kurds started to emerge. Komala Brayati (Brotherhood Society) was 
formed by urban notables. Darkar (Woodcutters), with a reference to the Italian 
Carbonari of the Risorgimento movement, was founded by more radical nationalists in 
Sulaymaniya. Hiwa (Hope) emerged from the Darkar and intended to bring together 
different groups. Hiwa soon had 1,500 members from young trainee professionals in 
Baghdad to officers and few landlords, chiefs, and aghas. It was an indication of a social 
shift from the mountain and tribal identity. However, peasants were absent.in this 
organization. Whether this was because the landlords chose not to incorporate them or 
the average peasant could not relate himself with the nationalist rhetoric; it significantly 
weakened the party (Gunter, 2009: 66). 
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3.5.b. Emergence of Mulla Mustafa Barzani as a Strong Political Figure 
 The next Kurdish leader that rose after Sheikh Mahmud was his grandson, Mulla 
Mustafa Barzani. He, his brother Sheikh Ahmad and their tribe lived around the village 
of Barzan near the Great Zab. He first clashed with the government over taxation issues 
and the resettlement of Assyrian refuges from Hakkari to Iraqi Kurdish areas. The 
government forces had aircrafts in their command and forced the Barzani brothers to the 
Turkish border, where they surrendered and remained detained until their escape in 1943 
(O'Ballance, 1996: 19-20). After his escape, Mulla Mustafa had started to preach vague 
nationalist ideas. On October 1943 the Iraqi government sent a small military 
detachment against him which he was able to defeat in Diyana. Barzani's victory had 
attracted Kurds attention and caused some Kurds to desert the Iraqi army. Seeing the 
severity of the situation, the British involved and asked Mulla Mustafa Barzani to 
negotiate with the government; he was threatened with a possible air strike against his 
forces if he would act otherwise. The negotiations ended with no positive outcome 
(O'Ballance: 24-25). Mulla Mustafa Barzani asked the Iraqi government to live 
peacefully in Sulaymaniya with his brother, Sheikh Ahmad. The government chose to do 
nothing which eventually led to another armed conflict between the two sides. Britain 
warned Baghdad to end the victimization of the Barzanis which would hurt the Kurd-
Arab relations. Britain also feared the Barzanis’ potential for an uprising as the Iraqi 
Kurdistan had been neglected by the government and nothing had been done to help the 
Kurdish famine of 1943 after a failed harvest. Eventually, the British forced the Iraqi 
government to pardon the Barzanis. Baghdad sent a Kurdish minister, Majid Mustafa to 
sort things out peacefully with Mulla Mustafa. Mustafa's return to Baghdad had become 
a personal triumph which greatly irritated the Arab nationalists with in the country. The 
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general neglect of the Kurds had gained widespread sympathy for the Barzanis 
(McDowall, 2007: 290-292). By 1944, Kurdish national feelings were starting to take a 
strong hold in Iran as well as in Iraq. 
 Majid Mustafa used the opportunity he received from the government to 
stimulate a Kurdish nationalist movement. In Sulaymaniya a meeting of tribal leaders 
took place to discuss grievances. They went to Barzan and then to Mahabad. The 
movement had the intention of uniting as one nation with the Iranian Kurds. This was 
important, because for the first time a transversal scheme to establish a unified Kurdistan 
was tried to be implemented. In December 1944, Mulla Mustafa demanded the 
fulfillment of promises for the detachment of Kurdish qadhas (districts) from Arab 
administered Mosul, together with the release of Kurdish prisoners, and the appointment 
of a Kurdish commissioner with a power of veto. The government was then given forty 
days to comply. Replying these demands, the Iraqi army marched against Barzani 
(McDowall, 2007: 292-293). 
 Once again tribal politics played a part as the Zibari tribe abandoned the Barzani 
movement and received a full pardon from the government. The revolts between 1943 
and 1945 were intrinsically tribal. The actions of Mulla Mustafa Barzani were to widen 
his political power rather than an act of nationalism. He had demanded removal of police 
posts, instruments of government authority and had attempted to act as a mediator 
between tribes. All point to Barzani's will to extend his regional influence under his 
traditional title. Indeed, the Kurdish nationalist movement in Iraq was in need of a leader 
and Barzani had proven his tactical skills winning over the government However, the 
reluctance of Barzani in giving up his personal agenda of increasing his own power 
against rival tribes and in leading the nationalist movement resulted in his failure. Hiwa 
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had tried to present the Barzani rebellion as a nationalist fervor but the failure of the 
revolts resulted in Hiwa's split into smaller groups. One of those groups became Rezgari 
Kurd Parti (Kurdish Deliverance Party) that aimed to construct a greater Kurdistan 
starting with a secure independent regional government in Iraq. In 1946,the Rezgari 
Kurds appealed to the American Legation in Baghdad for Kurdish sovereignty, but they 
obtained no result (Kaya, 2012: 138). 
 In mid-October 1946, Mulla Mustafa Barzani and Sheikh Ahmad fled to 
Mahabad where Barzani proposed an alliance to KDPI (Romano, 2006: 188). 3,000 
followers of Barzani from Iraq crossed over to Iran to aid Qazi Mohammad for this 
purpose. Barzani became the foreign minister of the Mahabad Republic and for the first 
time, a successful transversal connection was provided. However, Qazi Mohammad and 
Mulla Mustafa had conflicting political views and there was also an issue of linguistic 
and cultural differences among the Iranian and the Iraqi Kurds. These differences also 
opened the door to some rivalries (Kaya, 2012: 140). In the end, it was Barzani's troops 
that defended the Republic of Mahabad until its collapse. After the fall of the Republic, 
Mulla Mustafa Barzani fled to the USSR as he could not come to terms with Iranian 
government (O'Shea, 2004: 151-152, 171). 
 During this period, Iraq did not apply a civilizational geopolitical discourse as 
the British had artificially drawn Iraqi borders and they were controlling the political 
system. Tribal politics were in the foreground and Kurds were seeking to find their place 
within Iraq. Like everywhere else, tribal formations played a part in causing a disunity 
of the Kurdish people in the revolts against the government. Sheikh Mahmud was more 
of a nationalist leader than Barzani and believed that Wilson's principles meant self-
determination for Kurdistan. However, his wish to become the King of Kurdistan was 
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not accepted by various tribes and his influence proved to be of no use. Mulla Mustafa 
managed to become the face of the nationalist discourse but his desires for personal 
power and influence within the region prevented him to do so. Although Barzani aided 
The Republic of Mahabad, it was too short lived to unite the Iraqi and the Iranian Kurds 
as their differences in language and customs proved strong differences. In the 1940s an 
Iraqi government started negotiations over the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1930 and the 
withdrawal of the British forces. The coming years were to show clashes of Arab 
nationalism and the question of ideological geopolitics in Iraqi Kurdistan (Fattah and 
Caso, 2009: 174-179). 
 
3.6. Syria and the Kurds: French Mandate and Khoybun (1919-1950) 
 In the years between 1919 and 1950, Kurdish tribal political or nationalist 
activities in Syria were quite limited compared to Turkey, Iran and Iraq. Syria was a 
French mandate and the colonial regime downplayed the importance of Kurdistan. This 
is the reason why this section is comparatively shorter than those dealing with the 
previous three states. After the World War I, the French were able to establish their 
mandate regime within Syrian borders and continued the Ottoman ethno-religious 
organization of the millet system. They presented themselves as a mediator between the 
religious minorities and the Sunni majority. In reality, the French rule perceived Syrian 
unity as part of Arab nationalization designed by the Britain to harm French interests 
(Tejel, 2009: 2-16).  
The Sykes-Picot Agreement had created the spheres of influence for France and 
Britain, leaving Syria to France. Kurdish people mostly residing in Afrin and Damascus 
proved loyal to the French mandate administrators after the World War I. Two leading 
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families, al-Yusiv and Shamdin, preferred the French administration over an Arab one, 
whom they saw as a threat against their tribal lifestyle. Some tribes came from Turkey 
after the 1920 rebellion to be settled in Jazeera. Member of the Kurdish national 
associations in the Ottoman period had fled to Syria and settled under the French 
mandate, among them were many tribal leaders, aghas and sheikhs. The French policy of 
decentralization provided aghas with increasing power. By 1932, most of the Kurdish 
population had settled in the upper Jazeera. Bedirkhan family who founded the Khoybun 
organization and who had supported the Mt. Ararat rebellion against the Turks were also 
among those settled in Syria. The French sought to divide and rule by supporting 
minority groups against the potential of an Arab nationalist upsurge  (Yıldız, 2005: 28). 
When the French had difficulty with the rising demands against mandate power they 
recruited Kurds, Circassians, and Armenians to their armies against the Arab revolt 
against French administration in 1925 (Romano and Gurses, 2014: 86-87). 
 In 1924, the Kurdish population began to demand some form autonomy. The 
Kurdish Berazi tribes living between Jarabulus and Nusaybin appealed for the creation 
of a Kurdish state within the Syrian borders. These appeals became strengthened after 
Kurdish intellectuals fled from Turkey settled in Syria. The revolts that they had 
organized in Turkey, allowed these intellectuals to gain some experience on self-
determination. The declaration of Kurdish as the second language, the teaching of this 
language in schools and administration by Kurdish officials were among the demands of 
the Kurdish intellectuals (Romano and Gurses, 2014: 86-87). 
 By 1936, the French had installed an Arab nationalist government to appease 
growing nationalist resentment while they continued to support administrative autonomy 
for other regions. In 1937, some revolts took place against the centralization policies of 
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Damascene urban notables within the government. France chose to reestablish French 
power and increase autonomy of Kurds living in Jazeera. However this led to an 
increased conflict between the Sunni Arab population and the Kurdish community as the 
Kurds became unwilling to give up their autonomy and cultural identity to an Arab 
administration (Yıldız, 2005: 28-30). 
 The French had little respect for Syrian officials and often complained of their 
incompetence and dishonesty. They especially had a negative perception of Muslim 
Arab, Kurds, and Druzes, which were perceived as uncivilized peoples of Syria. 
Contrarily, the French colonial masters favored Maronites, as one French officer was 
noted to state that the Maronites were thinking as if they were French people (Khoury, 
1987: 71). Considering the roots of the civilizational geopolitics, the French attitude 
came from their belief in their superiority. The Christian communities were closer to 
their history and belief systems and therefore they were prioritized. Although the French 
colonial administrators held a civilizational perspective in governing Syria, they 
generally preferred following a divide and rule policy. Naturally these policies had no 
true interests in the culture or the language of the Kurds other than how they can be 
made useful in attaining the French colonial interests within Syria. The will of the 
Kurdish people were not the priority. Syria gained independence from the French 
colonial rule in 1946 and would witness an unstable political course disrupted by 
multiple coups and counter-coups in the coming years. The development of the Kurdish 
identity, perception of Kurdistan, assimilation and repressive state policies based on a 
civilizational geopolitical discourse will be examined in detail in the next chapter as 
these concepts became more visible after the 1950s as pan-Arabism and nationalist 
ideals became more apparent. 
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 The collapse of the Ottoman Empire after the World War I began a period of 
reterritorialization in the Middle East. The Sevres treaty had envisioned Kurdistan as 
political but entity but the political atmosphere did not allow it to be realized. The 
Kurdish population was deterritorialized amongst Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria which 
created a transversal Kurdish question. These newly formed states perceived Kurdistan 
as a security problem and enforced civilizational geopolitics. Meanwhile, the Kurdish 
population itself had troubles uniting for national purposes and was unable establish an 
independent Kurdistan. The aspiration for independence would soon transform itself in 
to a need to be ethnically and culturally recognized under the sovereign states. The 
period between 1950 and 1990 would witness the conflicts emerging from civilizational 
and ideological geopolitics. 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
REVIVAL OF KURDISH NATIONALISM AND DEMANDS OF 
AUTONOMY BETWEEN 1950 AND 1990 
  
 The period following 1950 has been a period of revival for Kurdish nationalism 
and the demands for an autonomous, self-governing “Kurdistan” based on Kurdish 
identity. Between 1940 and 1950, almost every Kurdish movement witnessed a sense of 
hopelessness against the power of the sovereign states. Particularly, from 1950s 
onwards, the Kurds were relatively optimistic about an opening in the political 
atmosphere to start the revitalization of “Kurdistan” as a self-governing geopolitical 
entity under the countries of the region. On the other hand, Iran, Iraq, Turkey and Syria 
developed similar perceptions regarding the threat of deterritorialization of “Kurdistan”; 
but they chose to enforce different policies. This period also witnessed the emergence of 
ideological geopolitical discourse, although civilizational geopolitical discourse 
continued to exist strongly. In Turkey, and, to a lesser degree, in Iran, the Kurdish 
political movements were associated with communism and therefore discredited as a 
threatening phenomenon towards to regime. In Iraq and Syria, on the other hand, where 
Arab socialism and anti-Westernism became prevalent, Kurdish political movements 
were labeled as a tool of the “Western imperialists” to penetrate into the Middle East and 
to disturb to territorial integrity of the state.  
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4.1. Turkey and the Kurds: The Revival of the Kurdish Nationalism (1950-1990) 
 The political atmosphere after the World War II had changed significantly. The 
defeat of Axis powers was seen as a victory for democracy. The USA emerged as the 
dominant power with its pluralist and capitalist values. Around this time, Soviet Union 
had not renewed the Treaty of Friendship with Turkey, which had been signed in 1925. 
Moreover, Soviet Union demanded Turkey to accept joint defense of the Straits as well 
as revision of the Montreaux Convention. This had contributed to the deterioration of 
Turkish-Soviet relations as well as development of Turkish-American relations. With 
American influence, İsmet İnönü, prime minister of the period, had begun giving 
speeches in favor of democratization in Turkey which eventually led to the declaration 
of a multi-party system in 1946. In the 1950 elections, the Republican People's Party 
(RPP), which had been in government for 27 years, was replaced by Democrat Party 
(DP) that had founded in 1946 and led by Adnan Menderes. DP came to power with the 
rhetoric of a free market and putting the rural people's interests first (Zürcher, 2004: 208-
226). In the coming years, Turkey would witness military interventions and a very 
unstable political atmosphere. The rise of the leftist parties and the influence of 
communism would create an opening for the Kurdish nationalist movement. From the 
1950s onwards there would be a strong revival of Kurdish nationalism. 
 
4.1.a. Kurdish Nationalist Revival and Emergence of Ideological Geopolitics 
 Two decades after the Dersim rebellion, the discourse of Kurdistan or rather any 
act of Kurdish nationalism was almost nonexistent. A massive aerial and land military 
campaign had broken the armed resistance and eliminated the leaders of the rebellion. 
This had broken the will of the Kurds, making any sort of resistance seemed pointless. 
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Moreover, the outbreak of the World War II had also undermined the discourse of 
Kurdistan. The rise of the Democrat Party signaled a new era for the Kurdish question 
and altered these conditions in a way to renew the demands of the Kurdish people. DP 
allowed the return of deportees and closed the inspectorates in 1952, while seeking to 
broaden its support among the Kurdish tribes and cooperation with regional religious 
leaders. The party chose to follow integrative policies instead of coercion. For example, 
the grandson of Sheikh Said, Abdülmelik Fırat, who had been considered to pose a 
double threat of Kurdishness and obscurantism, was made a deputy in the National 
Assembly (Bozarslan, 2008: 343). Through the party system local authorities were able 
to find allies in Ankara. Since landlords and aghas controlled most of the votes in the 
rural parts of Eastern Turkey, DP distributed spoils in exchange for votes (Van 
Bruinessen, 1984: 8). There was a significant change in political mobilization as the 
multi-party system drew different interest groups to the political arena in Turkey (Van 
Bruinessen, 1992: 26). 
 The Democrats presented themselves as the protectors of private property. RPP 
had wanted to pass a Land Reform Law to reallocate land to peasants. This had 
considerably bothered landlords in the Southeastern Anatolia. DP exploited the situation 
by obtaining religious fatwas (ruling on Islamic law by the recognized religious 
authority) regarding righteousness of private property, an act that especially had Kurdish 
aghas in mind. Their strategy worked, since in 1954, DP got thirty-four seats out of forty 
in the Kurdish populated areas of Eastern Turkey. However, by the mid-1950s, the 
Democrats started to lose their hold on this region as smaller parties chose to follow 
similar approaches in obtaining the votes of Kurdish landlords. This caused another 
breakup of unity among the Kurds. When a certain Kurdish tribe supported a particular 
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party, the rival tribe began to support the rival party. The polarization would eventually 
take a dangerous turn as coffee houses and other communal areas became marked by 
“political tribes” which became physical threats to their rivals (Romano, 2006: 400-402). 
 Meanwhile, as things seemed to improve for the Kurdish sheikhs and aghas, who 
had been receiving support from and cooperated with the government, towards the end 
of the DP era, the government began to suspect from the intentions of some Kurdish 
notables. Indeed, the Kurds began revive the movement for an independent Kurdistan in 
1958, the same year Mustafa Barzani returned Iraq, by forming the secret Kurdish 
Liberty Party (KİP - Kürt İstiklal Partisi). Based on a Marxist ideology, the KİP 
denounced the authority of aghas, tribal chieftains, sheikhs and seyyids. The party 
believed that when Kurdish leaders bearing these titles entered the Turkish parliament, 
they betrayed the idea of an independent Kurdistan. On the other hand, Adnan Menderes 
had claimed that a number of Kurdish politicians had used their position to attempt for 
an independent “Kurdistan”. As a result, 485 Kurds were arrested and detained. In 
December 1959, 52 Kurds, who founded the KİP, were arrested for attempting to divide 
the Turkish state with the help of foreign powers. Some of the Kurdish notables were 
considered as the most influential figures in this alleged rebellion for independence and 
were exiled to Western Turkey. What is especially interesting was that all but one of 
those exiled Kurds was members of the DP (Şimşir, 2011: 515).  
The civilizational geopolitical discourse, perceiving Kurds as un-civilized and 
incapable of self-government, survived during the 1950s as well. Particularly, this 
assimilative discourse was reinforced through the education system. Şerif Fırat, a 
Kurdish intellectual, argued that the Kurdish identity was suppressed as if there was no 
Kurdish nation. Similarly, Mahmut Altunakar, a prominent Kurdish politician, stated 
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that after leaving his home town in Mardin for Mersin, he was mocked by his school 
mates for being a Kurd. This interaction with the Turks made him more aware of his 
Kurdish identity. Based on these personal experiences, the Kurdish nationalists claimed 
that they were repressed and assimilated (Loizides, 2010: 516-518). These claims later 
turn out to be a common discourse for the Kurds. 
In 1960, a military coup took place as a reaction to increased authoritarianism by 
the Democrat Party, its contradictory behavior towards secularism, unconstitutional acts 
and economic distress. The coup claimed the lives of Adnan Menderes and two other 
ministers; while almost all the DP deputies were arrested and sentenced to 
imprisonment. Moreover, after the coup, a new constitution was adopted. The new 
constitution appeared to be social. In the aftermath of the coup an urban-middle classed 
coalition took place in hopes of economic progress and social justice (Daldal, 2004: 75-
98). On the other hand, the military government had chosen to give Turkish names 
towards Kurdish villages and towns. In other words, this renaming demonstrated the 
governmental attempt for reterritorialization by prohibiting the use of Kurdish names 
(Gunter, 1988: 391).  
Despite all its shortcomings, the new constitution seemed to bring wider civil 
liberties and more freedom of press. It also made it easier to establish trade unions and 
political associations. As a result of this relative liberalization, some journals began to be 
published entirely on Kurdish history, folklore and economic problems (Van Bruinessen, 
2000: 227). It was leftist views that gradually increased and spread out through the 
country. While the RPP began to define itself as a center-left political party, some 
factions of the Turkish left was consolidated under the Turkish Workers Party (TİP – 
Türkiye İşçi Partisi) and TİP was able to achieve fifteen seats in the Parliament in 1965 
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elections. TİP started to take interest in the Kurdish question, and finally in 1970, it 
openly declared that the Kurdish people constitute a distinct ethnic identity in Turkey as 
well as criticized the assimilation policies exerted upon them previously. This was 
particularly crucial to the Kurdish issue, because until that time no political party 
specifically recognized the existence of Kurdish people as a distinct ethnic group in 
Turkey (Gunter, 1988: 392). 
 In 1965 a Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) of Turkey was established by Faik 
Bucak who was a Kurdish lawyer from Urfa and a member of the Turkish parliament. It 
should be noted that this party was founded when Mulla Mustafa Barzani's uprising 
were covered by the Turkish press. Barzani's Kurdish Democratic Party of Iraq was 
without a doubt a model for the KDP of Turkey (Aydın and Taşkın, 2015: 172). 
Moreover, in 1969, Kurdish intellectuals in Ankara, Istanbul and some provinces of 
Eastern Turkey formed the Revolutionary Cultural Hearths of the East (DDKO - 
Devrimci Doğu Kültür Ocakları) as the first legal Kurdish organization. This 
organization was established to discuss economic problems of Kurdish-populated 
territories and the oppression of the Kurdish villagers by the Kurdish aghas and sheikhs 
(Gunter, 1988: 392-393). The formation of this society marked the beginning of 
separation of the Kurdish nationalist left from the Turkish Marxist counterpart. Besides 
formation of parties and organizations, there were also demonstrations. For example in 
the summer of 1967, mass student demonstrations took place in 19 Kurdish cities and 
towns (Kutschera, 1994: 12-13). 
 The official civilizational geopolitical discourse, denouncing any right of self-
government for the Kurds led the Kurdish people search for an outlet, where they could 
express their identity. The poor economic conditions of the East direct some Kurdish 
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families to encourage their children to take higher education as they saw a diploma as a 
guarantee of economic independence. For this purpose, these families themselves prefer 
to speak Turkish language at home, meaning a self-imposed limitation for achieving a 
higher status in the society to promote Kurdish interests (Kutschera, 1994: 13). It can be 
argued that as the Kurdish community received education in Turkish schools and 
universities, they became aware of socialist alternatives and oppression through the 
Kurdish tribal system. This led them to seek solutions in the leftist formations. The new 
constitution had enabled the strongest leftist movement of Turkish history until that 
period (Van Bruinessen, 2005: 45). In other words, the civilizational geopolitical 
discourse began to weaken as more and more Kurdish intellectuals emerge as a result of 
the increase in educated Kurds. In other words, through education, the Kurds were able 
to demonstrate themselves as “civilized” people and those who produced the 
civilizational geopolitical discourse had to face the phenomenon of “Kurdish 
intellectual” particularly in cities. The weakening of civilizational geopolitics 
transformed the geopolitical discourse to an ideological one. In other words, based on 
the external conditions, i.e., the Cold War, and the internal conditions, i.e. the leftist 
inclination of the Kurdish movement, ideological geopolitical discourse began to 
dominate. As the revival of Kurdish nationalism increased and leftist views drew 
sympathy both from the Kurds and Turks, the Turkish government was alarmed in a way 
to suppress the Kurdish movement not only as a separatist one, but also as a communist 
one. Although the civilizational geopolitical discourse had not disappeared, the 
ideological geopolitical discourse became more prominent starting from the late 1960s 
onwards. 
 Through their political parties and other civil society organizations, the Kurds 
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had conservative demands at first. They wanted official recognition of the Kurds as a 
distinct ethnic group and demanded economic development of Turkey's eastern region, 
especially the Kurdish-populated provinces. However, the fact that a Turkish left wing 
party, the TİP, backed Kurdish demands was perceived as the most serious threat by the 
government. Thus, the outcome was further suppression of such groups. This 
suppression did not bring a solution since the lack of support from other Turkish parties 
and civil society organizations pushed Kurds to organize themselves and resulted in 
more radical demands such as autonomy or even an independent Kurdistan on the 
Turkish territories (Van Bruinessen, 2005: 45). 
 Towards the end of the 1960s, clashes between the left and the right took a very 
violent turn. The combination of outspoken Kurdish organizations and violent leftist 
movements as well as armed conservative factions led the country into political chaos 
(Marcus, 2007: 22). This was intensified with workers’ strikes. Several lives were lost at 
political meetings as a result of clashes between rival political groups. Around this time, 
the autonomy agreement between Baghdad and KDP led by Mustafa Barzani on March 
1970 triggered Ankara's concerns for a similar attempt for autonomy in Eastern Anatolia 
and Demirel authorized military operations against Kurdish villages and towns. The 
operations would end shortly after the military intervention in 1971, but would remain as 
a model for the future governments (Kutschera, 1994: 13).  
 On 12 March 1971, the military intervened by demanding the resignation of the 
Demirel government. The generals threatened to take over the government directly, if 
the cabinet did not deal directly with the leftist terrorists. Demirel and his cabinet 
resigned and the parliament gave into the generals’ demands and authorized stronger 
military measures against the internal disorder. Although the military did not completely 
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take over the government, their presence behind the scenes was clear. They wanted 
martial law in provinces with great disturbances but were careful as not to dictate 
civilian politics directly. New articles were added to the constitution to reinforce 
government’s hand against the left which was marked as the main threat against the 
government. Restrictions were placed on the press, unions and autonomy of universities. 
Anything that could be a possible threat to national unity, public order or national 
security was restricted (Harris, 2011: 205-206). The intervention banned TİP and closed 
down RCHE. 
 From the 1960s onwards, a massive migration had started from Eastern to the 
Western cities. This had made assimilation harder as the Kurdish community preferred 
to live within its closed traditional system. Kurds also became more aware of the gap in 
ways of life between the West and the East in these cities. The new generation 
graduating from the universities and secondary schools were more engaged in political 
discourses of imperialism, class struggle and national problems. They became the 
vanguard of the Kurdish movement in the 1970s. The military intervention had tried to 
suppress the activities of the leftist movements, but until the end of the 1970s, there was 
still a relatively liberal atmosphere due to lack of a strong government. Since the state 
apparatuses had become much politicized and the parties had such low support, there 
was no constant repression of Kurdish activities until the martial law in 1979. During 
this period the Turkish left had abandoned the Kurds even though they accepted Kurds 
as subjected to oppression. It was believed that a socialist revolution under the Turkish 
proletariat would solve the current problems. Kurdish movement did not move away 
from the left; as they adopted a discourse perceiving “Kurdistan” as a colony of the 
Turkish rule, they began to look for inspiration in other parts of the world such as South 
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Africa and Vietnam. Kurds wanted to be free of oppression under their self-governed 
Kurdistan. This discourse also claimed that the Kurdish chieftains, landlords and 
religious leaders had allied with the central government and the Kurdish movement 
made a connection with the discourses of class struggle in order to name such Kurdish 
notables as collaborators. Therefore, one of their primary aim of the Kurdish movement 
would be weakening this dominant exploitative class in the Kurdish society and 
promoting anti-colonial and anti-feudal struggle. Thus, the Kurdish movement began to 
take much more radical turn in time by adopting an extremely leftist discourse (Van 
Bruinessen, 2000: 229-232). 
 In 1973, the new prime minister, Bülent Ecevit declared a general amnesty and 
the former leftist Kurdish exiles began to regroup into the new and old Kurdish 
organizations. The number of these organizations increased and their ideological stances 
became more and more radical. Kurdish activists had formed a more definite agenda 
since their Turkish counterparts had proved to be a disappointment. The more the 
Kurdish issue was pronounced, the more intransigent the Turkish left had become. There 
was an underlying Turkish nationalism promoted by the education system that even the 
Turkish leftists could not dislodge themselves (Marcus, 2007: 23-26). 
 It was in this atmosphere that Abdullah Öcalan, who would become the leader of 
the terrorist organization named the Workers’ Party of Kurdistan (PKK - Partiya 
Karkerên Kurdistanê), started his political activism. He took part in a leftist protest and 
was sent to jail in 1972. In jail he came to contact with leading members of the left, who 
insisted that only an armed struggle could save the country. Öcalan would later refer to 
those months in jail as his political schooling period. In the spring of 1973, together with 
friends from Ankara, Öcalan started to research the Kurdish problem and lay out plans 
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for resolving it. He joined the Democratic Higher Education Student Association of 
Ankara (Ankara Demoktratik Yüksek Öğrenim Öğrenci Derneği), hoping to find contacts 
that could help him form his own Kurdish organization and help lead a revolution with 
Turkish socialists. Öcalan could not find much support and the organization was shut 
down in 1975 by the government due to the propaganda of communism. This was the 
last attempt by Öcalan to find a Turkish counterpart. Öcalan and 15 of his friends quitted 
school and focused on establishing a Marxist-Leninist group that would fight for an 
independent Kurdish state. To take their ideas to the people in the Southeastern Anatolia 
they indulged in acts of attacking right-wing extremist groups, debating and sometimes 
fighting leftist groups who did not see the need for Kurdish nationalism and 
demonstrations (Marcus, 2007: 23-29). 
 In order to return to source of the problem, Öcalan’s movement started a 
propaganda campaign targeting its “home” population. The first targets were Gaziantep, 
Maraş, Elazığ, Tunceli and Ağrı. They held several meeting and many of them were 
chaired by Öcalan. Finally, in 1978, the organization had decided to evolve into an 
illegal political party, namely the PKK. A manifesto entitled “The Path of Kurdistan 
Revolution” was published as the first official document of the party. The manifesto 
appeared to be a conventional Communist Party program, but it provided insights for the 
near future as well (Özcan, 2006: 83-87).  
 The first part of the manifesto talks about the imperialism in the world and gives 
a brief summary about socialism. The second part focuses on Kurdistan and Kurdish 
society. Again, a brief historical analysis is provided. The third section is devoted to the 
so-called Kurdish revolution. In the manifesto, Öcalan wrote that it was the Turks that 
colonized Kurdistan between 1925 and 1940. During these years Kurdistan did not have 
117 
 
the means to resist the Turkish power. The Turkish act was justified by being an act of 
civilization against the wild Kurds. Abdullah Öcalan also perceived Turkey as being 
colonized by the USA after the World War II. With Turkey's entrance to NATO, 
Marshall Plan and the bilateral agreements between America and Turkey, he stated that 
Turkey was transformed into a custodian of American interests in the Middle East 
against the socialist construction and national liberation acts (Öcalan, 1978/1993: 81-
82). 
 Öcalan’s manifesto described his movement to be a “Kurdish Emancipation Act” 
(Kürdistan Kurtuluş Hareketi). He stated that Kurdish emancipation would be realized 
when the Kurds are freed from the imperialist control imposed by sovereign states. 
Öcalan aimed the removal of foreign control from Kurdish natural resources, agriculture, 
economics, politics, labor, language, history, and culture. The persisting feudal system 
was to be undone to make way for a fairer government and administration of the people. 
His movement was strictly leftist and shows persisting themes of the clash between 
ideologies. Öcalan developed an ideological geopolitical discourse to discredit the 
civilizational geopolitical discourse put forward by the Turkish and other sovereign 
states over Kurdistan. The Kurdish movement was meant to break through the 
civilizational policies to realize its full potential under the territorial entity named 
“Kurdistan”. Öcalan’s perception of Kurdistan is greater than that of a political entity in 
just one state. The emancipation movement would result in a revolutionary upheaval not 
only for the Kurdish people of Turkey but also for the Kurdish people of the rest of the 
Middle Eastern states. Therefore, Öcalan’s movement had the ultimate goal of 
reterritorializing the entire Kurdish nation under a single political/territorial entity. For 
him, an emancipated Kurdistan would be a democratic and an independent state that 
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could set an example for all oppressed minorities (Öcalan, 1978/1993: 121-129). 
 Öcalan saw Barzani's defeat (explained in detail under the subsection on Iraq) as 
the major flaw of all that was wrong with the Kurdish movement. In other words, the 
fact that Kurdish resistance remained part of feudal Kurdish society and depended on 
foreign powers for support was its main weakness. Independence from great powers 
would make the Kurdish movement successful and tribal leaders and large land owners 
should be eliminated for this cause. Öcalan did not only blame Barzani, but he also 
argued that previous Kurdish rebellions had failed because of their non-socialist nature 
and the cooperation of landlords as well as middle classes with the Turkish government. 
His Kurdish rivals in other organizations were also part of the problem. Öcalan saw 
them as collaborators and revisionists, thus they were false fronts. According to him, the 
PKK would be the one true solution to Kurdistan's needs and independence (Marcus, 
2007: 34). 
 Just as Öcalan was organizing his party, Turkey was again at a political chaos. 
Between 1971 and 1980 there were ten major political parties with no majority-based 
government. Coalition governments failed one after the other. 1970s gave priority to 
narrow and short term goals and each party, when they became part of the governments, 
sought to mark its political territory that led to serious polarization. Sociological factors 
such as rapid urbanization incapable of economic opportunities caused unrest among the 
deprived and lead to civil violence. There were also large differences in distribution of 
wealth and services among citizens. In 1979, the military which always took to the scene 
as the protector of democracy delivered a letter of warning to political parties. In April 
1980, the system was in such a deadlock that parties could not perform their 
constitutional duty of electing a new president. This dilemma and extremism 
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transgressed into anarchy and terrorism leading to another military coup in 12 
September 1980 (Gunter, 1989: 63-69). 
 Following the coup, 1,790 suspected PKK members were arrested, which was 
more than any other Kurdish group or organization. The leaders of the PKK had crossed 
the border to Syria where they would prepare for return. The three years after the coup 
laid low, the PKK did occasional raids to kill soldiers on the border. In July 1981, the 
PKK decided to better relations with the Iraqi Kurds to establish safe bases in Northern 
Iraq. In 1982, it formulated a strategy with three phases: defense, balance and offense. 
Basically it aimed to start guerrilla attacks that would end with war with Turkey and by 
victory they would drive out the Turkish forces from Kurdistan. In May 1983, Turkey 
attacked the border area and Iraqi Kurds had the heaviest casualties. Seeing Baghdad 
and Ankara allied against the Kurds, Barzani and his party KDP signed a protocol with 
PKK, allowing them into Northern Iraq (McDowall, 2007: 422). 
 In 1984, PKK was ready to launch an armed offense in Turkey. The party 
engaged in attacks, bombings against the army and the police in Eastern and main 
Western cities of Turkey. Through this conflict, some Kurdish residents particularly in 
the rural areas were forcefully relocated in or migrated to other parts of Turkey or 
abroad (Kaya, 2012: 143). From 1984 onwards, the PKK strengthened its paramilitary 
character with the help of neighboring countries such as Iran, Iraq and Syria. They 
focused on military and some civilian targets such the Southeastern Anatolian Project, 
which was a massive irrigation project to strengthen agricultural production in 
Southeastern Anatolia and to weaken separatist tendencies by increasing prosperity in 
the region. The PKK also sought to eliminate the Kurds whom were believed to 
collaborate with the Turkish government. In this course, the PKK targeted some tribes 
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suspected for their loyalty to the government, the Kurdish elite having a position in the 
government and the Kurdish communities downgrading their Kurdish ethnic identity 
(Arakon, 2010: 182). 
 For Turkey, this conflict became a severe problem with different dimensions. 
PKK became an economic issue as one third of the budget was spent on the struggle 
with it. Rising unemployment and declining social services strengthened radical Islam, 
ethnic polarization, and nationalism within Turkish borders. Second, democracy took a 
blow. The measures taken to fight the PKK impeded development of democratization 
and human rights. Thirdly, the international aspect of the situation became a huge 
constraint on foreign relations. Foreign policies would focus mainly on anti-PKK 
lobbying and containing the PKK's threat to Turkey's security. Turkey's relations with its 
neighbors were molded by these conflicts (Beriker-Atıyas, 1997: 440-442). 
 All in all, after the World War II in general and after the 1960 coup d’état in 
particular, the Turkish left began to be flourished and ideological geopolitical discourse 
began to replace civilizational geopolitical discourse. The spread of leftist ideology 
especially among the young university students, who believed they were the future of 
the country and were able to change the capitalist system, alarmed the government. 
Moreover the interest of the Turkish leftist parties and organizations in Kurdish issue 
exacerbated the fears of the government. The acknowledgment of these leftist political 
movements for the first time that Turkey had a Kurdish population which had been 
oppressed via a civilizational discourse, was equally alarming. The Kurdish requests had 
started as conservative desires for recognition and freedom of language. However, as the 
Kurdish demands were overlooked, the Kurdish political movements took a more radical 
turn. Abdullah Öcalan emerged as a strong Marxist-Leninist Kurdish nationalist leader 
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that chose to establish an independent Kurdistan on Turkish territories. However, his 
political establishment did not see democracy as a plausible option and believed that 
revolution would come only through an armed conflict against the “imperialist Turks”. 
Öcalan's idea of Kurdistan was free from the interference of landlord and aghas, who he 
believed to have exploited the Kurds for their own interests under the traditional system. 
While the coming years would witness bloody clashes between the PKK and Turkey, the 
first Turkish leader seriously attempting to change the states’ civilizational or 
ideological geopolitical discourse against the Kurds, namely Turgut Özal began to 
become influential in Turkish politics. 
 
4.1.b. Turgut Özal’s Discourse on Kurdish Question and the Perception of Kurdistan 
 The first elections held after the coup d’état in 1983 introduced Turgut Özal in 
Turkish politics, who would dominate the political arena until his death in 1993. He 
established his political party, the Motherland Party (ANAP - Anavatan Partisi) and 
consolidated the votes of the right-wing. Özal's policies aimed for a major shift of 
economic development by liberalization of the Turkish economy. However, his liberal 
approach to the economy did not equally bring a political liberalization. Turgut Özal 
appeared to be reluctant in allowing all rivals back to politics and completely 
normalizing the political life after the coup. According to Douglas (2001: 166-68), as a 
prime minister he built and managed patron-client relationships and became master of 
the tradition of political patronage.  
 Özal wanted to construct Turkey as a powerful regional actor by promoting 
Turkish influence over the former Ottoman territories in the Balkans and the Middle 
East through a soft-power approach. However, at the same time, he was aware that 
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without peace at home there could not be an influential Turkey in the political arena. 
Thus, Turgut Özal sought to end the state’s exclusion of cultural manifestations of Islam, 
of the Kurdish identity as well as other repressed identities and to resolve polarities. To 
achieve this, claims of Islamists or Kurdish activists had to be legalized (Aral, 2001: 74).  
 This idea of change meant a significant deviation from the civilizational 
geopolitical discourse of the previous governments, especially that of the early 
republican era. Özal claimed to follow the example of the Ottoman millet system and 
recognize other ethnic groups and cultural dimensions. Özal encouraged the idea of 
“Anatolia” as a geopolitical concept for uniting diverse ethnic identities; in other words, 
reterritorialization of Anatolia in a way to comprehend a multi-cultural society without 
favoring Turkism over the others became a major discursive target. The “Turkish men's 
burden” would, thus, disappear under the variety of cultures and tolerance of 
differences. On this course, political leaders chose to alter the famous Turkish saying Ne 
Mutlu Türküm Diyene (Happy is he who says I am a Turk) with Ne Mutlu Türkiyeliyim 
Diyene (Happy is he who says I am from Turkey). The official discourse of ethnicity 
was opened for question. The Islamic views had also played a part for downgrading 
ethnic identity by emphasizing a common religious identity with the Kurds (Ataman, 
2002: 128-130). Hence, there began a limited but significant discursive transformation. 
 Islamic movements of the time had success in finding support from the Kurds. 
The most organized and the biggest Islamic party founded after the coup was the 
Welfare Party (RP – Refah Partisi). This new party was critical of the so-called Kemalist 
principles that Turkey had been based on as well as the failure of nationalist promises of 
Westernization in Turkey. Their belief in religion as the driving force behind a nation 
instead of ethnicity allowed the RP look tolerantly to the Kurdish demands for 
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autonomy. Since both the Kurds and the Islamists were considered to be suppressed by 
the “Kemalist regime”, these two groups might join forces against it. The Kurdish 
movements were also tolerant to the RP, since in the beginning of the 1990s, the PKK 
only allowed RP’s activities in the region they called as “Kurdistan”. In the 1984 and 
1989 elections, the RP obtained quite significant amount of votes in the Kurdish-
populated cities (Ataman, 2002: 130-131). 
 The significance of Özal's perception of ethnicity and the rise of political Islam 
lies in the reterritorialization of “Kurdistan” as well. Under civilizational geopolitical 
discourse Kurdistan would not be considered as an autonomous region, capable of self-
governance, since the Kurds were considered as an un-civilized people. The 
reconsideration of the Ottoman millet system enabled a new understanding and a relative 
tolerance to the idea of Kurdistan. This in return allowed the cooperation of the Kurds 
with the Turkish Islamists. Turgut Özal's reference to Anatolia as the principal 
geopolitical identity for the peoples of Turkey aimed to reterritorialize the Kurds and the 
Turks under an identity acceptable to both ethnicities. If such an understanding could 
take root, then Özal would have been able to eliminate the cause for social disturbance, 
oppression and terrorism. In 1989, Özal declared that he had partial Kurdish origins as 
well, as he sought a non-military resolution to the Kurdish conflict and a greater cultural 
liberty. It was after the Gulf War that Özal saw a propitious time to abolish the law 
forbidding other languages other than Turkish of 1983. However, the death of Turgut 
Özal from a heart attack in 1993 would end his legacy as Turkey would return to politics 
that of the previous decades (Douglas, 2001: 172-175). 
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4.2. Iran and the Kurds: Shah, Iranian Revolution and Civilizational Geopolitics 
(1950-1990) 
 The 1950s marked the beginning of a nationalist movement in Iran, led by 
Muhammad Mossadeq. Before being sent to retirement by Mohammad Reza Shah, he 
had been a deputy, provincial governor, and cabinet minister of Tehran. He was known 
for campaigning for strict constitutionalism and freedom from foreign powers. On his 
return to active politics, he threatened the power of oil companies of the British but also 
the power of the Muhammad Reza Shah and his control over armies. Mossadeq called 
for a strong central government that ensured the basic rights and freedoms to all Iranians 
despite their religious or ethnic backgrounds. The Kurds supported Mossadeq and this 
had further angered the Shah (Romano, 2006: 230). In 1953, it appeared that Mossadeq 
had reached the climax of his political power. The same year, a coup d’état took place 
and the CIA appeared to have saved Iran from an international communism problem. In 
reality, this intervention was a British-American venture to preserve the international oil 
cartel. The coup had re-installed Muhammad Reza Shah and all his powers as a 
sovereign. However, the Shah would always be compared to Mossadeq in the coming 
years and his legitimacy would always be undermined. The Kurds once again found 
themselves on the wrong side of politics. Iranian Kurdistan was occupied by the Iranian 
army and the Kurdish movement had to go underground as any challenge to the Iranian 
government was harshly suppressed. In 1979, the Islamic Revolution would change the 
Iranian politics and its interrelation with the Kurdish movements permanently 
(Abrahamian, 2008: 113-118).  
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4.2.a. The Recovery of the Kurdish Movement and the Road to the Revolution of 1979 
 After the collapse of the Mahabad Republic, the Kurdish movement in Iran 
entered a period of recovery, although it had lost some of its most powerful leaders such 
as Qazi Mohammad. First stirrings started in early 1952 as the KDPI participated in the 
provincial elections and won a significant amount of votes. The Shah was quick to 
invalidate the election and mobilized the army in Mahabad. He then left pro-royalist 
representatives in the region. This was the sort of control that Mossadeq was trying to 
limit with a relatively liberal constitution. The same year KDPI tried to lead a Kurdish 
revolt against the landlords in Bukan, but the military intervened and stopped all 
Kurdish political activity (Yıldız and Taysi, 2007: 20). 
 The Kurdish support towards Mossadeq was mainly due to his desire for 
constitutionalism and his promise for equal rights to different ethnicities. Mohammad 
Reza Shah practices a strong authoritarian rule that suppressed opposition. These 
conditions led to another Kurdish uprising in 1956 near Kermanshah. This too was 
quickly oppressed by the government forces. Mohammad Reza Shah pursued strategies 
similar to those of Turkey. For example he tried eliminating rebellious Kurdish chiefs, 
but also co-opting some of the traditional Kurdish notables by employing them in 
important governmental positions. Between 1960 and 1963, the Shah made sure that 
land owners cooperating with the regime would not be affected by his land reform 
program. The key difference between the Iranian political environment and the Turkish 
at the time was the absence of civil society.  The Kurdish movement could not find a 
left-wing organization or a non-traditional path to pursue its goals. There were no 
equivalents to the TİP, the Kurdish cultural associations such as RCHE or the PKK. 
During the late 1940s and early 1950s, KDPI worked very closely with the Iranian 
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communist party of Tudeh. The relationship was so close that it was quite common at 
that time to consider KDPI as a branch of Tudeh at that time (Van Bruinessen, 1992: 
34). However, Tudeh was crippled after 1953 and its activities were very much limited. 
The Shah's secret police, Organization of National Intelligence and State Security 
(SAVAK - Sazeman-e Ettelaat va Amniyat-e Keshvar) made sure to appear as the most 
ruthless force to suppress any kind of anti-regime movement. It should also be 
considered that the Kurdish population constituted around 10 to 15 percent of Iran which 
might have made it easier for the Tehran government to suppress their mobilization. (In 
Iraq and Turkey the percent of Kurds are 25 and 20 respectively)  (Romano, 2006: 230-
231). 
 Between 1953 and 1958, 3,000 Tudeh members were arrested. Seeing the 
difficulties of the situation, the KDPI chose to go underground and began to change its 
priorities. Abdullah Ishaqi had been elected as the leader and he redirected the party 
away from a leftist position. KDPI re-prioritized its demands as the overthrow of the 
monarchy, the creation of a Kurdistan with its own elected government, the liberation of 
all Kurdistan and the enfranchisement of women. In 1958, Barzani proposed a 
unification of KDP (Kurdish Democratic Party of Iraq) and KDPI but before any action 
could be taken, the SAVAK arrested 150 Kurdish activists. Despite this, KDPI 
continued its support for Barzani, especially during his rebellion in 1961. Just like in 
Iraq, Barzani helped keep out the leftists from KDPI as tensions grew between 
traditionalists and Marxists (McDowall, 2007: 251-253). 
 In 1964, a group of Kurdish intellectuals, who were also part of the KDPI, left 
Tudeh for not showing enough interest in the Kurdish cause. In the following KDPI 
congress, the same group raised the slogan 'Democracy for Iran, Autonomy for 
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Kurdistan'. They wanted an armed resistance against Tehran to establish their demands. 
This resulted in a peasant uprising in Urmiyeh that lasted three years but the difficulties 
of the guerrilla warfare changed the party's focus to recruiting members from Kurdish 
students in Europe (Koohi-Kamali, 2003: 168-169). 
 The coalition between Barzani and Ishaqi did not last long. A huge blow to unity 
of Iraqi and Iranian Kurds came when Mustafa Barzani decided to assist the Iranian 
government. The KDPI had aided Barzani until 1966, but that year Mohammad Reza 
Shah decided to provide more aid to Barzani in his quest against the Iraqi government 
and make a deal with KDP. The Shah had several aims in signing a deal with the Iraqi 
Kurds. He believed he could create problems for the Iraqi government, make Barzani 
dependent on Iranian aid, destroy the relationship between the Iranian and Iraqi Kurds, 
and weaken the Kurdish movement in Iran. The Shah would also receive secret 
information regarding the Iraqi military movements and developments. Meanwhile in 
Iran, the Shah suppressed the Kurdish movement by killing and arresting KDPI 
members. The only Kurdish leaders to criticize Barzani were from the Political Bureau 
of the Kurdish Democratic Party of Iraq such as Jalal Talabani and Ibrahim Ahmad 
(Koohi-Kamali, 2003: 168-169). 
 After the deal, Barzani hindered the activities of Iranian Kurds in Iraq and 
refused to aid other Kurdish factions in Iran. This had a crippling effect on the unity of 
Kurds and the actions of Iranian Kurds. One of the most important incidents that ended 
the collaboration between Iranian and Iraqi Kurds was Barzani’s order of execution of 
the KDPI leader, Suleiman Mueini, as he attempted to cross the border into Iraq. His 
corpse was returned to Iranian government and the government left the body for public 
viewing for days. Barzani's forces arrested and killed many members of the KDPI. Such 
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actions led the Iranian Kurds to propagate the Kurdish cause in Kurdish populated towns 
and mountains of Iran. They tried to distance themselves from Iraqi Kurds. Moreover, 
instead of demanding an independent Kurdistan, the Iranian Kurds were content with an 
autonomous self-governing entity. The reasons for this choice are manifold. First of all, 
the Kurds in Iran had more in common with the minorities in Iran than with the Kurds of 
Iraq. The Iranian Kurds shared the same political oppression and economic negligence 
with other Iranian minorities. This fact can partially explain why the Kurdish national 
movement in Iran has had different objects and tactics of resistance compared to the 
Iraqi Kurds. Secondly, the Kurdish dialect of Iranians resembles much of Persian and the 
Kurds throughout Persian history have had common historical experiences with Persia 
which can be pointed out as one of the reason for demanding autonomy rather than full 
independence (Koohi-Kamali, 2003: 169-171). 
 The time frame between 1950s and the Iranian Revolution proved to be a 
complicated era for the notion of “Iranian Kurdistan”. The support of Mossadeq had 
placed the Kurds on the wrong side in the eyes of the central government and the 1953 
coup had increased Mohammad Reza Shah's power which he deliberately used to 
suppress any form of opposition against himself. The existence of a strong military and 
the SAVAK proved effective in crippling the Kurdish mobilization. The Kurdish 
opposition was weakened, but it did not end as it tried to cross borders in to Iraq for 
support. It seemed that until 1966 the Kurdish movement could be aided by the Iraqi 
Kurds which increased the hopes for a trans-boundary Kurdish movement, in other 
words, a reterritorialization of a “Greater Kurdistan” combining the Iraqi and Iranian 
Kurdistans. However, Barzani prioritized his personal interests over the interests of a 
“Greater Kurdistan” and turned his back on the Iranian Kurds. This created a wider gap 
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between the Iranian and the Iraqi Kurds as well as a very distrustful political 
atmosphere. Barzani's cooperation with the Shah hindered any possibility of erasing the 
border between the Iraqi and Iranian Kurdistan.  
 Before closing this section, the relationship between the pro-communist Tudeh 
part of Iran and the Kurds should be touched upon as well, since, this relationship 
produced a problematic ideological geopolitical discourse. Accordingly, the Tudeh Party 
in Iran was established in 1948 as a pro-Soviet communist political movement, 
criticizing the pro-Western and anti-democratic monarchical rule in Iran. The party 
called for the overthrow of the monarchy and resisted the American presence in Iran. 
The restoration of monarchical powers of the Shah through a coup by the CIA was very 
significant for its ideological discourse, since the Shah was begun to be perceived as an 
Anglo-American puppet by Tudeh as well as by most of the people (Richards, 1975: 4-
8). As the Shah tried to alter this image, he also tried hard to suppress the communists. 
The Kurdish intellectuals were happy to associate themselves with Tudeh, but they were 
never considered by the government as a part of the communist threat; in other words, 
unlike the ideological geopolitical discourse in Turkey and close relationship between 
the Kurdish political movement and TİP as in the case of Turkey, the alliance between 
Tudeh and the Kurds were seen not as an ideological threat, but as a security threat 
against the government. For the Iranian government, it was the KDPI that truly 
represented the ideals of the Kurdish people and the government perceived the KDPI 
and Tudeh as two separate threats to be contained. 
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4.2.b. The Iranian Revolution of 1979 and the Redefinition of Civilizational Geopolitical 
Discourse via Religion 
 While the Shah was able to suppress the Kurdish movement, in the 1970s he still 
felt a deep sense of insecurity. He had encouraged factions and division in government 
as well as in the court to prevent any one man to become a danger to his rule. Corruption 
was widespread in Iran especially among the Shah's family. On several occasions, the 
court ministers had warned the Shah to introduce democracy as way to close the gap 
between the people and the government but by 1975 the Shah had chosen to reinforce 
autocracy. Muhammad Reza Shah also attacked the ulama to replace Shi‘a hierarchy 
with a structure more loyal to the Shah's regime. By mid-1976 the economy had started 
to falter. Ayatollah Khomeini, an exiled religious leader and a revolutionary figure 
opposing the Shah's regime, managed to be effective across borders. Khomeini and his 
supporters among the clergy set up the Combatant Clergy Association (Jame-ye 
Ruhaniyat-e Mobarez) to coordinate the clerical movements against the regime. At the 
same time, the social discontent continued to rise and protests increased within the 
country. The Shah appeared weakened by the calls for revolution. The regime eventually 
lost control and credibility as the opposition movement led by Khomeini gained 
authority together with self-confidence. In the beginning of January 1979, the Shah left 
the country and soon after the Iranian monarchy was abolished. An Islamic Republic of 
Iran was declared by Ayatollah Khomeini (Axworthy, 2013: 76-122). 
 Towards the end of the 1970s, in the political protests not only the Shiite 
population but also the Kurds took place actively. In 1973, Abdal Rahman Ghassemlou, 
a former university lecturer, was elected as the new leader of the KDPI. Shortly before 
the revolution, Ghassemlou had started to lead the KDPI from a small underground 
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organization into a mass party with a program of establishment of autonomy in the 
Iranian Kurdistan. The other major organization, which became active during the 
revolution, was the Komala, also known as the Revolutionary Organization of the 
Toilers of Kurdistan. Komala was a far more radical party and considered itself to be of 
the Marxist orientation. There were also other smaller Kurdish organizations such as 
Fedaiyan-e Khalq (The Organization of Iranian People's Majority) and Mojahedin-e 
Khalq (The People's Combatants). In early 1979, the Komala and the Fedaiyan-e Khalq 
initiated Peasant Councils. They made some attempts to distribute land among peasants 
in the Sanandaj and Marivan areas but their work remained limited (Koohi-Kamali, 
2005: 142-143). All in all, the Komala had a very leftist perspective which fostered an 
ideological clash between the Kurds and the government. Although the work of the 
councils was limited the leftist perceptions were spreading among the Kurds. However, 
instead of creating a communist Kurdish identity, these ideals strengthened Kurdish 
nationalism in Iran.  
 The Kurdish chiefs were divided between the government and Kurdish political 
organizations. As the demands for Kurdistan's self-government began to strengthen 
some of these chiefs withdrew their support from the Kurdish nationalist movement; 
even, at times, they chose to act against the Kurdish nationalist movement. On the other 
hand, there was a group of individuals with strong tribal ties that worked together with 
the non-traditional leadership of the Kurdish movement to support the demand of 
autonomy. Some of these individuals even confronted the tribal leaders on their demand 
to collect traditional dues from the peasants. One of these individuals was Sheikh 
Izzedin Hosseini. He had joined the KDPI and enjoyed support from political 
organizations, tribal leadership and more importantly the Kurdish people in general. 
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Hosseini opposed Khomeini for interfering in government since Khomeini should 
remain, for him, as a man of religion and his duties lied within the clerics (Koohi-
Kamali, 2005: 144). 
 The revolution was a golden opportunity for the Kurdish community who had 
become much more articulate than couple of decades before. During the revolution there 
were no police or gendarme forces in the Kurdish region. Political forces in Kurdistan 
took the opportunity to govern the region. In 1979, the Kurds captured military garrisons 
and gendarme outposts from which they were able to obtain considerable amount of 
weaponry. Revolutionary Councils, Workers Unions, and Peasant Unions replaced the 
government bodies and transformed Kurdistan into a major opposition force against the 
Shah regime (Koohi-Kamali, 2003: 172). 
 In February 1979, together with the establishment of the post-revolution 
government in Tehran, discussions began about the future of the Iranian Kurdistan. 
Negotiations took place between the Kurdish representatives and the revolutionary 
authorities. The Kurds had reached a consensus among themselves regarding the 
establishment of autonomy. Tehran, on the other hand, was trying to centralize and 
assert its power within Iranian borders. The government demonstrated a very distrustful 
attitude towards the Kurds. The existence of multiple competing centers of power both 
within Kurdistan and within the new government made it very difficult to come to terms 
(Van Bruinessen, 1992: 36). The Kurdish side witnessed conflict through the emergence 
of Sheikh Izzedin Hosseini as a Kurdish spiritual leader. He was opposed by the pro-
Barzani Iranian Kurds and other elements of Barzani's KDP. The Komala and the 
Fedaiyan-e Khalq established themselves in Mahabad to ensure a share of power 
through bases. Baneh was created as a joint force between the KDPI and the Komala. 
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Iranian Kurdistan lacked harmony but proved sufficient enough to govern its regions in 
the absence of centralized power  (O'Ballance, 1996: 110). 
 In March 1979, Izzedin Hosseini called a Kurdish Revolutionary Council of 
tribal sheikhs and leaders. Around five hundred people were gathered and an eight point 
plan was agreed upon, which was presented to Tehran when Khomeini was preparing a 
new constitution. The plan had only left foreign affairs, defense and economic planning 
to the central government, giving all other responsibilities to Kurdistan's regional 
governance. Kurdish demands were ignored and Kurds were not consulted in the 
constitution-making process as Ayatollah Khomeini believed their demands were 
excessive. To minimize the Kurdish agitation, Tehran government tried to persuade the 
Kurds to support Sheikh Ahmad Moftizadeh, but this policy was not welcomed. 
Moftizadeh was an influential political and religious figure of the Sunni Kurds and he 
was in favor of the notion of a unified Islamic Iran with some self-governance granted to 
the Kurds. Khomeini thought him to be a significant factor in trying to appease the 
Kurds. Next, Khomeini ordered the revolutionary movement to stop providing arms to 
non-Farsis. Immediately the Kurds took action and seized the military commander of the 
Sanandaj garrison and broadcast a cry of rally over a local radio station. The minister of 
interior had to step in to persuade the Kurds to evacuate the garrison. In order to do so 
he, in return, assured them of authorization of Kurds in schools. The rebels accepted the 
offer as Kurdish was never officially authorized by the Iranian government. However, 
the inability of the sides to come to a lasting resolution would eventually climax in to 
armed conflict (O'Ballance, 1996: 109-110). 
 After three weeks of Khomeini's return, clashes took place between the Kurds 
and forces loyal to the new Republic close to Bana. This sparked other conflicts between 
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the Shi'ites and the Kurds. The rest of the year as well as the next year witnessed 
repeated encounters between the newly formed volunteer Revolutionary Guards also 
known as the Pasdaran, who asserted Shi’i values of the new government. The rising 
tension led Khomeini to accept a renegotiation and he offered a very limited degree of 
autonomy with regard to the economic, political, social and cultural affairs of the 
Kurdish province. Kurds responded with the same eight point plan with only one 
difference, they demanded Kurdistan’s autonomy to be written in the draft constitution. 
Few days later, the Kurds boycotted again after learning that there would be no mention 
of the Kurds in the constitution. Another fight broke out between local Kurds and 
Pasdaran (McDowall, 2007: 261-263). 
 Although Ayatollah Khomeini had established an Islamic Republic, he firmly 
followed civilizational geopolitical discourses. The only difference came from the fact 
that the Republic chose to use 'religion' in place of 'ethnicity'. Understanding Ayatollah 
Khomeini's belief system is crucial in order to understand the emergence of 
civilizational geopolitical discourse via religion. To begin with, Khomeini believed that 
the monarchy was illegitimate and the only system of government would originate from 
the God. The Qur'an was a collection of conditions that in way provided a constitution 
for an Islamic state. Khomeini stated that “whatever is in [constitutional] accord with the 
law of Islam we shall accept and whatever is opposed to Islam, even if it is the 
constitution, we shall oppose” (Mahdavi, 2014: 29). 
 The doctrine Khomeini tries to put forth is very similar to civilizational 
geopolitics. There is one dominant factor: religion. Islam is glorified just like the way 
Europeans chose to glorify their history. Islamic way of life is believed to come directly 
from God, therefore there cannot be a more perfected conduct of government. Religion 
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would also strengthen the bonds between different communities within Iranian borders. 
Instead of choosing an ethnicity to bear the burden of civilization as in Turkey, or 
constructing a nation from different ethnicities as in Reza Shah's plan, Khomeini 
administered religion in a way to reproduce the simple dichotomy of 'us vs. them'. If the 
Kurds chose to disassociate themselves from the Iranian government by demands of 
autonomy or independence, they were perceived as heretics or betrayers of Islam since 
the Islamic Republic was fair to all Muslim subjects and followed the perfected path of 
God. There was no place for ethnic diversion. Tehran did not deny the existence of other 
ethnicities but it saw no reason to acknowledge their demands. This perception was 
incorporated into the constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Articles 11 and 152 to 
155 state "all Muslims" are "one nation" (ummah) and that the government should exert 
"continuous efforts" to realize "the political, economic, and cultural unity of the Islamic 
world" (Menashri, 1980: 130). Below is an example of Ayatollah Khomeini's thoughts 
on minority groups:  
“Sometimes, the word minority is used to refer to people such as the Kurds, Lurs, Turks, 
Persians, Baluchis and such. These people should not be called minorities, because this term 
assumes that there is a difference between these brothers. In Islam, such a difference has no 
place at all. There is no difference between Muslims who speak different languages, for 
instance, the Arabs or the Persians. It is very probable that such problems have been created 
by those who do not wish the Muslim countries to be united. They create the issues of 
nationalism, of Pan-Iranism, pan-Turkish and such isms, which are contrary to Islamic 
doctrines.” (Menashri, 1980: 130) 
 In sum, according to Khomeini, the Kurds were negatively perceived for 
bringing their ethnic identity to the forefront instead of their religious identity. Thus, 
they were attempted to become “civilized” by adopting the religious doctrines of the 
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new regime. Contrarily, Sheikh Izzedin Hosseini dismissed the doctrine of the Islamic 
Republic. The Kurds were afraid of the Republic becoming a Shia dictatorship against 
the Sunni Kurdish identity. The following is an example of this concern voiced by 
Hosseini: 
What we have is not religious government, but a dictatorship under the name of Islam.... 
The role of the clergy is to be murshid (guide) in knowing God. You will also find some 
Shi'i clergy who reject Khomeini's concept of faqih (an Islamic expert in Islamic law). It is 
not an Islamic regime.... Any religious government will end in dictatorship, and religion will 
become a means of beating, executing and killing in the name of God (Entessar, 2010: 38). 
 Khomeini's civilizational geopolitical discourse based on the distinction between 
Islam and others on the one hand, and Shia and Sunni Islam on the other brought no 
solution to the Kurdish case and, in fact, caused more concern as perceived from 
Hosseini's words. In 1980, the discord provoked Tehran on a major assault on Kurdistan. 
The government was determined to control all the regions within Kurdistan and feared 
that a liberated Kurdish territory would become a very dangerous example to other 
minorities. At the end of April 1980, after a very bloody conflict, Tehran was able to 
obtain the control of Kurdistan. The conflict did not cease as Saddam Hussein decided to 
attack Iran. During the Iran-Iraq War Iranian Kurds perceived another golden 
opportunity to throw off the grip Khomeini had on Kurdistan. The KDPI demanded 
Tehran to accept their autonomy before joining the Iranian troops in a battle against Iraq. 
Tehran treated such an ultimatum as treason. At first the troops concentrated on the Iraqi 
assaults and left Kurdistan alone but in 1982 Khomeini started an advance to the 
Kurdish populated regions. By 1983, all Kurdish rebel-held territory was under Iranian 
control. In the coming year, the KDPI was driven in to Iraq. The end of the war between 
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Iraq and Iran in 1988 did not do much to change on the Kurdish territories. The 
Revolutionary Leadership made peace with Komala, something KDPI could not bring 
itself to do. Shortly after Khomeini's death, Ghassemlou was called to start negotiations. 
However, Ghassemlou was assassinated during the negotiations in Vienna allegedly by 
the governmental agents. This was a huge blow to the Kurdish hopes. Six weeks later, a 
senior Komala member was also assassinated. This showed that the Iranian government 
chose to eliminate Kurdish leaders that it considered to be a threat, meaning that there 
would be no negotiations at all (McDowall, 2007: 272-277). 
 To conclude, Ayatollah Khomeini's new Islamic Republic replaced Muhammad 
Reza Shah's regime. Although the Islamic Republic was a different political entity, it 
chose to practice civilizational geopolitics through religion. The mindset that constructed 
the civilizational perception remained unaltered but transformed. Religion was promoted 
through a glorified Islamic history and it put forth a perception of perfected state 
governance. Since Islamic outlook downgraded ethnic identity claims among Muslims, 
the Kurdish nationalist movement was handicapped as demands of autonomy were not 
only ignored but perceived as treachery. The Kurdish mobilization was more articulate 
than it was between 1919 and 1950 but its force and unity was not enough to establish a 
Greater Kurdistan between Iran and Iraq, let alone autonomous Kurdistan on the Iranian 
map.  
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4.3. Iraq and the Kurds: Question of Autonomy and Rebellions (1950-1990) 
 On 14 June 1958, Iraq witnessed a military coup. The military announced the end 
of the Hashemite monarchical order and the start of a new republic. Huge 
demonstrations started in the streets as the people proclaimed their devotion to the new 
regime. Two officers stood as the leaders of the coup, Brigadier General Abdul Karim 
Qasim and Colonel Abdul Salam Arif. One of the first institutional initiatives was the 
creation of the Popular Resistance Front (PRF) which was a militia designed to defend 
the Republic against internal and external threats. Additionally Peace Partisans was 
formed which included people of different backgrounds, ranging from lawyers to 
peasants (Dawisha, 2009: 443.9 / 966). 
 Soon after the coup, a conflict emerged between Qasim and Arif. It was a 
personal issue but became entangled with the identity of Iraq. Would the new regime 
remain as a potential nation state or as an administrative part of the Arab nation? Arif 
was an admirer of Gamal Abdel Naser who was the symbol of pan-Arabism. Qasim was 
more sympathetic towards domestic social reforms and the building of an Iraqi national 
community. It was not long before Qasim emerged as the sole leader of Iraq (Tripp, 
2007: 147-148). Qasim would become Iraq's first true independent leader. However it 
was also Qasim who would commence the Kurds’ estrangement in politics by his 
attempts to centralize the state and his pursuit of sovereignty (Rubin, 2007: 354). In 
1963, Qasim was overthrown by the Baath Party, which had a strong pan-Arabist 
ideology. The party wanted to unite Iraq with Egypt and Syria. Within a few months 
they began to lose power and were replaced with another pan-Arabist Party. In 1968, 
Baath party came back to power with a final coup d’état. The Baath Party tried to carry 
out pan-Arabist policies, but radicalization of politics exposed the regime to many 
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dangers and difficulties. Baath chose to abandon the pan-Arabist rhetoric and replace it 
with a new Iraqi-centered discourse. Such an understanding led Baghdad to enforce its 
will over Kurdish nationalists and Shi'i traditionalists (Baram, 1991:  xiii-xiv). The 
following decades would witness very severe acts of suppression, leaving the Kurdish 
community devastated; but it would fuel the desire and the struggle for a self-governed 
Kurdistan. 
 
4.3.a. Return of Mulla Mustafa Barzani and Kurdish Demand for Autonomy 
 Since 1945 it had appeared as though Kurdish nationalism in Iraq had shown 
little manifestation. Just like in Iran and Turkey, the intellectual leaders had been 
persuaded that, for the time being, nothing could be done against the state power. They 
were waiting for an opportunity to mobilize. Meanwhile, Iraq's Kurds with the exception 
of the aghas, had moved closer with the anti-monarchic forces, including communists, 
Pan-Arabists, and anti-regime liberals. Such was possible due to similar perceptions of 
the developments in the Middle East. For example the Pan-Arabists had disliked the 
Baghdad Pact signed in 1955 on grounds that it aided Western imperialism. The Kurds 
had disapproved the Pact as well because it had brought together Iran, Iraq and Turkey, 
the three countries oppressing Kurdistan. As the demise of the Hashemite monarchy 
begun, all Iraqi Kurds found themselves to be united. This was neither because of class 
interests nor political allegiance; it was because all factions of the Kurdish community 
distrusted the Hashemite regime (Rubin, 2007: 356-357). 
 1958 revolution was a popular act among all Iraqi peoples. Kurds saw a new 
opportunity for a Kurdish-Arab understanding. Barzani immediately sent a telegram of 
congratulations to the new regime asking permission for himself and his men to return to 
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Iraq (Edmonds, 1959: 7). Qasim ignored Barzani's first call, but three days later, in his 
second attempt, Barzani was invited back to Iraq. On 3 September 1958, all the Kurds, 
who had been involved in the insurrections, were pardoned. Qasim had decided to use 
Kurdish nationalism to his advantage. If he could cultivate Kurdish fears of pan-
Arabism, Qasim would gain a valuable ally in his rivalry with Arif and broaden his 
power base. Qasim had hoped to transform Barzani and his men into state functionaries. 
Mulla Mustafa Barzani becomes the president of United Kurdistan Democratic Party 
(UKDP). Barzani later would state that he desired no such title, but was forced by the 
Iraqi president to accept it (Rubin, 2007: 359-360). 
 A few days after the revolution, Qasim had promulgated a “Temporary 
Constitution”, which stated Iraq as part of the Arab world but referred especially to the 
Kurds as co-partners of Arabs. The Kurdish people perceived this as a sign of a fairer 
place in administration. They took to the streets with pictures of Kurdish leaders and 
cheered for complete independence and freedom for Kurdistan. Kurdish and Arab 
brotherhood was emphasized and telegrams were sent to Council of Sovereignty to 
congratulate the revolutions' success (Edmonds, 1959: 3). However, still, as months 
passed there was no indication of an autonomous Kurdistan or there was no reference to 
the Kurds at all. Qasim had failed to build lasting political alliances as he did not 
understand the political mentality and norms of the Kurds. He based his relations on 
reconciliation with the KDP and Barzani. His system was based on economic patronage 
and shared enemies. Thus the two sides failed to reach an agreement on how much 
power would be given to Kurdistan while preserving the sovereignty of Baghdad (Rubin, 
2007: 355). 
 Things started to sour when Qasim wanted to give an official pardon towards 
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Barzani’s rivals; this step was clearly rejected by Mulla Mustafa Barzani. In order to 
keep the support of Barzani, Popular Resistance Front used aggressive activities against 
Barzani's adversaries. The cooperation between PRF and Barzani disturbed other 
Kurdish tribes and they started to show signs of restlessness. When Qasim realized the 
predicament, he chose to play the tribes against each other. He wanted to undermine the 
tribal power while at the same time bind the Kurds to the state. To do so, he gave arms 
to the Lolani tribe, then to the Zibar, Baradosti and some other tribes. The situation 
escalated in a way that tribal sheikhs traveled to meet with Qasim and requested him to 
stop disruptive actions in Kurdistan. The inter-tribal conflict led to armed conflicts 
between the Kurds that lasted until the 1960s (O'Ballance, 1996: 37-39). 
 Many aghas had feared the new regime since the beginning but their fears 
intensified in 1958 when Qasim told Barzani about his plans for agrarian reform. The 
plan did not seek to destroy landed elites as it would have given them significant 
compensation and continued ownership of major portions of the land. Yet it caused a 
severe chaos between the peasants and the landlord as there emerged significant clashes 
between these two classes. The Agrarian Reform Law shook the foundations of tribal 
authority. Anti-regime aghas feared confiscation of their lands and Qasim’s efforts of 
directing the peasants against them. Barzani's patronage relations with Baghdad 
compounded the damage. They feared the one man rule of an outsider in their areas of 
influence (Rubin, 2007: 360-362). 
 In 1959 an uprising began to emerge in Kirkuk. It started as a leftist rally and the 
situation grew more complicated through inter-tribal disputes of the Kurds and rivalry 
between Turcomans and the Kurds. This resulted in Qasim's distrust of his allies as he 
had depended on the Kurds as well as the communists against the threat he perceived 
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from pan-Arabist group led by Arif. In 1960, when Barzani left for four months to 
USSR, Iraqi government withdrew some of the privileges they had given to the 
Barzanis. The same year, UDPK was declared illegal and some officers were arrested. In 
September reports broke out about a revolt led by Barzani. The government was quick to 
declare it a Kurdish inter-tribal feud, which had lasted for weeks until the government 
stepped in to restore order. In reality it was Barzani's consolidation of power as he 
defeated all of his rivals. He had prepared himself to fully face the threat presented by 
Qasim's regime (Wenner, 1963: 71-72). 
 It was only a matter of time before fighting broke out between the government 
forces and the Kurds. The government suffered setbacks from the Zakho Mountains to 
the Khanaqin area. Lack of military success, made Qasim resorted to air strikes, similar 
to Turkey’s offensive against Kurdish rebellions. The government also made use of 
Jash, which meant little donkey in Kurdish. The Jash were the Kurds recruited by the 
government and they were mainly chosen from the tribes hostile to the Barzanis. They 
remained organized in a tribal manner but their number dwindled as it became unpopular 
to fight against Mulla Mustafa Barzani since he appeared as a strong leader having the 
necessary military means to fight for the Kurdish cause (O'Ballance, 1996: 57). These 
attacks had an unexpected result as they caused the Kurds of different ideologies and 
backgrounds to unite for the rebellion. Soon the revolt turned into a national uprising 
that lasted until the overthrow of Qasim in 1963. Despite this temporary alliance, it 
could be argued that the Kurdish front did not form a coherent unity throughout the 
rebellion. Tribal and personal feuds fueled conflicts among the Kurds in their rebellion 
against Baghdad as well (Edmonds, 1959: 514-515). 
 On 8 February 1963, Iraq witnessed another coup in which Qasim was killed and 
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a military junta in the hands of a pan-Arabist party, known as the Baath Party, took 
power. The coup was led by General Tahir Yahya, who later became the Chief of the 
General Staff. Abdul Salam Arif was brought back as the president. Once again the 
Kurds thought that the new government could solve the Kurdish problem. KDP sent 
Jalal Talabani as its negotiator to discuss the terms for self-government. Both sides were 
unable to find the means to an agreement and cleared the path for an armed conflict. On 
10 June 1963, an offensive started by Baghdad. The troops moved to fight in three 
different regions: (1) against the towns and villages of Barzani tribe, (2) against the 
power centers of KDP and (3) against the limestone caves of Chami Razan, where the 
rebels found a natural stronghold. Arif demanded that Kurds should lay down their arms 
and placed a price on Mulla Mustafa Barzani's head. Curfews were ordered in Arbil, 
Kirkuk and Sulaymaniah. Intense fighting continued with no sides winning a decisive 
victory. On 30 July 1963, the government restarted negotiations but the Kurds did not 
agree to centralization. It was in 1964, when Arif announced a ceasefire and stated that 
the government would recognize Kurdish rights in a provisional constitution based on 
decentralization. Kurds would receive amnesty and the Jash would be dispatched. 
Barzani agreed to the terms (O'Ballance, 1996: 64-70). 
 The 1964 constitution did not uphold the Kurdish expectations as it did not 
specifically recognize the Kurds as an autonomous community. The government had no 
intention of granting autonomy; the constitution emphasized the unity of Iraq and 
stressed the aim of Arab unity. Complications rose on the Kurdish side as well, since the 
ceasefire agreement had not been consulted by the politburo of the KDP led by Jalal 
Talabani and Ibrahim Ahmad. Barzani used his authority to summon his own party 
congress, which endorsed the ceasefire. He then expelled the dissident voices. 
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Meanwhile it appeared that Arif was redeploying the Iraqi army under the cover of 
negotiations. Barzani rejected the disbandment of his own forces in case of a possible 
clash with the army. Soon, armed confrontations started once again. These events 
demonstrated that if the president of Iraq seriously pursued pan-Arabist unification 
schemes with Egypt, a high price would have to be paid by the Kurds, which was the 
denouncement of an autonomous Kurdistan. The period between 1964 and 1965 proved 
that point. Pan-Arabist policies led to serious fighting and managed to bring Barzani 
together with the expelled politburo. To change the direction of the politics, Arif 
appointed a new Prime Minister Abdul Rahman al-Bazzaz, a lawyer and an academic 
with conservative inclinations (Tripp, 2007: 172-174).  
However, soon after this appointment, in 1966, Abdul Salam Arif died in a 
helicopter crash. The dependency and weakness of all who relied on personal patronage 
became apparent. Arif's brother Abdul Rahman Arif was elected president and al-Bazzaz 
was reappointed as prime minister. The new cabinet was able to reduce the hard 
militarist factions, allowing a new ceasefire with Barzani. Al-Bazzaz declared his 
willingness to recognize Kurdish nationalism. At the end of June 1966, the prime 
minister publicly offered the Kurds a twelve-point program. The program recognized the 
bi-national character of Iraq and the Kurds’ separate culture and linguistic identity. It 
promised full representation and self-government. Although it did not meet every 
Kurdish demand, it certainly offered more than any previous regime. Barzani accepted 
the program as a foundation for a settlement. On the other hand, the program disturbed  
many Kurds as well. Some opposed the declaration because it seemed to emerge out of a 
military defeat, damaging the military prestige. Others were against any concessions to 
Kurdish self-determination. Hostility quickly built up and the president felt the need to 
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replace al-Bazzaz. The negotiations entered a standstill as war broke off with Israel in 
the Middle East. Simply, Kurdistan was put on hold (Tripp, 2007: 176-182). 
 President Arif was overthrown in July 1968 and the second Baath government 
came to power. The new government issued a directive regarding the Kurdish problem 
in March 1970. Saddam Hussein represented the Baghdad government and Mahmud 
Osman negotiated on the behalf of KDP. It had taken twenty months of severe fighting, 
but at the end, the Iraqi government issued the document known as the March 
Manifesto. This was the largest program Iraq had issued to accommodate Kurdish 
national desires. Accordingly, in Iraqi Kurdistan, Kurdish would be recognized as the 
official language, a Kurdish vice-president would be appointed, self-government would 
be granted, national administrative units were to be established in the Kurdistan and the 
constitutional recognition of equality and bi-national character in Iraq would be 
finalized. Other provisions included the establishment of a Kurdish academy of letters 
and a Kurdish university in Sulaymaniya. In return it was asked of the Kurds to 
relinquish heavy arms to the government and end their broadcasting station. Although 
some action was taken to realize the plan, problems hindered the full realization the 
Kurdish autonomy. The question of appointing a Kurdish vice-president could not be 
settled as the Kurds wanted the nomination of KDP's Secretary, Habib Mohammad 
Karim and Iraqi government found him unacceptable due to his Iranian background. 
Another name could not be settled on. A more significant problem emerged in terms of 
the determination of the geographical area to be placed under Kurdistan's self-rule. 
Barzani was insisting on Kirkuk, a major oil producing area and the government was 
pressing for areas with proven Kurdish majority. Kirkuk had lost most of its Kurdish 
population due to the forced relocation of the Kurds in previous years (Entessar, 1984: 
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918-919). 
 The previous agreements on Kurdish autonomy in Iraq were not fulfilled because 
of the lack of goodwill of the Iraqi government as well as because of political instability 
and the weakness of state apparatus. 1970 agreement was different but it could not be 
implemented as well due to the mentioned difficulties. Iranian and CIA agents in contact 
with Barzani encouraged him to take military action and supplied him with weapons. 
Later Barzani himself would state that had he not had the American support, he would 
never have indulged in resistance (Ghareeb, 1982: 141). Barzani began raising his 
demands and Baghdad began reneging on the terms of the agreement as well as 
launching attempts to assassinate Mulla Mustafa Barzani. In 1972, Soviet–Iraqi 
Friendship and Cooperation Treaty was signed and Baghdad had begun receiving arms 
in preparation for war with the Kurds. In 1974, Saddam Hussein gave Barzani two 
weeks to accept Law for Autonomy in Iraq. The law seemed reasonable as it purported 
to establish Kurdistan as a self-governing region and it explained in detail the areas 
administration setup. The territories would be defined according to the 1970 agreement 
and the 1957 consensus records. It fell short of Barzani's demands due the absence of 
Kirkuk and more administration of central government control (Yıldız, 2007: 20). Soon 
a large scale war broke out. Soviet assistance and the huge income from petroleum 
companies had strengthened the Iraqi army. It appeared as though Kurds could no longer 
pose a threat to the government. Unlike the Kurds in Turkey, Iraqi Kurds were not 
accustomed to guerrilla warfare. The government could easily identify Kurdish 
communities and their tribes. Therefore it was important for the rebels to defend their 
land. By the end of 1974, Kurdish forces were forced back to the Iranian, Turkish and 
Syrian borders. The Kurdish side continued to be divided internally, again crippling the 
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Kurdish chances for victory. Many tribes were recruited to fight together with the Iraqi 
army and non-tribal peasantry and urban workers remained passive (Romano, 2006: 
193-195). 
 During this conflict, the idea of forming an autonomous Kurdistan faced major 
difficulties due to the presence of tribal leadership in the nationalist movement. The 
leadership did not see democracy as a solution, both the Iraqi and Kurdish sides chose to 
use arms instead trusting the state institutions and negotiating through state organs. KDP 
has chosen to lead its agendas through undemocratic methods. The other problematic 
aspect of the tribal leadership was violence and the factions among tribes. Between 1966 
and 1970 the Kurdish community witnessed the most politically pronounced divisions. 
In 1966 Talabani and his followers split from Mullah Mustafa Barzani’s forces, creating 
their own political movement. Talabani forces chose to cooperate with the government 
as Baghdad provided them with arms, money, daily newspapers, communication 
equipment, buildings, and vehicles. With the agreement in 1970, Talabani forces 
regrouped with Barzani. Although Barzani appeared as the sole leader of the Kurds once 
again, not all joined him in the insurgency of 1974. Some, including Barzani's eldest son 
Ubeydullah, chose to side with the government and accept the Autonomy Law for the 
Kurdish region (Dawoody, 2006: 488-489). 
 The Algiers Agreement of 1975 signed between the Shah and Saddam Hussein, 
shocked the Kurds. Iraq left a contested border demarcation on the Shatt al-Arab 
waterway and in return Iran agreed to stop supplying arms to the Kurdish rebellions. 
CIA left the region (Romano, 2006: 196). The KDP entered a time of disarray as 
Mustafa Mulla Barzani's reputation took a hard blow. A split occurred in the KDP ranks 
as those ousted by Barzani accused him of betraying the Kurdish cause. These dissidents 
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led by Jalal Talabani formed the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) (Entessar, 1984: 
992). Barzani's sons Idris and Massoud Barzani took it upon themselves to reconstruct a 
wing of KDP, Kurdish Democratic Party-Provisional Leadership. The Iraqi Kurdish 
fighters known as the Peshmerga regrouped themselves under this wing (Entessar, 1989: 
91). 
 All in all, after 1945, it appeared as though all of the Kurdish movement in Iraq 
had lost hope for obtaining autonomy from the Iraqi government. The 1958 Revolution 
seemed to open a new page for the Kurdish question. With the return of Barzani from 
USSR, a demand for autonomy emerged among the Kurdish community. Soon, it 
seemed as though an alliance had formed between Qasim and the Kurds. In reality 
Qasim had no true intentions of granting self-government to the Kurds. He wanted a 
centralized government and believed the Kurdish demands for autonomy would 
deterritorialize Iraq in a way to end territorial unity. Qasim played the Kurdish tribes 
against each other breaking their unity and weakening their opposition. The next coup 
lifted up the Kurdish hopes once again. However, the rise of the Baath Party meant the 
rise of pan-Arabism. Pan-Arabism was a serious concern to Iraqi Kurdistan because if 
the Arabic states reterritorialized as one political entity, then the Iraqi Kurdistan would 
be reduced to a small minority among a huge Arab population. Pan-Arabism’s 
challenges to the Iraqi state proved to be more than its profits. As Baghdad made a 
switch to the administration of nation-state policies, the question of Kurdistan continued 
to be an unresolvable problem. As the Baath Party tried to stress Iraqi unity, Kurds 
emphasized their difference as an ethnic group by constantly referring to and using the 
word “Kurdistan”. The use of the term “Kurdistan” had roused perceptions of secession 
and awakened fears of Iraq's deterritorialization. Several programs were put forth and 
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many ceasefires were made but none until the March Manifesto had made the sides 
content. When the Manifesto appeared it seemed as if the Kurds could finally establish 
their self-governed Kurdistan.  The negotiations highlighted the complications of the 
geopolitically important territories. Both sides did not want to give up Kirkuk and 
Mosul. Overall the fight for reterritorialization of Iraq by the Kurds resulted in bloody 
encounters that lasted for years. The coming years under Saddam Hussein’s presidency 
would prove much more devastating and he would choose to suppress the demands for 
an autonomous Iraqi Kurdistan forcefully. 
 
4.3.b. Saddam Hussein and Increasing Pressure over the Kurds: 
 Saddam Hussein had always been a trusted and an active member of the Baath 
Party but the Algiers Agreement had further solidified Saddam's position. General 
Ahmad Hassan al-Bakr who took Abdul Rahman Arif's place after the coup, stepped 
down as president and Saddam Hussein took his position in July 1979.  Saddam's power 
stemmed from his influence on the military and the civilian intelligence services. He 
managed balancing different elements through financial incentives, patronage networks, 
and tribal loyalties (Fattah and Caso, 2009: 220). Saddam's perception of Iraq was 
similar to “a huge ship for all Iraqis, Arabs, and Kurds” and he argued that if any one 
tried “to drill a hole in this ship, lest it fall apart and sink”. He believed in three threats 
of disintegration. These were the schemes for an autonomous Kurdistan, the Islamic 
revolution in Iran and the Shia upraising after the Gulf War (Bengio, 1998: 122). 
 During the 1970s, Iran was the most powerful state in the Gulf. Iraq had a hostile 
relation with Tehran but was in no position to defy Iran's power. During this time, Iran 
put constant pressure on Iraq by provoking the Kurdish population within its borders. 
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The only way Iraq was able to persuade the Shah to stop his anti-Iraqi policies was 
through ceding half of the Shatt al-Arab. After the revolution in Iran, Ayatollah 
Khomeini was determined to expand his influence over the Islamic world starting with 
the state of Iraq. He pushed the Kurdish and Shiite population to topple Saddam. Border 
clashes between the two states became frequent. Saddam saw Khomeini to be weak and 
isolated after the revolution and perceived it to be good time to obtain a military victory 
(Mearsheimer and Walt, 2003: 52-53). 
 When the Iran-Iraq war broke out in 1980, Saddam Hussein was quick to play 
the Kurdish card. Iraqi government established a supply route to the Iranian Kurds who 
were fighting the Pasdaran near the Kurdish cities of Qasr-e Shirin and Nowdesheh. 
With the received assistance, Ghassemlou launched a three month offensive against the 
Pasdaran and achieved relative success. When Iraqi forces found themselves in forced 
retreat, the Iranian Kurds were also affected. It was not long before Ghassemlou realized 
that creating a “liberated Kurdish zone” was almost impossible and the Iranian Kurds 
had been used as an instrument against Iran in the war. On the other hand, Iran had 
begun to see the Iraqi Kurds as a destabilizing factor against Baghdad but they proved to 
follow a better strategy. Islamic Republic acquired the support of Massoud and Idris 
Barzani. In the final two years of the war Iran was also able to get the PUK to work with 
itself. The Kurdish forces succeeded in keeping Iraqi forces at bay. As Turkey witnessed 
the achievements of Kurdish forces, it started to fear a spillover effect on its own 
Kurdish populated areas. Ankara chose to dispatch expeditionary forces to fight off the 
Iraqi Peshmergas. Seeing its allies under attack, Iran accused Turkey of helping Iraq. 
Turkey responded by declaring its intentions of only protecting the Kirkuk-Iskenderun 
pipeline that supplied one-third of its oil needs (Entessar, 1989: 95-96). 
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 During the Iran-Iraq war Saddam feared losing control of Kurdish areas 
especially the oil producing lands. The Kurdish defiance had infuriated Saddam; soon he 
announced the government’s plan to crush the Kurds, with a campaign called the Anfal 
(Pringle, 2009: 29).The word literally means the spoils of war and derives from the 
Koran, from the eighth sura (verse) that deals with the battle of Badr (Bengio, 1998: 
189). Saddam issued decree no. 160 of the Revolutionary Command Council on 29 
March 1987 and appointed his cousin Ali Hassan al-Majid to command the Northern 
Bureau of the Baath. This basically gave al-Majid uncontrolled power in the Kurdistan 
region of Iraq, as his orders were to be carried with no question. During the Anfal 
campaign, Baath forces charged and razed villages to make sure that the Peshmerga 
could not interfere. Al-Majid made use of chemical weapons in Kurdish villages. There 
were mass shootings, executions and torture. After a chemical attack by airplanes or 
helicopters,the villages were looted by the army and then by the Jash. The Anfal 
campaign continued until 1989 and it is believed that two-thirds of the Kurdish 
population left the region during the operations. Around 60,000 refugees sought refuge 
from Turkey and 100,000 refugees sought refuge from Iran (Yıldız, 2007: 25-33).  
 The terror that Saddam Hussein imposed effectively pacified Kurdistan. The 
Kurdish political parties renounced armed struggles and decided to seek political and 
diplomatic efforts abroad. The evacuation of villages and the resettlement of the Kurds 
continued until 1990. When the Gulf War against Kuwait started the same year, the 
government threatened the Kurds to face something much worse than Halabja, where 
thousands of Kurds had been killed by chemical weapons. The Kurds knew that Saddam 
was not bluffing and they refrained from military activities (Van Bruinessen, 1992:43-
44).  
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 Saddam Hussein prevented the emergence of Kurdistan as an autonomous 
geopolitical entity. He used all means to keep Iraqi territorial integrity intact. The 
struggle for creating an autonomous Kurdistan almost came to a halt after the Anfal 
campaign. However, the Iraqi defeat in the Gulf War of 1990 made Kurds rise for the 
biggest rebellion ever. There was one problem in the Kurdish timing; the Iraqi army had 
not lost its military power during the Gulf War. As the Kurds experienced a worse defeat 
in the hands of Saddam, more than two million Kurds left their homes. Iraqi president 
had almost succeeded in deterritorializing Kurdistan by exporting its Kurdish population 
across borders into Turkey and Iraq. The trans boundary character of the Kurdish 
problem became apparent once again as Iraqi neighbors faced the economic burden and 
the destabilizing effect of such huge numbers of refugees (Van Bruinessen, 1992: 44). 
 
4.3.c. Ideological and Civilizational Geopolitical Discourse in Iraq 
 The traces of ideological and civilizational geopolitical discourses in Iraq had 
also been evident toward the end of the Hashemite regime. On the level of national 
ideology, the monarchy offered Iraqi patriotism and militant pan-Arabism. It was the 
ruling Sunni elite that desired an Arab unity. One of the main reasons was to change the 
Iraqi demographic balance. As years past, idealist teachers spread pan-Arabist teachings 
among schools. Pan-Arabism was regarded with hostility because neither the Shiites nor 
the Kurds wanted to be reduced to small minorities. Arabism was perceived as the 
hegemony of a minority of Sunnis over Kurds, Shiites and non-Muslims. The first 
decade of the republican rule was a conciliatory beginning but as time went on Arab-
Kurdish estrangement deepened. Kurds were alienated and negotiations soon turned into 
armed conflicts. The pattern of armed warfare would turn into a pattern under the Baath 
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regime. When Abdul Salam Arif died and was replaced by Abdul Rahman Arif, the 
Kurds paid heavily for their demands of an autonomous Kurdistan. Urbanization, 
economic development, proper provision of health and education became extremely 
problematic in the Kurdish region. Such problems only increased the tensions between 
the Arab nationalists and the Kurds (Baram, 1991: 5-7). 
 The Baath Part envisioned the political union of all Arab states. The Arabs would 
rise from their ashes to fulfill a worldwide risala khalida (eternal mission) of civilization 
and enlightenment. Very little thought was given to other ethnic communities such as 
the Kurds. It was believed that these different communities shared a common history 
and destiny with the Arabs that it would not be much of problem. However, when the 
Kurdish demands rose it became a persistent complication. In other words, non-Arab 
communities of Iraq were perceived as un-civilized compared to Arabs and Arabization 
was perceived as a civilizing mission over these un-civilized peoples. The other 
principle of the party was hurriyya (freedom), which meant a struggle against the 
Western imperialism and influence in the Middle East. This principle gave pan-Arabism 
its ideological tune and make it close to a socialist discourse; thereby bringing 
ideological geopolitical discourse in. This principle included battling feudalists and 
capitalists. Up until the 1960s, socialism was understood to be a tool to unite different 
classes. After Sixth Pan-Arab Congress in October 1963, Arab socialism adopted 
Marxist terminology and became the official ideology of the Baath Party when it took 
over in Iraq (Baram, 1991: 7-10). 
 Ahmad Hassan Bakr came to power in 1968 and formed the Revolutionary 
Command Council which included Saddam Hussein as a dominant member. The 
communists were becoming concerned about the autocratic nature of the Bakr's 
154 
 
government. Saddam chose to deal with the communists through military means, each 
time further angering them. The guerrilla units of the communists began raids in 
Baghdad and other cities (Couglin, 2005: 78-79). The government found it necessary to 
neutralize the situation with the Communists which had a stronghold on certain 
segments of the population. As a show of its strong desire to relieve Iraq from Western 
hold and to appease the demands of the communists, Iraqi government nationalized its 
pipelines. Despite this pro-socialist move, the Communist Party members were 
continued to be suppressed and forced into an alliance with the government (Fattah and 
Caso, 2009: 209-214). 
 The Communist Party of Iraq had a very weak leadership and could not hold its 
position regarding the Kurdish issue. During the Kurdish revolts of the 1960s, the 
communists found themselves in a conflicting position. Despite their support for 
Kurdish autonomy under the unity of Iraq, the Communist Party condemned the 
rebellion. When the war rose once again between Barzani and the government in 1974, 
the Baath regime forced the Communists to fight the Kurds whom were their allies at the 
time, despite their disapproval (Eppel, 2004: 182). 
 It should be noted that Saddam was given direct authority to deal with the Kurds 
in 1969 because the Baath government was finding it difficult to deal with Shiites, 
Communists and Kurds at the same time. The Soviets, seeking to increase their influence 
over the Gulf, had started to work with Mustafa Barzani. They did not like the treatment 
of Iraqi government against the Communist Party and saw the Kurds as means to 
pressure the regime. Saddam's first reaction was to fight against the Kurds but the Iraqi 
communists supported the Kurdish Peshmerga. The potential of a Kurdish-Communist 
alliance was considered as an ideological threat for Baghdad; however, Saddam Hussein 
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did not refrain to convince the Soviet Union in giving up supporting the Kurds. In other 
words, he followed a very realist foreign policy and downplayed the ideological 
geopolitical discourse. He convinced the Soviets to stop aiding the Kurds by assuring 
that no massacre in Kurdistan would take place. Moscow announced a new autonomy 
plan, which became known as the March Manifesto. Saddam seemed reluctant to stick 
with the plan and tried his best to create obstacles for Barzani. As mentioned above the 
Manifesto could not be implemented (Couglin, 2005: 82-83). 
 In the aftermath of the 1974-75 war, the Iraqi regime moved quickly to 
strengthen its grip on Kurdistan. The regime created a security belt along Iranian and 
Turkish borders that stretched from 5 km to 30 km depending on the topography. This 
meant wrecking of villages and collective resettlement in camps. If any Kurdis group 
tried to return to their homeland, they would immediately be killed by soldiers. Active 
supporters of Barzani and refugees, who failed to return in the period of amnesty, were 
sent to south Iraq, to Diwaniya, Nasiriya and Afak. The government chose to address the 
demographic problems by resettling populations in disputed areas of Khaniqin, Kirkuk, 
Mandali, Shaykhan, Zakhu and Sinjar. The local administration was rearranged to hold 
an Arab majority. Other measures for the Arabization of Iraqi Kurdistan were giving 
financial support to Arabs who took Kurdish wives, encouragement of ethnic 
assimilation, the transfer of Kurdish civil servants, soldiers, and police out of Kurdistan, 
the removal of Kurdish faculty from the University of Kirkuk and the Arabization of 
names in some places (McDowall, 2007: 339). In other words, through these Arabization 
policies, the Kurdish identity was attempted to be suppressed and Iraqi Kurdistan was 
tried to be reterritorialized as an Arab region. 
 The 1980s marked the continuation of harsher Arabization policies under 
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Saddam Hussein. Iraq began to increasingly define itself as an Arab state (Paasche, 
2015: 2116). The Anfal, as mentioned above, was a state led movement against the 
Kurds. The documents obtained after Saddam's fall in 2003 detailed a systematic razing 
of villages, forced expulsions or deportations, large-scale disappearances, targeted 
assassinations, and the torture and mass executions of tens of thousands of Kurds. 
Saddam's decision to start the Anfal campaign was a result of Arabization as well as an 
act of revenge for the aid of the Peshmerga to Iran (Montgomery, 2012: 349). The result 
of the campaign was devastating and settled fear and anger in the hearts of Kurds. It 
froze armed insurgency until the Gulf War, after which the Kurds sensed an opportunity 
to revive Kurdish nationalism once more. 
 To conclude, the Iraqi revolution increased the ties between the new Iraqi regime 
and the Soviet Union and thus this period saw the emergence of an ideological 
geopolitical discourse when the Iraqi communists aligned with the Kurds. However, 
still, the Kurds did not directly become part of the leftist movements as they had in 
Turkey. The Kurds had found their representation under Barzani's leadership and did not 
seek a communist party to speak for themselves. Barzani himself also feared from the 
increasing influence of communists over the Kurds; therefore, instead of openly 
becoming a part of the Communist Party, the Kurdish movement chose to form an 
alliance. However this alliance was problematic considering the weak leadership of the 
Communist Party. When faced with governmental pressure, the Iraqi communists 
resisted against the Kurdistan's autonomy and even fight with the Kurds. Therefore 
ideological geopolitical discourse could not dominate during this period. 
 Pan-Arabism in the Middle East tried to revive a civilizational geopolitical 
discourse and unite the Arab community as one political entity. This proved very 
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problematic in Iraq, which lacked the ethnic and sectarian unity. The minorities such as 
the Kurds were afraid of becoming neglected and oppressed. The Kurds showed their 
concern through constantly emphasizing the term “Kurdistan” and rebelling against the 
government that chose to ignore their demands for self-government. Iraqi attempts for 
assimilation were not as severe as in the case of Turkey nor as loose as in the case of 
Iran until Saddam Hussein’s rule. It was with the rise of Saddam that Arabization 
politics intensified in Iraqi politics. The Anfal was the most destructive campaign led 
against the Kurds but was only a partial implementation of civilizational geopolitical as 
it appeared more as an act of revenge. The harsh politics of this period would only 
strengthen the Kurdish determination for a self-government which would take form after 
the Gulf War. 
 
4.4 Syria and the Kurds: Oppression under Arabization 
 From 1948 onwards, Syria witnessed several coup d’états that made the state 
swing continuously from parliamentary rule to direct military administration. A search 
continued for a way to establish a territorially defined unitary Syrian state compromising 
between different ethnic and sectarian communities. The secular Arab nationalism 
seemed to be the best solution to Syria's mixed population. It had the potential to unite 
religious minorities such as the Alawis, Druzes and Christians but Kurds remained an 
anomaly because most of them were Sunni; but rather than aligning with Sunni Arab 
population they brought their ethnic identity forward (Yıldız, 2005: 31). When great 
political turmoil was experienced between 1957 and 1958, the Syrian foreign minister, 
Salah al-Din Bitar, convinced the ruling elite to work toward unification with Egypt's 
Gamal Abdel Nasser. It was not only the drive for pan-Arabism but the search for 
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protection that led Syria towards this path. When Egypt demanded a fully integrated 
Syria instead of a federal state, the Syrian leaders did not object. A deal was made to 
form United Arab Republic in 1958 but it only lasted until 1961. The aim of Arab unity 
sucked the Baathist Iraq and Syria and Nasserist Egypt in to a very costly political 
adventure. This ended with the failure of unification, meddling of each other's internal 
affairs and a variety of military actions against other Arab states. The Baath regime that 
had come to power in Syria in 1963 promised socioeconomic reforms and development 
projects but it was unable to fulfill any of its founding principles of unity, freedom, or 
socialism (Baram, 1976: 44-48). As of the constitution of 1973, Syria was defined 
explicitly as an Arab state. The Kurds were not recognized as a national or an ethnic 
minority. The Kurdish population was perceived as a threat to Syria's unity and 
sovereignty. The influence and the interests of the of former colonial powers, the 
artificiality of the Syrian borders, foreign influence in domestic affairs, development of 
Arab and Kurdish nationalisms, all contributed to the perception of Kurds as a security 
problem (Montgomery, 2005: 7-8). 
 The departure of the French troops from Syria had started a period of social, 
economic, and political upheaval that would last around two decades. The agricultural 
development affected the Kurds on a socioeconomic level. Particularly in agricultural 
regions of Syria, the Arabs as well as Kurds living in Aleppo, Hama, and Damascus 
obtained rights to claim land in low costs and the betterment of irrigation systems 
enriched the agriculture. The economic development sparked tensions between aghas 
competing for power. Despite the existence of Kurdish landowners, the majority of 
workers in the urban centers were the Kurds, who had settled in the cities. The rural 
exodus and the abuse of landlords opened the way for communism among the urban 
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Kurdish population. A sociological transformation started among the lower class through 
the way of union movements. Urban notables during the 1950s found themselves 
challenged by other social circles that tried hard to cast them out. New elites were able 
to acquire power by first controlling political resources as was the case of Arab 
nationalism or by coups. This fragility of the Syrian system opened the country to 
pressure and intervention from external powers. Thus, the politicians had to rely on 
external developments such as the Arab–Israeli conflict, the pan-Arab or the Kurdish 
and Iraqi revolts, to create alliances with the foreign powers. A debate between Syrian 
nationalists and pan-Arabists was flared by the distrust of the ethnic and the religious 
minorities of the country. Pan-Arabism appeared as a solution to integrate minorities 
into the national Syrian social structure. The Kurds became the scapegoats of Arab 
nationalism. They became to be known as “shu‘ubiyyun” (people who did not allow 
themselves to Arabized). It was not long before Arabs perceived the Kurds as agents of 
foreign powers who wanted to destroy Arabism (Tejel, 2009: 38-41). 
 The elections of 1954 witnessed a great participation by the Syrian peoples. 
Syrian Communist Party, Syrian Popular Party, Baath and the Muslim Brotherhood were 
the four significant political actors representing a new current in the Syrian political 
structure against the conservative parties that held a strong position in the country. A 
strong political debate fired between the political right and the left. For the first time 
ideology prevailed over pragmatism. The freedom of speech and rights were widely 
represented in the parliament after the elections (Tejel, 2009: 47). 
 In the summer of 1957, Kurdish Democratic Party of Syria (KDPS - Partiya 
Demokrat a Kurdistanê li Sûriyê) was created as a left wing alternative to the 
Communist Party. The Communist Party at the time was led by a Kurdish leader, Nur al-
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Din Zaza, but it showed no signs of campaigning for the Kurdish rights. The party was 
perceived as a continuation of Khoybun as most of its members had been part of the 
Khoybun movement. The party worked to better the negative perception of the Kurds 
and tried to ameliorate their rights. Jalal Talabani at the time was living in Syria and he 
forced the party to alter the party's name by switching the word “Kurdish” to 
“Kurdistan”. This was much more provocative title and created unease among the 
members. This word implied a connection to the Greater Kurdistan across the borders of 
Syria and it was not a message the KDPS wanted to send (Sinclair and Kajjo, August 31, 
2011). 
 In 1958, the United Arab Republic was formed together with Egypt. Nasser 
dominated economic, social and political spheres of Syria which increased the Arab 
national sentiment within Syrian borders. The Kurdish social identity and culture was 
threatened by the rising Arabist attitudes. Nasser was quick to launch campaigns against 
the Kurds and the communists. Anti-Kurdish propaganda began by depicting the Kurds 
as traitors and separatists. Kurdish nationalism was presented as having a connection to 
Zionism and Western imperialism. Kurdish officers were quickly removed from their 
military positions. Suppression towards the Kurdish culture began as well. Kurdish 
language and publications were prohibited, Kurdish music was forbidden and recordings 
were confiscated by the government officials. Anyone owning or distributing Kurdish 
publications or recordings together with hundreds of members of the KDPS was 
arrested. The Kurdish uprising in Iraq in 1961 fueled concerns for a similar revolt with 
in Syria. It was also believed that Iraqi Kurds had rebelled with Israeli aid, which 
triggered unease regarding the openness of the Kurdish problem to foreign powers. Soon 
all of these matters led to the recognition of the Kurds as a threat to sovereignty and 
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territorial integrity (Yıldız, 2005: 36-37). 
 After the United Arab Republic had been disintegrated, the new state was 
renamed the Syrian Arab Republic. This particular emphasis on Arabness was a huge 
blow to the Kurdish community as they were waiting for recognition and betterment of 
rights. The importance of the Kurdish regions to Syria derived from their economic and 
strategic value. Some of the Kurdish areas are the most fertile lands in Syria. The 
Kurdish territories are also cut by water making them very influential in the Syrian 
economy. This fact made it especially important to define Kurdish lands as Arab lands. 
The fact that Iran, Iraq and Turkey have Kurdish minorities, made the Kurdish issue a 
tool in interfering in domestic affairs of each other and on the other hand allowed the 
cooperation of allies to work against the establishment of unity under a Greater 
Kurdistan or the gaining of rights for the Kurds (Montgomery, 2005: 9). 
 In August 1962, a consensus was administered. Known as the Consensus of al-
Hasakeh, the government effectively stripped 150,000 Kurds of Syrian citizenship. They 
were named ajanib (foreigners) (Mansour, 2012: 2). The need for this consensus 
emerged from the concern of the government about the number of Kurds that had 
entered Syria from Turkey after the World War II. The authorities also believed that 
some had acquired Syrian citizenship through illegal means. The consensus had aimed to 
differ between those, who had a right to citizenship and those who did not. The 
government officials required one or all of the following documents to decide on the 
status of the Kurds: a Syrian identity card; a family card and land deeds that showed 
ownership and residency before 1945 (Yıldız, 2005: 33). Though, it did not really matter 
whether the Kurds had the proper documents or not. This development left the many 
Kurds deprived of civil rights as they were left stateless and could not travel abroad, 
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complete education, be admitted to state hospitals or own property. Strong 
discrimination appeared and the Kurdish community was pushed into harsh poverty 
(Lowe, 2005: 7). 
 The situation worsened after the coup that took place in 1963. The Baath Party 
came to power and it had been militantly anti-Kurdish since its inception in Syria in the 
mid-1940s. The Baathist land reforms were designed to weaken the Kurds by destroying 
the power of its traditional elite (Gambil, 2004: 2). On 12 November 1963, Lieutenant 
Muhammad Talab al-Hilal published a security report that on how to act against the 
Kurdish issue. Al-Hilal referred to history in order to deny the existence of the Kurds. 
He stated that they neither possessed a civilization, a language nor an ethnic identity. 
Kurdish demands appeared irrelevant within the Arab territories. He called for an 
increase in oppressive policies to erase all signs of Kurdish identity. He also stated that 
there was no difference between the Kurds and the Israelis who were both enemies of 
the state. In his report, there were many contradictions in his findings of a “non-existent 
ethnic group”. The report suggested a dozen articles to depose of the Kurdish problem 
(Tejel, 2009: 60).. The following are the twelve points of al-Hilal's report: 
1. tahjir, or the displacement of Kurds from their lands to the interior; 2. tahjil, or the denial 
of education; 3. extradition, or the handing over of a wanted Kurds to Turkey; 4. the denial 
of employment possibilities; 5. a large-scale anti-Kurdish propaganda campaign; 6. the 
deportation of Kurdish religious ulama who would be replaced by pure Arabs; 7. the 
implementation of a divide-and-rule policy against the Kurds; 8. iskan, or the colonization 
of Kurdish lands by a pure, nationalist Arabs; 9. the militarization of the a northern Arab 
cordon and the deportation of Kurds from this cordon (sharit or hizam) area, replacing them 
with Arabs; 10. the creation of collective farms (mazari jamaiyya) for the new Arab settlers 
who were to be armed and given military training exactly as in the Israeli border colonies; 
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11. the denial of the right to vote or hold office to anyone lacking a knowledge of Arabic; 
12. the denial of Syrian citizenship to any non-Arab wishing to live in the area (Vanly, 
2005: 122-123).  
 Under the cover of socialism and agrarian reforms, a plan known as the Arab 
Cordon based on Hilal's report was put into effect. 140,000 Kurds were planned to be 
replaced by Arabs. The Kurds resisted being resettled. In 1967 the Kurds were informed 
that their lands had been nationalized and the government sent few groups to build 
model farms; but the plan was interrupted by the Arab-Israeli War (Chaliand, 1993: 
200). 
 In 1970, Hafiz al-Essad, a general in the Syrian army, came to power through a 
military coup. He started to reconstruct the political system by extending control over 
the cities and reforming the institutions. This process consolidated an authoritarian 
structure for the control of society by the Baath Party and the mukhabarat (security 
services). The new regime chose to assimilate the Kurds into the Arab society and 
emphasize the Syrian identity of the state (Montgomery, 2005: 8-9). Hafiz al-Essad 
deliberately excluded the Kurds from his reforms who were around twelve percent of the 
country at the time (Phillips, 2012: 68). 
 The true implementation of the Arab Cordon started in 1973. This new cordon 
would be a military cordon created on the Turkish-Syrian and the Iraqi-Syrian border. It 
was planned to be approximately 10–15 kilometers deep and 375 kilometers long. The 
idea was to separate the Syrian Kurds from the Turkish Kurds and force the Kurds in 
these areas to the cities in the interior regions (Yıldız, 2005: 36-37). Bedouin Arabs from 
the Euphrates area were resettled in Kurdish territory. The Kurdish villagers did not 
have possession of their lands but clung to their houses and refused to move. It should be 
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noted that the authorities did not resort to force for resettlement but chose to Arabize the 
names of the areas instead (Vanly, 2005: 124).  The Arab Cordon is a perfect example of 
the government’s reterritorialization efforts within its borders. By deterritorializing the 
settled Kurdish population, the government would play with the number of inhabitants, 
thus changing the demographic structure of the region. This policy would soften the 
Kurdish character of the region and reassure the fears of Damascus. 
 Despite the growing oppression towards the Kurds during the 1960s and 1970s, 
the Kurdish community was unable to organize a resistance or rebellion. This was due to 
the political disunity that almost made any form effective resistance impossible. The 
strength of kinship ties as well as the loyalties to tribes and clans proved to be much 
stronger than a Kurdish national sentiment. Syrian agencies bought off local village 
chiefs and used them against each other as in Turkey and Iraq. Syrian Kurdish political 
activism was also affected by the lack of transversal support. Barzani worked to 
undermine KDPS, which did not accept his leadership. In the 1980s Syrian activists 
received hostile receptions in conferences organized by the Kurdish Diaspora in Europe 
because they were perceived as a threat to the PKK (Gambil, 2004: 2-3). 
 In contrast to the hostile relations among various Kurdish tribes or political 
organizations at home countries, the relationship between a state and Kurdish political 
organizations across the borders of that state was generally cooperative (Kaya, 2012: 
145). For example, the PKK received support from the Syrian government. In 1980, the 
PKK escaped to Bekaa Valley which was Lebanese territory under Syrian control. Bekaa 
Valley turned out to be a settlement for training the PKK members for guerrilla warfare 
and it was a passage for them to enter Northern Iraq. Syrian authorities also hosted 
Öcalan and allowed him to gather new recruits (Özcan, 2006: 89,170).  It should be 
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noted that it was the support of the Syrian government that allowed PKK to train new 
recruits and build camps rather than the support of the Syrian Kurds (Van Bruinessen, 
1999: 3). 
 All in all, the Kurdish movement in Syria can be defined as the weakest of the 
Kurdish movements. It could not establish Kurdish representations, organizations or 
parties strong enough to defend its rights. The Syrian state feared a reterritorialization of 
the Kurdish-populated areas of the country as an autonomous geopolitical entity and the 
transversalization of the Kurdish question increased Syrian governments’ concerns. The 
key difference in Syria was the implementation of the civilizational geopolitical 
discourse. It can be said that the shortcomings of Kurdish organizations allowed 
Damascus to broaden its civilizational discourse, leaving thousands of Kurds deprived of 
civil rights. The Kurd-Arab rivalry seemed to peak in Syria. Pan-Arabist and 
Arabization policies were strongly carried out. The Syrian Kurds chose to keep quiet and 
not attract more attention than which had already been given. The dominance of Kurdish 
tribal and traditional life paralyzed the Kurdish national sentiment, which prevented the 
emergence of Kurdistan as a political entity within Syrian borders. The division among 
Kurdish people together with governmental practice of civilizational geopolitical 
discourse over the Kurds proved to have dire results for the Kurdish population of Syria.  
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CHAPTER V 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This thesis attempted to examine why the region named as “Kurdistan” by 
various actors could not emerge as a geopolitical entity through a critical geopolitical 
approach. It focuses on three types of reasons for the non-emergence of Kurdistan as a 
territorially defined and self-governing region. The first set of reasons are categorized as 
the internal factors which underlines the lack of a single geopolitical discourse among 
the Kurds for clearly defining the borders of the region that hampered the actualization 
of the abstract notion of “Kurdistan”. The second set of reasons is labeled as the external 
factors focusing on the reactions of the territorial states of the region against the 
construction of such an entity disturbing the so-called “territorial integrity” of these 
states. In other words, the governments of the home states perceived the very notion of 
Kurdistan as an existential threat for their territorial integrity and opted for preventing 
any attempt to construct it as a self-governing entity. In order to do so, a civilizational 
and an ideological geopolitical discourse were developed which made the other of the 
Kurdish community either based on a civilized home state vs. uncivilized Kurdish 
community dichotomy or based on an ideologically legit home state vs. ideologically 
threatening Kurdish community dichotomy. Therefore, the discursive foundations of 
home states’ geopolitical outlook served to legitimize the pressure exerted upon the 
Kurds. Finally, the third set of reasons linked internal and external factors in a way to 
argue that there were crosslinks between the home states and various Kurdish political 
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movements fostering several transversal connections at the expense of others. In other 
words, some home states tended to cooperate with the Kurdish political movements of 
the neighboring states to minimize the threat perception that they felt from them, or 
some Kurdish political movements tended to cooperate with neighboring home states to 
undermine the pressure of the home state over themselves. All these factors contributed 
to the lack of a certain unitary definition of “Kurdistan” and to the insufficiency of the 
transversal nature of the Kurdish political movements. 
While the Kurdish political entities had a certain level of autonomy until the late 
nineteenth century in the Ottoman and the Safavid Empires, the centralization attempts 
in both empires resulted in a severe reaction by some Kurdish groups while others 
tended to cooperate with the central government if they were satisfied with the 
protection of their interests by the ruling elite. The end of World War I, on the other 
hand, tremendously altered the conditions and created some opportunities for the 
Kurdish elites claiming for an independent Kurdistan. The Great Powers also 
encouraged the Kurds through the Sevres Treaty, which promised an independent 
Kurdistan in the Middle East. However the regional reterritorialization after World War 
I in the form of territorial states dividing Kurdish people under four states, namely, 
Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria, did not allow an independent and unified Kurdistan to be 
established within the region. The division of the Kurdish community created a 
transversal conflict that raised the security concerns of these four sovereign states and 
resulted in a reactive stance against Kurdish autonomy.  
 The first and perhaps the most influential internal problem hampering the 
emergence of Kurdistan as a unified entity stemmed from the traditional tribal structure 
of the Kurdish community. For centuries, Kurdish people had lived under chiefdoms and 
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other tribal political configurations, mostly in geographically closed areas, such as the 
Zagros Mountains. This geographical aspect shaped their loyalties; the Kurdish culture 
prioritized obedience to a powerful clan leader rather than the general Kurdish nation 
and gave significant political and religious authority to the landlords, chieftains and 
seyyids. The rivalry among the strong pursue of self-interests by such leaders created 
further fragmentation. By the end of the World War I, these factors had crippling 
implications on the establishment of an independent Kurdistan. In sum, the Kurds failed 
to imagine a “Kurdistan” that could incorporate the entire Kurdish peoples into one 
political entity. 
 In addition to these internal factors based on Kurdish identity, the identity of 
newly-established territorial states in the Middle East after the World War I turned out to 
be a significant factor preventing the Kurds to establish an independent Kurdistan. 
Accordingly, the new Turkish Republic managed to integrate the Kurdish nation into the 
state by not recognizing the Kurds as a distinct ethnic identity with the right of self-
government. The first serious reaction against this policy within the country was 
organized by Sheikh Said, whose rebellion occurred in time of conflicting ideologies 
between modernism/secularism vs. traditionalism. Sheikh Said represented the 
traditionalist Kurdish mentality. He revolted against the modernization reforms and the 
centralization acts of the Turkish Republic. The next two revolts in Mt. Ararat and 
Dersim were not much different and desired the preservation of traditional system 
favoring the historical social strata and relative autonomy of the Kurds vis-à-vis the 
central government. In all three uprisings there were a significant number of Kurdish 
tribes fighting against the government, but the government could always find Kurdish 
recruits as well from rival Kurdish tribes. In other words, the government effectively 
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benefited from the segregation among the Kurds and cooperated at least with some of 
the Kurdish notables. 
 In Iran Simko had established himself as a powerful leader among the Iranian 
Kurds. Simko kept control over different tribes through intimidation of power. Although 
Simko used a nationalist discourse and opted for an independent Kurdistan, he sought to 
increase his influence in Iran as well. Reza Shah confronted Simko's troops with a 
modern army that proved to be too strong for the Kurdish forces. Most of Simko's 
followers gave up their support upon his military defeats ; in other words, just like the 
Turkish case, the Kurdish tribes had chosen to be on the side that they perceived to be 
more powerful. The unity of the Kurds fighting for an independent Kurdistan had 
scattered and the national cause was abandoned. As Kurds failed in unification, the 
sovereign states did not. Iran, Turkey and Iraq formed an alliance through the Saadabad 
Pact. These three states had understood the consequences of transversal logistic support 
among the Kurdish tribes and felt threatened by the security issues caused by the desire 
to establish an independent Kurdistan. Thus they sought alliances among themselves to 
effectively enforce their sovereignty.  
 Following Simko’s defeat, the Kurds of Iran, once more gathered by Qazi 
Mohammad established the Mahabad Republic. For the first time in Iran, a Kurdish 
political movement seemed to have succeeded in overcoming tribal relations and 
managed to attract different tribal confederations against a commonly identified enemy, 
namely the central government in Tehran. However, there were still some tribes that 
remained hostile as the Mahabad Republic posed a threat to tribal leaders’ power and 
influence. This geopolitical entity depended on tribal military power to survive as it did 
not have an organized army of its own. This was its main weakness and its major 
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problem in eliminating tribal influence. Iran was quick to bribe Kurdish notables and 
offer state support to the adversaries of the Republic. The Mahabad government was 
inexperienced and poorly-organized as a result of Kurdish tribal affiliations and could 
not resist Iran’s power. It came to an end in 1945 proving, once again, the divisive 
powers of traditional tribalism. 
 In Iraq Sheikh Mahmud had true nationalist ideals and believed that an 
independent Kurdish state could be formed under his authority. However his interest to 
become the king of Kurdistan was met with resistance among the Iraqi Kurds and the 
presence of the British had hindered his rebellion. Sheikh Mahmud's imagining of 
Kurdistan was not that of a transversal entity and similar to Simko's uprising, it aimed 
freedom under one particular sovereign state. His movement was not successful but 
Mulla Mustafa Barzani, who rose as the next prominent Kurdish leader was able to 
awaken the nationalist sentiment within Iraqi borders. Barzani fostered the Kurds for 
independence and used the government's neglect of Kurdish rights for self-government 
to gain sympathy among tribes. He managed to round up a nationalist upraising between 
1943 and 1945. This movement proposed the unification of all Kurds under one 
Kurdistan but Barzani’s intentions proved not to be nationalist but self-interested. In 
reality, Barzani wanted to extend his influence by retaining and if possible enlarging his 
traditional titles. The Iraqi government, just like Turkey and Iran, had noticed the 
fragmentation of tribes and offered a full pardon to those who would abandon the 
Barzani revolt. Baghdad also formed the Jash amongst Barzani's rivals to fight beside 
the government against the rebellion. Barzani's reluctance in giving up his personal 
agenda resulted in his failure and he was forced to leave for USSR. 
 On his return to Iraq in 1958 Mulla Mustafa Barzani tried to pursue autonomy 
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under Iraq but the Kurdish movement had not lost its tribal nature. Abdul Karim Qasim, 
who had overthrown the monarchy via a coup d’état, was willing to play the Kurdish 
chieftains against each other to handicap a Kurdish coalition. This strategy would once 
again prove effective as the opposing tribes began armed conflicts against each other, 
splitting the Kurdish unity.  
 Two other coups had followed Qasim's rule. Each time Baghdad felt weakened 
against the Kurdish movement, it offered armistice and began negotiations to win time. 
The Law of Autonomy offered by Saddam Hussein appeared to be the most reasonable 
offer by Iraq. Barzani's decision to decline this offer was met with harsh criticism within 
the KDP. By 1980, Barzani's influence was weakened and Jalal Talabani had established 
the PUK to represent the Kurdish interests dividing, yet again, the Kurdish resistance. 
 Syria suffered the most from the lack of Kurdish unity within the state as well as 
across the borders. Syrian Kurds could not form parties, organizations or any form of 
powerful resistance in order to defy the suppression of Damascus. The dominance of 
Kurdish tribal and traditional life paralyzed the Kurdish national sentiment, allowing the 
government to impose policies relinquishing the rights of the Kurds. 
 The second obstacle in front of establishing Kurdistan was the sovereign states 
that exercised control over the Kurdish populations. Prior to the proclamation of Turkish 
Republic and during the War of Liberation, Mustafa Kemal chose to cooperate with the 
Kurdish leaders to battle against the foreign powers. The Kurdish chieftains collaborated 
willingly with the Turks as they were promised autonomy under a Turkish regime. 
However, once the deterritorialization of the Ottoman Empire and its reterritorialization 
as the Turkish Republic was recognized in the Lausanne Peace Conference, Ankara 
discarded any mention of Kurdish autonomy. A formation of a self-governed Kurdistan 
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under Turkey's authority was perceived as an obstacle in front of modernization and 
westernization of the country. The secular reforms of the newly established state aimed 
at dissolving the traditional structure of the Ottoman Empire and replacing it with a 
nation state. The construction of such a nation meant Turkification, homogenization of 
the Turkish nation to prevent ethnic separatism. Within this nationalist and secularist 
fervor, Kurdistan as an unnamed geopolitical region and Kurds as a people were 
perceived as backward and uncivilized, meaning that they were incapable of self-
government because of their backward tribal identities and their anti-secular religious 
establishment. The Kurds were referred as Mountain Turks and it was emphasized that 
they had forgotten their true Turkish identities. Deterritorialization of Kurdistan within 
Turkey started with plans of demographic resettlements and replacement of Kurdish 
language with Turkish. 
 The 1950s in Turkey was a period of relative liberation for the Kurds, since the 
Democrat Party governments opted to collaborate with various Kurdish notables if they 
chose to give up any separatist policies. Particularly, the governmental resistance against 
land reforms enhanced this cooperation between the Democrat Party and the Kurdish 
landlords, who wanted not to lose their authority. The 1960 coup, on the other hand, 
provided the tools necessary to voice the Kurdish concerns regarding cultural 
assimilation. The Kurdish intellectuals, who resisted the collaboration between the 
landlords and the government found some representation in the leftist political 
movements. Although the Leftist groups showed sympathy towards the Kurdish 
concerns, they were schooled under the nationalist education system and found it 
difficult to pronounce Kurdish rights. At the time, Ankara perceived a double threat, one 
from the Kurds and one from the Leftist groups. It chose to suppress both groups with 
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vigor. Such actions pushed the Kurds to form their own organizations and radicalized 
their demands. The Kurdish people switched requests of cultural and ethnic recognition 
with radicalized demands of autonomy and independence. After the 1980's PKK 
emerged as a terrorist organization with a Marxist-Leninist manifesto. Its leader 
Abdullah Öcalan used ideological geopolitics to confront the civilizational geopolitics of 
the Turkish state; in other words, he perceived the Kurdish notables as puppets of the 
imperialist regime imposed by the government and resisted the governmental 
understanding of Kurds as an uncivilized people. On the other hand, the government 
began to perceive the Kurdish movement as an ideological threat as well, since the 
Marxist-Leninist nature of the PKK became prevalent. As the PKK chose to use terrorist 
methods as means of obtaining its intentions, Turkey found no other alternative to its 
civilizational discourse until Turgut Özal's presidency. Turgut Özal tried to alter the 
Turkish military rhetoric by at least recognizing the Kurds as a distinct ethnic group 
towards the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s, but his untimely death in 
1993 cut short his legacy. 
 Iran had a more complex ethnic composition compared to Turkey. When Reza 
Shah came to power he tried to construct an Iranian nation but this proved more 
troublesome because of this complex network of different ethnic groups. Regarding the 
Kurds, the Shah chose to deterritorialize powerful Kurdish aghas by enforcing land 
reforms that would impoverish Kurdish landlords. Even under this atmosphere, the 
Kurdish leaders had failed in uniting to protect their rights against the Iranian state but 
they were relatively relieved from governmental pressure with the Reza Shah’s 
abdication of the throne in 1941. The Kurdish leaders had hoped for reconciliation with 
the new Shah but his reign also witnessed unsuccessful Kurdish efforts for taking a 
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unified action.  
 In 1979, the Kurds had become an opposition force against the monarchical 
regime and with the formation of the new Islamic Republic; they had once again hoped 
to obtain autonomy. The Islamic Republic of Ayatollah Khomeini had no place for an 
autonomously governed Kurdistan as the new regime entered a period of constructing 
authority and establishing a government around the Shiite religion. Tehran believed that 
if the Kurds were to be granted with self-autonomy, they would set an example for other 
ethnic and religious minorities, deterritorializing the newly founded regime. When the 
Iran-Iraq war started, the Kurds demanded autonomy in order to fight against Iraq. Such 
an ultimatum turned the Kurds into traitors in the eyes of the regime. Iran did not refrain 
from fighting the Kurds and the Iraqi forces in two different fronts.  
 Iraq formed its own version civilizational geopolitics under the influence of the 
pan-Arabic ideals. The estrangement of Kurds had started with Qasim but took a 
different turn with the Baath influence. The Kurds feared a pan-Arab reterritorialization 
as a single political entity, which would reduce Kurdish population to a small minority 
among a huge Arab population. As pan-Arabist ideals proved too challenging to the 
Iraqi regime, Baghdad chose to make a shift towards a nation-state administration. Baath 
Party tried to stress Iraqi unity; meanwhile the Kurds emphasized their difference as an 
ethnic group by constantly referring to and using the word Kurdistan. The failed 
negotiations for autonomy turned the Iraqi Kurdistan into an unresolvable problem 
within Iraqi borders.  
 The strongest oppression over the Kurds in Iraq came with Saddam Hussein's 
presidency. Saddam wanted a regionally strong and a united Iraq. He was willing to use 
force if necessary to accomplish territorial leadership. Sensing a weakness in 
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Khomeini’s attempts for creating a new regime in Iran, Saddam launched an offensive 
attack to Iran. He was quick to play the Kurdish card, but seeing the Peshmerga fight 
back effectively against himself with Iranian assistance, Saddam’s policy collapsed. 
Towards the end of the war Saddam sought revenge against the Iraqi Kurdish population 
by launching the Anfal campaigns that resulted in death of thousands of Kurds. The 
Anfal operations also silenced the Kurdish demands for autonomy until the end of the 
Gulf War. 
 Syria was perhaps the most insecure state of the four. It feared external regional 
powers as well its own Kurdish population. The Kurdish rebellions across its borders 
only added to its worries of the emergence of an independent Kurdistan. To guarantee 
preservation of Syrian territorial integrity, the government chose to impose pan-Arabist 
policies under civilizational geopolitics perceiving the Kurds as uncivilized people and 
denying any right to self-government for them. Meanwhile, the Syrian Kurds could not 
form representations, organizations or parties strong enough to defend its rights as in 
Turkey, Iran or Iraq. They feared drawing more negative attention to Kurdish ethnicity 
through such organs and they had no interests in getting mixed up in transversal 
Kurdistan conflicts. This fact strengthened Syria's hand in imposing civilizational 
geopolitics as Arab-Kurd rivalry reached its peak within the country. In 1963, 
Lieutenant Muhammad Talab al-Hilal published a security report about the Kurdish 
population. He depicted the Kurds as the enemy of the state and requested further 
oppression under twelve points. The report led to the implementation of the Consensus 
of al-Hasakeh that effectively stripped 150,000 Kurds of Syrian citizenship, naming 
them foreigners. The Arab Cordon also emerged as a result of this report and it aimed to 
reterritorialize the Kurds by resettling the Arab people close to the Turkish and Iraqi 
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border and cutting the ties of the Syrian Kurds with the other Kurdish communities. 
 The sovereign states chose to not only play the Kurdish tribes within their 
boundaries against their rivals, but also armed Kurds across borders to undermine 
Kurdish opposition. Reza Mohammad Shah gave support to Barzani while trying to 
suppress its own Kurdish communities. Barzani's assistance to the Shah hindered the 
Kurdish movement in Iran and collapsed the belief in a united Greater Kurdistan. In the 
Iran-Iraq war both countries endorsed each other’s rival Kurdish population. As the Iraqi 
Peshmerga showed success, Turkey got involved dispatching expeditionary forces in 
fear of a spillover effect amongst the Turkish Kurds. In sum, the transversal character of 
the Kurdish conflict was used to break apart Kurdish unity. 
 In resisting the demands of the Kurds, the home states opted for a civilizational 
geopolitical discourse arguing for non-competence of the Kurds for self-governance 
because of their archaic, non-modern and uncivilized nature. This discourse survived not 
only the pre-Cold War period, but also during the Cold War as well. However, during 
the Cold War, alongside the civilizational geopolitics, ideological geopolitics played a 
significant role within the region. In Turkey it was through the leftist political 
movements that the Kurds tried to obtain cultural and ethnic recognition. TİP voiced its 
concern of the Kurdish issue but it was not willing to make Kurdistan a top priority. TİP 
believed that once a revolution would take place all the ethnic problems would naturally 
be solved. This led the Kurds to create their own organizations after leaving the Turkish-
formed organizations but most of the Kurdish political activists continued to remain 
ideologically Marxist-Leninist. It should be noted that only in Turkey the Kurds were 
considered as a serious ideological threat in addition to their perception as a nationalist 
security threat. The government recognized the Kurds as part of the communist danger 
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and legitimized the military operations against the leftist Kurdish organizations through 
an ideological discourse. Iran and Iraq did not perceive the Kurdish movement as a 
communist threat as strong as Turkey did. The Soviet support towards Barzani and KDP 
largely remained political instead of ideological and there was no efficient leftist 
political movement among the Iraqi Kurds. Barzani's tribal self-interest was in contrast 
with the leftist political movements criticizing these tribal interests. The traditional 
feudal system, which was not much altered by Barzani left no room for a leftist political 
movement in Iraq. In Iran however, Marxist-Leninist ideology was far more important. 
The Kurds had formed Komala that presented an ideological clash with Tehran. Komala 
had the support of the Soviet Union, but their attempts for an independent Kurdistan 
were even too radical for the USSR. Komala was transformed into KDPI in order to 
keep the Kurdish demands in check. KDPI had to find a way of incorporating the tribal 
leaders to pursue autonomy for Kurdistan, thus it had to comprise some of its radical 
rhetoric. KDPI collaborated with Tudeh, which was a strong communist movement in 
Iran; however the central government effectively prevented this collaboration. In Syria, 
Kurds did not cooperate with leftist organizations and the governmental discourse 
remained strictly civilizational. Overall Iran, Iraq and Turkey developed ideological 
geopolitical discourses during the Cold War; however, except for Turkey, Iraqi and 
Iranian responses to the Kurdish political movements as an ideological threat remained 
limited. 
 In conclusion, the period between 1919 and 1990 witnessed a struggle for the 
establishment of a Kurdistan as a geopolitical entity. However, from a critical 
geopolitical perspective, such a geopolitical entity had never existed. The reason for 
non-emergence of Kurdistan had both domestic dimensions stemmed from tribal 
178 
 
politics’ superiority over modern nationalist political movements as well as lack of unity 
among the Kurds in defining where really the Kurdistan is. The insufficiency of 
transversal cooperation among the Kurds of different states was another reason of 
failure. The home states’ policies regarding the Kurds were equally effective in 
preventing the emergence of Kurdistan. The high sensitivity of the home states about 
territorial integrity forced them to resist any kind of separatist activity. In doing that, 
they either benefited from internal division of the Kurds by aligning a group of Kurds 
against the others, or they tended to produce civilizational, and to a lesser degree, 
ideological geopolitical discourses to legitimize their denial of self-government to the 
Kurds. Although there was limited cooperation among these states as in the case of the 
Saadabad Pact, generally, the states preferred to use the Kurdish groups in the rival 
states to undermine their power while the Kurdish groups sometimes use the 
governments of rival states to undermine the power of the home state. All in all, 
considering these internal and external factors, and the factors combining these two, it 
could be argued that an independent Kurdistan turned out to be a geopolitical abstraction 
instead of a concrete construction. 
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1919-1950 Turkey Iran Iraq Syria 
Type of 
Geopolitical 
Discourse 
Civilizational Civilizational Civilizational Under the French 
Mandate 
 
 
 
 
Actions of 
Governments 
Sun Language Thesis 
 
Turkish History Thesis 
 
Declaration of the 
Kurds as Mountain 
Turks 
 
Settlement Plans 
 
Turkish Nationalist 
Education 
 
Construction of an 
Iranian identity 
 
Settlement Plans 
Under the British 
influence Kurdistan is 
neglected 
n/a 
 
 
Actions of 
the Kurdish 
Peoples 
Sheyh Said Rebellion 
 
Mt. Ararat Rebellion 
 
Dersim 
Ismail Agha Simko 
upraising 
 
Formation of Komala 
JK, KDPI 
 
Mahabad Republic 
Early Political 
Formations 
 
Upraising of Sheikh 
Mahmud 
 
Upraising of Mulla 
Mustafa Barzani 
n/a 
1950-1990     
Type of 
Geopolitical 
Discourse 
Civilizational and 
Ideological 
Civilizational and 
Ideological 
Civilizational and 
Ideological 
Civilizational 
 
 
 
Actions of 
the 
Governments 
Perception of the Kurds 
as a communist threat 
 
Coups and oppression 
by the military 
 
Continuation of 
civilizational 
geopolitical policies 
Muhammad Reza 
Shah’s oppression 
 
Revolution of 1979 
under Ayatollah 
Khomeini 
Baath Party Influence 
and 
Pan-Arabist Ideology 
 
Formation of Jash 
 
Anfal Operations 
 
 
Baath Party 
Influence and 
Pan-Arabist 
Ideology 
 
Al- Hasakeh 
Consensus 
 
Muhammad Talab 
al-Hilal Report 
 
Arab Cordon 
 
 
 Actions of  
the Kurdish 
Peoples 
Revival of Kurdish 
Nationalism 
 
Radicalization of the 
Kurdish demands under 
leftist groups for an 
independent and a self-
governed Kurdistan 
Tudeh working with 
the KDPI 
 
Raise of Sheikh Izzedin 
Hosseini 
 
Demands of Autonomy 
for Kurdistan 
Negotiations for an 
autonomous Kurdistan 
 
PUK separates from 
KDP 
 
No perception of 
Kurdistan 
Table 5.1 A table summarizing the time frame between 1919 and1990 within Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria 
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